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ABSTRACT

GOD’S LAW OR STATE’S LAW:
AUTHORITY AND ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW REFORM IN BAHRAIN
Sandy Russell Jones
Dr. Joseph E. Lowry
This dissertation examines the role of religious authority in the debate over the
codification of family law in Bahrain. It analyzes the grounds upon which three sets of
actors claim authority over family law: religious scholars, women activists, and the
state. While the state already holds the power to determine its laws simply by nature of
its character as an authoritarian regime, religious scholars and women activists
challenge that power by referencing sources of authority outside the state, such as
religious texts and institutions, international human rights treaties, and regional ideals of
justice. Elements of Bahrain’s debate are similar to legal debates in other Muslimmajority countries. However, Bahrain’s demography adds a layer of complexity that is
not present in any other state. Bahrain’s Shii majority is ruled by the Sunni Ᾱl Khalīfa
family. Therefore, the debate regarding the fate of religious law takes on a specifically
political tone. The research involved a combination of ethnography, textual analysis,
and archival research. A multi-disciplinary approach is used which draws upon work in
the fields of religious studies, the history of Islamic law, anthropology, and political
science in order to understand, primarily, the workings of power. For instance, the state
may have the power to enact a family law, but it does not have the legitimacy to do so
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in the eyes of many Bahrainis. For those citizens, religious scholars have legitimate
authority over family law, however, they do not have power. Considering Foucault’s
phrase “where there is power, there is resistance,” as well as its inverse, “where there is
resistance, there is power,” women’s activism is analyzed here as a “diagnostic of
power.” By discovering where and when women activists exert influence reveals
relationships of power between and among the state and non-state actors. While the
family law debate in Bahrain is about many things: women and the family, the role of
sharīʻa in contemporary Muslim society, sectarian relations between a Sunni ruling elite
and its Shii population, it is, at the broadest level, a symbolic referendum on the
authority of the modern nation-state and its relationship to religious authority.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

In a significant departure from Bahrain’s history of allowing sharīʻa court
judges to use independent reasoning to rule on family-related cases, the Sunni-ruled
kingdom passed a codified family law on May 27, 2009. Lawyers, human rights
activists, and women’s NGOs had been calling for such a law since the early 1980’s.
The new law, however, will only apply to the nation’s Sunni population. The ruler had
submitted two separate drafts to the Parliament, one for Sunnis and one for Shiis.
Because members of Parliament rejected the draft applying to Bahrain’s Shiis, the
majority Shii population will remain subject to the old system. While women activists
applaud the passing of the Sunni law, they voice great concern about where this leaves
Shii women. “I have some Shiʻite women who worry that their law will be forgotten,”
said Mariam Al Ruwaie, president of the Bahrain Women’s Union.1 Examples abound
in regional newspapers of individual Shii women in desperate legal situations who will
not be helped by the new law. Some women feel that the situation is now even worse:
“The passing of [the] Sunni family law is a direct act of discrimination," Amal Juma
Abdulla told the press, “We are all Bahraini women and we all have Bahraini families Sunni or Shiʻite…we are all suffering and this move is a total neglect of Shiʻites as
human beings."2 If the Shii community, which by some counts amounts to a healthy
sixty to seventy percent of the population, has as much need for a codified law as the
Sunnis, why would the government not pass a law that applies to both sects?
1
2

Gulf Daily News, May 28, 2009.
Ibid.
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The Kingdom of Bahrain has been struggling with the fate of its sharīʻa courts
for nearly three decades. Having declared its independence in 1971, Bahrain’s Sunni
rulers initially allowed its Sunni and Shii qāḍīs (religious judges) to proceed as they had
done for centuries: to adjudicate family issues such as marriage, divorce and child
custody by referencing Islamic jurisprudence and religious texts. In 1982, a small group
of lawyers and women activists began to call for the reform of the sharīʻa court system.
Citing inconsistencies in rulings, inefficiency, and even corruption, the reformists
argued for the institution of a codified, Western-style law. At first, these calls were
ignored by the then ruler, King ʻῙsā ibn Salmān Ᾱl Khalīfa, whose priorities did not
include addressing social concerns. However, when ʻῙsā’s son Ḥamad was crowned in
1999, activists saw hope for change. Immediately upon taking office, Ḥamad reversed
some of his father’s most oppressive measures and announced a plan for far-reaching
reforms. The women activists were pleased to learn that one of these reforms was the
enactment of a codified family law. While the activists enthusiastically applauded the
king’s initiative, many others opposed it. Those who most strongly opposed the idea of
codification were Shii male religious scholars (ʻulamā’). The Shii ʻulamā’ asserted that
codification is a Western invention, and that the reformers are secularists, aping the
West and threatening Islam.
At first glance, Bahrain’s family law struggle looks like the battles that have
been fought over family law in many other Muslim-majority countries: conservative
rijāl al-dīn (men of religion) defending an institution they have construed as
authentically “Islamic” against modernist, secular, or otherwise Western-influenced
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reformers pushing for change. This characterization is certainly part of the story in
Bahrain. The women and men who began the reform movement borrowed many of their
strategies from activist groups in other countries, within the region and in the West, and
use the language of international human rights. Also, members of the ʻulamā’ blamed
the West for influencing events in Bahrain. However, as Deniz Kandiyoti points out,
“Anti-imperialistic pronouncements about the West are often a thinly disguised
metaphor to articulate disquiet about more proximate causes for disunity.”3 Bahrain has
a complicated history. The simple fact of the nation’s demographic make-up suggests
that sect plays a significant role in the debate. The majority of the more than 100,000
protesters who demonstrated against a proposed family law in 2005 were Shii, and had
been prompted by the Shiis’ largest political organization and the council of Shii
ʻulamā’ to participate. However, not even the intifāḍa (uprising) of the mid-1990’s,
which specifically addressed the Shiis’ political grievances, mobilized the public to the
extent that the family law, which deals only with the Islamic rules regarding marriage,
divorce, and other personal issues, managed to do.
The family law debate is not just about the rights and responsibilities husbands
and wives retain within a marriage or the role of sharīʻa in contemporary society. Nor is
it only about sectarian politics. The family law debate in Bahrain is a symbolic public
referendum on the authority of the modern nation-state and its relationship to religious
authority. In seeking to understand the basis of contemporary, popular calls to restore
the sharīʻa, Wael Hallaq, a major historian of Islamic law, submits that the Muslim
3

Deniz Kandiyoti, “Introduction,” in Women, Islam, and the State, ed. Deniz Kandiyoti, Philadelphia,
P.A.: Temple University Press, 1991, pp. 3-9, p. 8.

4
world is suffering from a severe crisis of authority.4 This crisis, he argues, was created
by the transition from the pre-modern world to the modern nation-state in which the
centralized state appropriated control over aspects of life that, before, were managed by
others in society. This crisis is manifest on many levels: social, ethical, political, and
legal. With regard to legal authority specifically, Hallaq argues that the law was once
the province of a professional legal elite, the Muslim jurists, and that rulers generally
considered themselves subject to that law. The modern state, however, reversed this
principle, and assumed the responsibility to determine what the law is or is not.
Suddenly there were two competing sources of legal authority: the state, and the
religious legal elite, whose authority, while seriously compromised by the erosion of the
traditional systems of religious and legal education, was still sought out by Muslims
who resisted what they saw as the illegitimate authority of the state. Indeed, Hallaq
points out that these two forms of authority were different in kind. Power does not equal
authority, and Hallaq shows how the authority of the jurists was born of their erudition
and piety, and was therefore seen as legitimate, while that of the state was merely
backed by physical force. The modern state, therefore, suffers from a crisis of political
legitimacy, a fact which has imbued modern calls to the return of sharīʻa with a
distinctly political tone.
In Bahrain, the modern state has encountered this crisis on many levels, but the
fact that the sharīʻa courts were left alone by the state until recently saved the state from
confronting the full extent of the crisis in the legal sphere. King Ḥamad’s announcement
4

Wael B. Hallaq, “Juristic authority vs. state power: The legal crises of modern Islam,” Journal of Law
and Religion, Vol. 19, no. 2 (2003-2004), pp. 243-258.

5
in 2003 of his intention to enact a codified family law forced Bahrainis to measure the
king’s authority to apply such a law versus the authority of the qāḍīs over what was, in
theory, a religious matter. Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori suggest that in order to
understand the way in which power works in Muslim societies, or in any society, it is
helpful to use a geopolitical framework which may be defined as “the art and science of
understanding and predicting spatial aspects of the shifts in political power among
groups, particularly states.”5 While geopolitics are most often used to analyze relations
of state power, Eickelman and Piscatori demonstrate that a consideration of various
social actors’ spatial awareness of loyalties, opportunities, and affinities can reveal
networks of authority and can explain those actors’ actions. For Bahrain’s Shii ʻulamā’,
authority over the sharīʻa resides in the religious texts and those who are qualified to
interpret them. The person most qualified to determine laws for the majority of Bahraini
Shiis is Ayatollah ʻAlī al-Sīstānī, a senior Shii cleric who happens to reside outside of
Bahrain. When confronted with King Ḥamad’s initiative, the Shii ʻulamā’ insisted that
any law that would be applied to the Shii population would have to be approved by this
supremely authoritative jurist. Shii religious networks existed long before the Bahraini
state came into being, connecting Shii scholars in Bahrain with those in Jabal ʻᾹmil in
south Lebanon, the shrine cities of Iraq, and the centers of learning in Iran. To demand
that this continuity be maintained did not seem, to Shiis, unreasonable. What did seem
out of place, on the other hand, was the fact of a Sunni and arguably secular state
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Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori, Muslim Politics, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1996, p. 136, citing Demko and Wood, 1994: 3.
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suddenly disrupting that connection and deciding for itself how the Shiis’ religious
matters should be handled.
Bahrain’s women activists are in a different position from the Shii clerics. They
accept the authority of the state over family law, and in fact, invoke the state’s own
definition of its responsibilities toward its citizens in this matter as laid out in the
constitution. However, an analysis of the sources that the activists draw upon in their
demands reveals that they, also, invoke networks of authority that extend beyond the
physical borders of the Bahraini state. In addition to claiming their rights as Bahraini
citizens, the women activists claim their rights, as humans and as women, that are
defined and enumerated in international treaties. They also claim that Muslim women
have rights as Muslims that derive from Islamic texts, the authority of which spans all
space and time, according to Islamic theology. The Middle East, and especially the
Arab world, as an area mainly comprising Muslim-majority states, has developed
regional ideals of justice based on Islamic texts, history and culture. The activists also
refer to these regional Islamic ideals as sources of authority. There is no doubt that the
activists’ approach is in part based on expedience. Their primary concern is to allieviate
the suffering of Bahraini women in crisis. However, they have also consistently
concerned themselves with criticism of the sharīʻa courts. Their claims, that the courts
are inefficient, incompetent, and biased toward men echo those of Westerners who have
been exposed to the workings of Islamic law. As Hallaq has also pointed out, the term
“law” itself is frought with Western cultural and ideological baggage that prevents it
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from accurately representing non-Western systems of law.6 There are definitely some
women in both of the NGOs examined here who would not object to the adoption of an
entirely Western code of family law. However, the recurring theme of the activists’
statements from the early eighties and into the present is a sense of anger and having
been betrayed that they would have to resort to Western forms of law. By studying court
records in Ottoman Syria, Palestine, and Jordan, and the Sudan, Judith Tucker, Amira
Sonbol, Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban and Abdullahi Ibrahim and others have demonstrated
that in the pre-modern period, and in some cases the modern period, the sharīʻa courts
were very much champions of women’s causes.7 Aware of the compassionate, just, and
thoughtful manner in which women were treated by sharīʻa judges in the past, Bahraini
women activists feel betrayed because contemporary Bahraini judges are not living up
to this legacy, and the ideals that they feel Islam stands for. In a television interview
discussed below, activist Ghāda Jamshīr nearly shouts at the host that the men who
claim to speak for Islam have used it for their own selfish purposes, and that this is the
image of Islam people see. “Islam is innocent of this,” she said.8
As for the state, Bahrain’s government is authoritarian. King Ḥamad does not
technically require the permission of either the ʻulamā’ or the women activists to enact
any law he wishes. So, if a codified family law is what the ruler wants, and he has stated
6

Wael B. Hallaq, Sharīʻa: Theory, Practice, Transformations, Cambridge, New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2009, pp. 1-4.
7
See Judith Tucker, In the House of the Law: Gender and Islamic law in Ottoman Syria and Palestine,
Berkeley, C.A.: University of California Press, 1998; Amira Sonbol, Women, the family, and divorce laws
in Islamic history, Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1996; Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban, Islamic law
and society in the Sudan, London, England; Totowa, N.J.: F. Cass, 1987; Abdullahi Ibrahim, Manichaean
Delirium: Decolonizing the Judiciaryand Islamic Renewal in Sudan, 1898-1985, Leiden; Boston: Brill,
2008.
8
Ghāda Jamshīr, Interview on “al-Iḍā’āt,” Al-Arabiyya, December 21, 2005.
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that it is, what can explain the fact that it has not been achieved? Dale Eickelman writes
that while the politics of the state inevitably involve the allocation of resources and the
definition of physical boundaries, political struggles are not just battles over power, but
also struggles over the meaning of symbols. Warning against viewing politics and
religion as separate and independent categories, Eickelman demonstrates the way in
which all societies base cooperative relations on a common set of “ideas about what is
right, just, or religiously ordained.”9 These “background understandings” inform and
frame all social action. For instance, if a ruler wants more than just a military state; if he
wants legitimacy, then he must compete for control over “the interpretation of symbols
and the control of the institutions, formal and informal, that produce and sustain
them.”10
Considerations of religious doctrine, which necessarily changes and evolves, are
only one part of what contributes to the meaning of these symbols and common
understandings. There are also competing interests, and Eickelman and Piscatori argue
that “politics may have as much, if not more, to do with bargaining among several
forces or contending groups as with compulsion,” that it is important also to see
“politics as public negotiation over the rules and discourse that morally bind the
community together.”11 In the case of Bahrain and the issue of the family law, most
obviously, King Ḥamad is confronted with two diametrically opposed groups, the Shii
ʻulamā’ and the women activists. There are several other forces that maintain
9

Dale F. Eickelman, Islam and the languages of modernities, Daedalus, Vol. 129, No. 1, Multiple
Modernities (Winter, 2000), pp. 119-135.
10
Ibid.
11
Eickelman and Piscatori. p. 7.
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significant interests in the outcome of the family law project. The state itself is
comprised of various agencies that are not necessarily in agreement on the issue. The
Parliament, the judiciary, and the Supreme Council for Women are all participants in
the debate and have varying needs and interests. In attempting to act on his family law
initiative, Ḥamad has had to balance the interests of these forces, along with his own,
through negotiation and persuasion.
In some manner, Ḥamad himself is responsible for creating a situation in which
various social forces can exert power. The transformation to a modern society, which
was accomplished in part by British reforms of the early twentieth century such as
centralization, bureaucratization, and the conversion to a market economy created the
conditions for the emergence of a public sphere in which private persons could ideally
participate in critical debate about public issues.12 However, Bahrain’s first modern
ruler, ʻῙsā, instituted a repressive regime in which public political opposition was met
with harsh, and arbitrary, consequences. It was not until ʻῙsā’s successor Ḥamad granted
the freedoms of speech, press and association that Bahraini citizens were allowed fully
to engage in public discussions of state affairs. Once he did so, the genie was out of the
bottle, so to speak. The expectation of democratic political participation, once created,
could not be extinguished. The problem for Ḥamad was that, Shiis being the majority,
an increase in political participation would give the Shiis more power than he was
prepared to offer. When it became clear that the majority of the Shii population opposed
the codified family law, Ḥamad found that he had a powerful political tool to use to
12

Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, trans. Thomas Burger,
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1991.
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leverage the Shiis into a position of acquiescence. When the Shiis began to agitate for
greater political rights, Ḥamad could threaten to pass the family law.
The special character of the family law issue has made it a lightning rod that has
focused the country’s attention on matters that go well beyond marriage and divorce
law. As Bahrain is one of a very few Muslim-majority countries that continues to
maintain a sharīʻa court system, the future of family law has implications for
perceptions of the nation’s Islamic identity, cultural authenticity, moral authority,
and/or progressive nature in the eyes of the world. More importantly, it is in this
moment of reform that relations of power are shifting: relations between the state and
the religious scholars, between the state and its citizens as citizens, and relations
between lay people and the religious scholars. By framing this study in terms of the way
in which each actor claims authority over family law, this dissertation reveals the
fundamental conflict between networks of religious authority and the sovereignty of the
modern nation-state. These actors are in the process of working out the role that
religious authority plays in a contemporary Muslim society. The attendant power
struggles and shifts in power relations are indicative of the kinds of conflicts taking
place throughout the Muslim world. While this study contributes a wealth of empirical
data on a country about which very little is known, in no other Muslim-majority country
does sect play such a significant role in the debate over family law. The effect of
administrative centralization on Islamic religious institutions has been considered by
many scholars. However, the present work addresses this question specifically in a dual-
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sect context in which the sects have historically maintained for the most part separate
judicial institutions.

LITERATURE
It is likely due to its small size that there is so little scholarly literature that
addresses Bahrain. A fair amount of archaeological research has been carried out in the
town of Saar where there exists a field of burial mounds believed to belong to the
ancient civilization of Dilmun. There are isolated works that look at Bahrain’s
indigenous music, folklore, poetry, or natural attributes. Some of this work relates to the
history of Bahrain’s pearling industry, which remained vibrant until the late nineteenth
century. However, the bulk of twentieth century scholarship on Bahrain deals with the
country’s relationship with the West and its strategic value as a British protectorate, its
role as a producer of oil, the location of the base of the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet, or its
role as a rising center for business and finance.
The Bahraini state has produced several works of official history of the
kingdom. These studies offer a version of the country’s history that presents the Ᾱl
Khalīfa as benevolent rulers who established peace on the islands, protected its
inhabitants from foreign threats, and brought economic success.13 Even to a casual
observer, these accounts read as contrived and self-congratulatory. One volume even

13

See ʻAbd Allāh ibn Khālid Ᾱl Khalīfa and ʻAbd al-Mālik Yūsuf al-Ḥamer, eds., Bahrain Through the
Ages, Government of Bahrain, 1983; Shaykha Hayā ʻAlī Ᾱl Khalīfa and Michael Rice, eds., Bahrain
Through the Ages, the Archaeology, London: Kegan Paul International, 1986; ʻAbd Allāh ibn Khālid Ᾱl
Khalīfa and Michael Rice, eds., Bahrain Through the Ages, the History, London: Kegan Paul
International, 1993; Ḥamad bin ʻῙsā Ᾱl Khalīfa, First Light: Modern Bahrain and its heritage, London;
New York: Routledge, 1995.

12
openly states in its introduction that contributors were asked to avoid controversial
topics and not to engage with “seriously contested views on recent political history.”14
Madawi Al Rasheed, a historian of modern Saudi Arabia who has analyzed the
production of official historiography in Saudi Arabia reviewed the volume, calling it,
“an ideological product of a state and ruling elite desperate to search for historical depth
and authenticity.”15
The sum of serious literature that examines Bahrain for its own sake and is
relevant to the current project amounts to a handful of studies, one on pre-modern Shii
legal theory, and the others on shifts in twentieth century political authority. Robert
Gleave’s work, Inevitable Doubt, concerns the debate between what are termed the
Usuli and Akhbari schools of Shii legal thought. In the eighteenth century, Bahrain was
home to the prominent Akhbari scholar, Yūsuf al-Baḥrānī (d. 1186/1772). Gleave
compares al-Baḥrānī’s legal theory to that of Muḥammad Bāqir ibn Muḥammad alBihbihānī (d. 1207/1792), a scholar who many Shiis consider responsible for returning
Usulism to prominence against the Akhbari critiques of the eighteenth century. Of
greatest concern to Gleave is the question of the origin of the Akhbari school. While
other scholars such as Andrew Newman see continuity between the traditionalist
tendencies of Shii scholars in the earliest centuries of Islam, Gleave argues that one
cannot truly speak of an Akhbari school until the time of Muḥammad Amīn al-
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Astarābādī (d. 1033/1623).16 While the question of the origins of the Akhbaris is not
directly germane to the present project, Bahrain’s intellectual heritage is significant in
terms of its legacy for current modes of thinking, especially about law. There is still a
divergence between Akhbari and Usuli thought among Bahrain’s Shii scholars.
Although the divide is much less pronounced than it is reported to have been in the past,
that split cleanly divides the kingdom’s Shii ʻulamā’ on the question of the family law,
a fact of significance that is explored in Chapter Three. In addition to the work of
Gleave and Newman that discusses the role of Yūsuf al-Baḥrānī in Shii thought, there
are some references to Bahrain as a thriving center of Shii legal and religious
scholarship in the pre-modern era. However, no full-length study of this aspect of the
country’s history has been completed.17
Studies of twentieth century Bahrain are for the most part political analyses of
the effects of colonial intervention by the British, and the subsequent processes of statebuilding carried out by the new Ᾱl Khalīfa ruling family after independence was
declared in 1971. After a number of border disputes with other tribal powers in the
Gulf, the modern territory of Bahrain was determined to include the main island on
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which sits the capital of Manama, Muharraq to the northeast, the Hawar islands to the
southeast, and the Umm al-Nasan islands to the northwest. M.G. Rumaihi offers a
breakdown of the Bahraini population, an investigation of the shifts in the domestic
economy from pearling and agriculture to oil and commerce, and an analysis of the role
of the British in early twentieth century domestic affairs, especially the reforms of the
1920’s.18 Rumaihi also looks at the development of the educational system and asserts
that some of its social effects include new roles for women, sectarian unity, and “a
sense of Bahraini identity that is stronger than any class feeling.” While the nationalist
movement of the 1950’s drew together both Sunnis and Shiis, united in their opposition
to colonial interference, the domination of the Ᾱl Khalīfa, and the high rate of
employment of immigrants from South Asia, this unity was simultaneously undermined
by continuous, and sometimes violent, sectarian clashes.19 Despite the strength of the
nationalist causes, it is doubtful that a sense of national identity ever surpassed the
deep-seated divide between the sects. Rumaihi himself points out that this divide was
routinely exploited by the rulers, whose interests were served by ongoing sectarian
strife.
Mahdi Abdalla al-Tajir’s study covers the period of 1920 to 1945, and focuses
on British imperial policy in Bahrain.20 Al-Tajir attributes the success of the
administrative reforms of this period to the pressure exerted from below by the native
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Shii population. As the British records on which al-Tajir relies attest, the native Shiis
supported British reforms because they were aimed at dismantling the feudal system
dominated by the Sunni tribes. The Sunnis of the ruling ʻUtūb alliance, on the other
hand, vehemently opposed these reforms. Emile Nakhleh’s work takes up where alTajir’s leaves off, and focuses on the process of nation-building prior to, during, and
immediately after independence.21 Through a close look at the history of labor unrest,
Nakhleh demonstrates that after independence, the movement for greater political rights
continued unresolved. The work provides the reader with thorough and valuable
empirical data drawn from the Bahraini press and personal interviews.
Fred Lawson’s book is a compact and nuanced analysis of the origins of the
post-independence Bahraini political structure.22 Carefully considering the formation of
political alliances influenced by British involvement, Lawson demonstrates the way in
which the Ᾱl Khalīfa managed their rule by distributing favors and patronage in typical
rentier state fashion, and achieved a delicate balance between competing domestic
forces and various foreign interests. In the course of his analysis, Lawson also addresses
the role of the nationalist movement of the 1950’s. In contrast to Rumaihi, Lawson
perceives the fragmented nature of the movement, which, along with the rapid response
of the Ᾱl Khalīfa to a perceived threat to its sovereignty, eventually leads to its failure.
The only study to consider the role of religious authority in the events that led to
independence and the subsequent establishment of the modern nation-state is Fuad
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Khuri’s Tribe and State in Bahrain.23 Like the authors mentioned above, Khuri is
primarily concerned with explaining how the current political system came into being.
Unlike the other authors, however, Khuri seeks to explain the emergence of the political
order by examining three forms of social organization: tribe, peasantry, and urban
society. Viewing colonial rule and the development of the oil industry as the two major
forces that have affected Bahrain’s development into a modern nation-state, Khuri
analyzes these forces’ effects on social organization, an analysis which in turn reveals
shifts in underlying structures of social and political authority. In comparing the
different forms of social organization, Khuri shows how social organization affects
ideas about religious authority. Demonstrating that the Sunni rulers belong to a tribal
form of social organization, and that meanwhile the native Shii population is organized
according to the village model, Khuri argues that Sunni concepts of religious authority
are quite different from those of the Shiis. The role of the qāḍī in the Sunni community
is compared at length to that of the qāḍī in the Shii community, with special
consideration given to the respective qāḍīs’ access to communal resources such as
waqf24 holdings. Because the qāḍī served dissimilar needs in each community, the effect
of centralization on each community was also very different. Khuri shows that because
the Sunni qāḍīs’ responsibilities were limited to fairly mundane matters, British
attempts to define the office of the qāḍī within a bureaucratic structure changed little in
the Sunni community. On the other hand, limiting the Shii qāḍīs’ responsibilities to
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purely judicial matters created a substantial shift in the authority structure of the Shii
community, as the qāḍī served as a community leader, advisor, and civil administrator,
as well as a judge. While Khuri at times overstates his case, achieving a full
understanding contemporary attitudes toward the state of the sharīʻa courts and toward
the possibility of codification of the family law would not be possible without this
important study.
Bahraini women have been active and visible in national events for half a
century. They have participated in the nationalist movement, protests over the
dissolution of Parliament in 1975, Shii demonstrations of the 1990’s, and the family law
debate. However, almost nothing has been written about them by scholars in Western
languages. Bahrain’s own Munira Fakhro is the only scholar who has completed a fulllength study of women in Bahrain. Women at work in the Gulf looks at women’s
participation in the workforce, obstacles to that participation, and possible solutions to
overcoming those obstacles.25 Another scholar, May Seikaly, published a small number
of articles on women in Bahrain.26 Seikaly examines Bahraini women’s changing
identities as a result of the steady increase in educational opportunities and women’s
increased participation in both the workforce and political protest movements. One
article focuses specifically on women’s involvement in the protests of the mid-1990’s
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and explores the relationship between political radicalization and Islamic revivalism. In
a series of personal interviews with both Sunni and Shii women Islamists of varied ages
and socio-economic backgrounds, opposition to the West was reported most often as the
factor which motivated their activism. Seikaly also argues that the Islamist movement
gave women a sense of authentic identity, status, and worth as guardians of morality
and social values.
To supplement the meager literature that exists on Bahrain, I looked to works
produced in several other fields. My reading was guided by a need to understand the
roles of relevant actors in the family law debate. Those who led the vanguard of
opposition to family law reform were the Shii ʻulamā’. The opposition of the Shii
ʻulamā’ was based in part on the argument that a codified law would remove control
over family law from religious scholars and place it in the hands of elected lawmakers.
These lawmakers, the ʻulamā’ argued, have no authority over religious law since they
have not participated in a specific tradition of education, scholarship, and the
acquisition of piety. To analyze this part of the ʻulamā’’s argument, I have drawn upon
the work of Marilyn Robinson Waldman and Muhammad Qasim Zaman. Waldman
examined contemporary Muslims’ references to the past as efforts to lend authenticity
to current projects, to legitimate themselves as authoritative figures, and as a response
to and strategy for social change.27 The act of piecing together elements of history in
response to current social and political needs is a creative act in which the Islamic
narrative is constructed anew. Waldman writes that, “Traditions can be part of the
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ideology of modernity as well as of the ideology of tradition; and not all things from the
past have to be recognized as tradition, just as not all traditions originated in the premodern past. Furthermore, either ideology can support change.”28 Muhammad Qasim
Zaman examines the role of the ʻulamā’, specifically, in the active creation of Islamic
tradition.29 Zaman’s work, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change,
focuses on British India and Pakistan during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries;
however, it also provides a comparative study on the role of the ʻulamā’ in the
contemporary Muslim world. In analyzing transformations the ʻulamā’ have undergone,
and their growing religious and political activism, Zaman specifically interrogated the
ways in which “perceptions and imaginings of the past shape articulations of identity in
the present.”30
Most helpfully for the present project, Zaman considers the ʻulamā’’s
confrontation with the emergence of the modern nation-state. One of the elements of
modernity that has had a great effect on the role of the ʻulamā’ in society is the
codification of law. Zaman found that there is a relationship between madhhab and the
degree to which Western codified legal systems have been resisted by members of the
ʻulamā’. Where legal scholars are given wide latitude in the ability to perform ijtihād,31
codified systems are usually opposed. On the contrary, schools that require conformity
to the existing legal tradition tend to concede rather easily to the enactment of a codified
law. For instance, in Saudi Arabia where Hanbali scholars are free to interpret the texts
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themselves, codification has been vehemently opposed. In contrast, the Hanafi
ʻulamā’of Pakistan consented to codification without incident. The reason for this,
Zaman argues, is that the act of codifying law is not dissimilar from the method of
deriving rules used by schools such as the Hanafi. Both processes select rules from
already extant sources. According to this premise, ʻulamā’ in Bahrain who follow
madhhabs that allow a high degree of ijtihād (Shii Usulis) would be most likely to
oppose codification, while those who follow madhhabs that encourage taqlīd (Shii
Akhbaris and Sunni Malikis and Shafiʻis) would not. The relationship between ijtihād
and taqlīd is complex and cannot be summed up by this simple equation, nevertheless,
the equation holds for the case of Bahrain.32
On the other side of Bahrain’s debate over family law are the women activists.
The work of Lila Abu-Lughod addresses most fully the relationship between Muslim
women’s activism and structures of power.33 While studies of “unlikely” forms of
resistance, for example by women or subalterns, have provided us with valuable
empirical material and have filled previously blank spaces in our understandings of the
workings of society, Abu-Lughod observes that these studies can fall into the trap of
romanticizing resistance, and seeing all of its forms as indications of the ineffectiveness
of systems of power. It is potentially much more interesting, she argues, to look at
various forms of resistance in terms of power relations, rather than a power binary. She
contemplates Foucault’s phrase “where there is power, there is resistance,” and also, its
32
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inverse: “where there is resistance, there is power.” This latter phrase is especially
illuminating as it opens up the possibility to locate specific points where power is
applied and the methods by which this is accomplished. Bahrain’s women activists use
many different strategies to influence the government’s actions with regard to the
family law. They engage in public debate, they form liaisons with key political figures
as well as respected members of the ʻulamā’. They participate in international forums
on women’s and human rights, and report to the international community on the state of
affairs in Bahrain, a measure that creates pressure on Bahrain’s ruler from the outside.
In all of these actions, Bahraini women are exercising limited amounts of power.
Additionally, the opportunities to do so are always changing. Abu-Lughod views
women’s activism as a diagnostic of power that can also reveal the ways in which
relations of power are historically transformed, especially, by the introduction of
techniques and forms of power that are specific to the modern nation-state. In this way,
one is able to get past the East/West binary by looking instead at the “ways in which
intersecting and often conflicting structures of power work together these days in
communities that are gradually becoming more tied to multiple and often nonlocal
systems.”34
Saba Mahmood, analyzing urban women’s mosque movements in Egypt, is also
concerned with the ways in which women’s activities affect power relations.35
Mahmood argues that it is not only women’s overt resistance to power structures that
34
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can result in shifts in power relations, but also, and at times more importantly, their
performance of “pious” activities that re-inscribe religious norms that can influence
those relations. Mahmood’s work is an important corrective to the tendency to focus
solely on political activities as resistance. Bahraini women activists are examined here
for the role they play in advocating family law reform. Therefore, the types of activities
analyzed are by definition political. However, Mahmood encourages us to consider how
the demonstration of piety within those activities, for instance, justifying an argument
by citing a hadith, or seeking the endorsement of a member of the ʻulamā’, also affects
political outcomes. The result is a more nuanced understanding of the ways in which
power and authority are applied.

METHODS
In a survey on feminist research methods, Shulamit Reinharz and Lynn
Davidman found that feminist research tended to be subject-driven rather than methoddriven, meaning that “feminist research will use any method available and any cluster of
methods needed to answer the questions it set for itself.”36 While the current project is
only feminist in part, it is subject-driven in that its central questions determined the
multiple methods that were used. As I developed my research agenda, the questions that
most immediately begged for an answer could not be categorized as addressing only
one type of issue. Most definitely, these questions were about religion: as a newly36
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formed modern nation-state that defines itself as an Islamic nation, how would the
codification of family law affect Bahrain’s status as such? After centuries of
maintaining a traditional sharīʻa court system under the rule of several different types
of sovereigns, what can account for the desire to change now? Sharīʻa is believed to be
God’s law, and as such has historically been administered by religious scholars and
officials. What factors have made it possible in contemporary Bahrain for laypeople to
engage in debates over this topic? What does their participation in the debate say about
the role of religion in contemporary society? What does it say about the role of women
in Islam?
Questions that emerged in my initial consideration of the topic also involved
law, society, and politics. In their effort to codify the sharīʻa, how would Bahrainis
blend these two different forms of law? How does madhhab affect legal scholars’
perspectives on codification and reform? What is the historical relationship between the
madhhabs in Bahrain, and how does this relationship shape contemporary attitudes, if at
all? And the most nagging question of all for which there did not seem to be an
immediate or obvious answer, what is the relationship between religion and politics in
the modern Muslim-majority nation-state? It was this question that dogged me
throughout the research and writing period, and for which I am still not sure I have a
satisfactory answer. The family law debate is, in the end, a debate about authority;
namely, about who has the authority to grant or deny women’s rights; to preserve,
amend, or discard particular rules of Islamic jurisprudence; to preserve or eschew the
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particularities of each sect; and most broadly, the authority to determine the future of
the role of Islam in society.
The only way to answer these questions and to get at the heart of an issue as
elusive as authority was to look at several different types of sources. My research
involved a combination of formal interviews and ethnography, textual analysis, and
archival research. I resided in Bahrain for a total of twelve months during three separate
visits between 2003 and 2006. During this time I conducted formal interviews with
women activists, human rights activists, religious scholars, judges, lawyers, women
sharīʻa court litigants, and government officials including members of Parliament,
representatives of the Supreme Council for Women, and the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. In addition to formal interviews, I spent time with Bahrainis on a social basis
and participated in various aspects of Bahraini life.
The types of texts I analyzed were many and varied. I looked at current and past
issues of major newspapers. From the women activists, I received copies of petitions to
the Bahraini government as well as to the United Nations, seminar papers from
conferences held on the topic of family law, organizational documents, personal
statements or responses to my or other researchers’ questions, and in one case, a newly
published book on one of the activists’ experiences. The ʻulamā’ that were most
involved in the debate were those who are members of the Shii organization Majlis alIslāmī al-ʻulamā’ī (ʻUlamā’ Islamic Council, hereafter, UIC). The UIC maintains a
website on which the khuṭab of the leading members are archived. The website also
provides articles and statements written by members, press articles relevant to specific
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issues, and information about the organization’s history and goals. There is a large file
on the family law initiative including these many different types of documents as well
as photographs of demonstrations the UIC held to oppose the family law. From sharīʻa
court judges, I received copies of past and current procedural rules, examples of
marriage contracts, and copies of both the Sunni and Shii family law draft proposals.
The Supreme Council for Women (SCW) was generous with their time and materials,
providing me with summaries of the results of their studies on divorce and the public
opinion poll on family law; current and back issues of SCW newsletters; lists of royal
decrees relevant to the SCW; and, most helpfully, promotional materials from the 2005
family law campaign.
To situate the current debate within a historical context, I spent many hours at
Bahrain’s Historical Documents Center, searching for records relevant to the history of
the sharīʻa courts. My search there did not meet with a great deal of success; however, I
did obtain copies of some correspondence between the Ᾱl Khalīfa and the British
agency on the subject of the courts. As it turned out, these same letters were transcribed
in the records of the British India Office. Nevertheless, seeing the documents in their
original form was exciting. The majority of my archival research was done using the
Government of Bahrain records of Britain’s India Office, together with the memoir of
Charles Belgrave, advisor to the ruler during the years 1926 – 1957. I also consulted the
biographical dictionaries of Yūsuf al-Baḥrānī and ʻAlī ibn Ḥasan al-Baḥrānī, which
describe the lives and work of major Bahraini Shii ʻulamā’ of the pre-modern period.
*******************
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In order to make sense of positions held by the ʻulamā’ regarding family law
and the sharīʻa courts, Chapter Two provides an historical sketch of Bahraini legal
institutions. Beginning in the ninth century, the chapter demonstrates that Sunni and
Shii legal institutions have remained, for the most part, separate. The governmentsponsored law would, for the first time, not only standardize the rules to be applied in
the sharīʻa courts, but also give the Sunni rulers control over Shii family law.
Contemporary attitudes of Bahrain’s Shiis toward the government’s family law are
better understood in light of these historical patterns.
The response of the Shii ʻulamā’ to the government’s initiatives to enact a
codified family law are analyzed in Chapter Three. Through examining press
statements, Friday sermons, and political activism, the chapter demonstrates that the
Shii ʻulamā’ claim authority over family law by referencing Islamic texts and tradition.
They also argue that through the enactment of a codified law, the Sunni government
would be one step closer to its alleged goal of eradicating Shiism completely. The
chapter also addresses the religious and legal ideological divergence within the Shii
ʻulamā’ between Usulis and Akhbaris.
Chapter Four examines the two women’s NGOs that have been most active in
advocating a codified family law. These groups argue for greater rights for women
which they believe to emanate from four sources: Islam, the Bahraini constitution,
international human rights treaties of which Bahrain is a signatory, and regional Islamic
and pan-Arab ideals of justice.
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NARRATIVE
Before analyzing each of the main actors in the debate, I would like to provide a
basic narrative of the development of the debate within the last eight years. This can be
used as a general reference, and will help the reader to situate points of analysis within
the context of a timeline of events.
Upon Bahrain’s independence in 1971, adjudication of cases involving family
and personal status issues was left in the hands of the sharīʻa courts. These courts
consisted of a small number of appointed qāḍīs who issued judgments based on
independent consideration of rulings of past jurists or Islamic texts. Prior to the
establishment of the British agency, Sunni qāḍīs were chosen by tribal leaders, and Shii
qāḍīs emerged as authoritative figures sanctioned by the community. When the British
agency began during the early twentieth century to take a more active role in the
domestic affairs of the islands, qāḍīs for both communities began to be appointed by the
Ᾱl Khalīfa. By the time of independence, qāḍīs were salaried employees of a central
government into which the sharīʻa courts had been absorbed. The sources consulted and
the manner in which cases were handled, however, was left to the individual discretion
of the qaḍīs.
In 1982, a small group of lawyers and representatives of NGOs began to discuss
the state of the sharīʻa courts. A couple of these lawyers were women, the first women
to argue cases before the Bahraini courts. This group, headed by Lūlwa al-ʻAwaḍī and a
member of the royal family, Shaykha Maryam Ᾱl Khalīfa, began to speak to the press
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about aspects of the sharīʻa courts that they considered to be flawed. Primarily, the
women contended that the qāḍīs discriminated against women litigants, and that they
did not follow the precepts of Islam. The small group began to petition the ruler to
reform the courts by enacting a codified personal status law, or at the least, to address
some of their concerns. The calls of the group that eventually took the name The
Personal Law Committee were largely ignored by the ruling Emir, ʻῙsā ibn Salmān Ᾱl
Khalīfa.
The PLC continued to work for reform. In 1987 they held a conference titled,
“Perspective on the position of women in the issue of personal status law”. Papers were
delivered by scholars, lawyers, and activists, covering such topics as the effects of
social and economic changes on the family in Bahrain, divorce in Bahrain, the role of
the women’s organizations in advancing women’s rights, and the comparison of the
personal status laws of Arab countries Committee members formed ties with activists in
other countries, and in 1985, some members travelled to Beijing to take part in the
United Nations’ International Decade for Women Convention.
Events of the 1990’s brought the PLC’s advocacy for a personal status law to a
halt. Political repression, social and economic discrimination, and incidents of torture of
political prisoners spurred a Shii intifāḍa (uprising). Demonstrators and government
forces clashed frequently in the streets, and Shii community leaders were exiled.
The crowning of Ḥamad in 1999 heralded an era of new hope for Bahrain.
Ḥamad promised an end to the repression and violence that had wracked the country
under his father’s rule. Within a year, Ḥamad had drafted the National Action Charter, a
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document in which the new administration pledged reforms that would grant citizens
the freedoms they had previously been denied. The charter mapped out a new
government with checks and balances that would create more transparency and
accountability to the Bahraini people. Receiving overwhelming support in a public
referendum on the Charter in February of 2001, the new King began immediately to
implement key reforms. Most significantly, Ḥamad abolished the State Security Law,
the most oppressive tool in his father’s arsenal, which had allowed the government to
arrest and imprison citizens without due course or fair trial.
The improvement of women’s conditions was also featured prominently as a
means to move toward a more progressive society. In 2001, Ḥamad established the
Supreme Council for Women, a government agency charged with assessing women’s
status and proposing actions that would lead to its elevation. The following year, the
ruler formed a committee of legal specialists to draw up a proposal for a codified law to
be applied in the sharīʻa courts. The committee, which included women lawyers and
members of the Supreme Council for Women, initially began to draw up two separate
laws: one for Sunnis and the other for Shiis. However, after realizing that there were
only a small number of issues on which the sects differed, the committee decided to
merge the two drafts into one, unified law that included some separate articles that
applied only to one sect or the other. The completed draft was announced in the press in
September of 2003, an announcement that ignited a firestorm of controversy. The
country’s ʻulamā’ were incensed, and accused the government and the women activists
of being influenced by the West. Members of Parliament engaged in heated debates.
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Primarily at issue was the unified nature of the draft. Many Shiis were concerned that
Shii legal particularities would not be preserved. Shii ʻulamā’ opposed the whole
project of codification, arguing that what they considered to be God’s law had no place
in Parliament.
The issue proved so contentious that the draft was shelved. Additionally, the
Minister of Justice was dismissed and replaced. No explanation was given for these
moves. In the meantime, a new women’s NGO was founded. The Women’s Petition
Committee was founded in 2002 by Ghāda Jamshīr, a member of a prominent Sunni
family who had recently been divorced from her husband. Jamshīr began by petitioning
the king for a codified family law, but it quickly became evident that her approach was
to be much more aggressive than that of the PLC. Jamshīr began to organize
demonstrations in which women who had received what they considered to be unjust
rulings from the sharīʻa courts stood outside the court buildings. The women held signs
on which each woman printed the name of her judge, the case number, and the ruling he
delivered. Bahrainis reacted strongly to the unseemly nature of the demonstrations;
however, the women’s claims struck a chord with the public. Women of both sects
started to contact Jamshīr and to tell her their stories. Within a few years of founding
her organization, Jamshīr had heard from hundreds of women, and had amassed stacks
of court rulings that demonstrated the judges’ lack of training and professionalism, the
courts’ inefficiency, inconsistency in rulings, and the existence of corruption. Jamshīr
told the women’s stories to the press. She described instances of bribery and extortion,
and in one case revealed a taped recording of a judge offering a woman litigant a
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favorable verdict in exchange for sexual favors. Jamshīr also pursued reform through
more official channels. She requested meetings with the Minister of Justice, members of
Parliament, and members of the ʻulamā,’ in which she presented her case for Bahrain’s
adoption of a codified family law. During these meetings, Jamshīr called for the
dismissal of several of the sharīʻa court judges whom she felt had committed the worst
offenses.
Officials were reeling from the media storm Jamshīr had created. She had aired
the country’s dirty laundry in the eyes of the region and the world, and her claims were
difficult to deny. Jamshīr’s identity also prevented her from being silenced. She was
well aware that not many others could get away with what she had done. She admitted,
“You know why I can say the things I say? One, I’m rich. Two, I’m Sunni. Three,
because of who my family is. Nobody can say the things I say.”37 The extent of
Jamshīr’s influence became evident after she publicized the case of Badriyya Rabīʻa, a
mother who lost custody of her children during a particularly ugly divorce. Jamshīr
obtained the written documents relating to Rabīʻa’s case and exposed its details to the
press. Several months later, Ḥamad dismissed six judges from the sharīʻa courts.
Officially, the judges “retired,” however, rumors abounded that they were fired as a
result of Jamshīr’s work.
Despite the fact that women activists and some members of Parliament alike
expressed anger and frustration at the king for stalling the codification project, it was
not the case that Ḥamad had abandoned it. In 2002, he instructed the SCW to carry out a
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study of sharīʻa court cases. The study was completed by four women lawyers chosen
for their expertise in family law. The lawyers examined 306 cases in both the Sunni and
the Shii courts and found that much of what Jamshīr had claimed was in fact an accurate
assessment of the state of affairs in the courts. Approaching the issue from a different
angle, the government formulated a plan to run a national campaign that would educate
the public about the benefits of a codified law and build popular support. In preparation
for the campaign, the Supreme Council for Women commissioned a research firm to
conduct an opinion poll regarding Bahraini’s knowledge of and views on the prospect
of a codified family law. The sampling was not large (1261 individuals), and, opponents
of the law charged, not necessarily representative of the entire public. However, the poll
confirmed what opponents had long been arguing, that any family law that would be
applied in Bahrain must be drawn from the sharīʻa, and not from Western law.
As the results were being compiled, the king was at work on another front. He
formed a second drafting committee. This time, it included only religious scholars and
no women. The new committee also prepared entirely separate drafts each for the Sunni
and the Shii courts. By the time the SCW campaign was launched in November of
2005, the drafts were nearing completion. The SCW campaign was designed to have
three stages. The first stage included a series of public information sessions, the
delivery of public statements of support by prominent national figures, and the
distribution of promotional materials such as flyers, pamphlets, posters, and T-shirts.
Understanding that there were strong associations between codification and the West,
the campaign focused on providing the public assurances that any law passed in Bahrain
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would be drawn from Islamic texts. Members of the ʻulamā’ and judges who were
supportive of codification spoke on behalf of the campaign, pledging that Islam is not
incompatible with codification. The second stage was to involve the assessment of the
results of the first stage, and the third stage would be determined thereafter.
Unfortunately for supporters of the new law, the campaign failed. Days after the
campaign was launched, over 100,000 Bahrainis marched on one of Manama’s main
thoroughfares in opposition to the family law initiative. The demonstrators were mostly
Shii, mobilized by a partnership between the ʻUlamā’ Islamic Council, the council of
leading members of the Shii ʻulamā’, and al-Wifāq, the primary Shii political
organization. A statement issued on the UIC website expressed the Shiis’ rejection of
the government’s project, on the grounds that lawmakers were not religious scholars,
and possessed no authority to handle matters of the sharīʻa. The UIC explained that it
was not the idea of codification itself that they opposed, but the fact that the laws would
be submitted to the Parliament for approval and that in the future, the Parliament may
amend the laws in a way that could violate the sharīʻa. The UIC offered their support
for codification in exchange for the satisfaction of three demands. First, that the laws,
separate for each sect, would be drafted exclusively by sharīʻa scholars; second, that the
constitution would be amended to guarantee that the Shii law would not be passed until
it was approved by the Shii’s highest religious authority, the marjaʻ (who, for the
majority of Bahraini Usuli Shiis was Ayatollah ʻAlī al-Sīstānī; and third, that the law
could not be amended in the future without the marjaʻ’s agreement. Observers were
exceedingly skeptical that the king would meet the UIC’s demands. It was also believed
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that the UIC’s demands were merely a cover for their more urgent goal to acquire
greater political rights through constitutional reform.
In January, 2006, the SCW admitted defeat. SCW Secretary-General Lūlwa alʻAwaḍī explained that the campaign failed to reach the grassroots. The reason for this,
she claimed, was that women in some segments of society are unreachable because of
their dependence on male religious leaders. Despite the failure of the campaign, it
quickly became clear that the government intended to push forward anyway. In January
the press announced that the new drafts were complete, and that the government
intended to submit them to the Parliament for approval before the 2006 elections which
were to take place in November. Speaking to the press, the UIC expressed surprise and
anger that a draft had already been prepared. The Council said it had not been consulted
on the contents of the draft and that the government had hand-picked the Shii scholars
that composed it. Arguing that the draft did not in any way represent their views, they
vowed to prevent it from passing in the Parliament. In the spring of 2006, president of
the UIC ʻῙsā Qāsim invited all Shii members of Parliament to a meeting to discuss the
family law draft. Qāsim’s goal was to encourage the lawmakers to vote against the law.
One member of Parliament reported that Qāsim went so far as to threaten to revoke the
Shii community’s support of any candidate who voted in favor of it. As it turned out,
the drafts were not submitted for a vote until three years later.
On January 3, 2009, two family law drafts were presented to the Parliament, one
that would apply to Sunnis and the other for use in the Shii courts. Shii members of
Parliament rejected the Shii draft, but announced that they would not stand in the way if
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Sunnis chose to approve their own draft. On May 27th, the Sunni draft was re-submitted
and passed by a large majority. Only three members voted against it, members of the
minority Salafi bloc who told the press that they had consulted Salafi authorities abroad
who had advised them to reject the law.
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CHAPTER 2: LAW AND SECT IN BAHRAIN: A Brief History of Legal
Institutions

In considering the reactions of Bahrain’s religious scholars to the government’s
proposed family law, one of the central questions that arises is why most Sunnis support
it, while most Shiis do not. The fact that each sect would respond differently to this
major change in the judicial system is not surprising when viewed from a historical
perspective. It has only been since 1926 that the Sunni and Shii sharīʻa courts have
existed within the same institutional framework. It is not known exactly how long
Sunnis and Shiis have coexisted on the islands, but there is evidence suggesting that it
has been at least as long as five centuries, dating back to the mid-fifteenth century when
the Shii officials of the Banū Jarwān administration were replaced by the Maliki Sunnis
of the Banū Jabr tribe of Eastern Arabia. From that time until 1923, Sunnis and Shiis in
Bahrain developed and maintained separate legal institutions to adjudicate family
issues. While there were periods when the entire population fell under the jurisdiction of
a single official with respect to certain matters, such as the muḥtasib (market inspector),
who ensured fair market prices and maintained a standard of public behavior, family
issues such as marriage contracts, divorce settlements, and child custody arrangements
were handled by a qāḍī of the litigant’s own sect.
In fact, even since 1926, Bahrain’s sharīʻa courts have had separate sections for
each sect which have preserved the legal competence of religiously-trained judges to
administer to their respective sect’s personal status cases. The government’s law could
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have, for the first time in Bahrain’s history, forced Sunni and Shii qāḍīs to adjudicate
these cases by referring to the same, codified legal document, or even dispossess
religious judges altogether of their roles, and replace them with judges trained only in
secular law. Viewing the issue from a historical perspective demonstrates the enormous
shift this law could produce in Bahrain’s legal and religious landscape.
The present chapter provides a sketch of the history of Bahrain’s legal
institutions to show that these institutions have remained for the most part separate
according to sect. It outlines shifts in political authority and analyzes the effects of these
shifts on legal institutions, and conversely, ways in which religious doctrine affects
attitudes toward political and legal authority. This chapter also compares Sunni and Shii
religious authorities and argues that not only did Sunnis and Shiis have separate
authority structures, but that those authority structures were different in kind, a situation
that complicated British efforts to unite both sects under one, centralized state. Sharīʻa
in particular was positioned differently in relation to other communal forces in the
Sunni community than it was in the Shii community. Understanding the role sharīʻa has
played within each community historically helps to explain current Sunni and Shii
perspectives on family law reform.

Bahrain Before the Modern Era

Shii Rule of the Ismāʻīlīs: 899 – 1460 C.E.

38

In early Islamic sources, the name Bahrain refers to the islands that comprise
present-day Bahrain in addition to the regions of al-Ḥasā and Qaṭīf in eastern Arabia.
These early references mention Bahrain as the location where the Ka’ba’s black stone
was held for almost twenty-two years during the tenth century by Abū Saʻīd al-Ḥasan b.
Bahrām al-Janābī (d. 301/913-914), chief of an Ismāʻīlī sect referred to as the
Qarmaṭīs.38 Unlike Imami Shiis who believe in a line of twelve Imams extending from
the Prophet’s nephew ʻAlī to Muhammad, son of Ḥasan al-ʻAskarī, Ismāʻīlīs hold that
the sixth Imam, Jaʻfar al-Ṣādiq, designated his eldest son Ismāʻīl as his successor even
though Ismail predeceased his father. While both sects are messianic in the sense that
they believe in the existence of a savior, the Mahdī (Muhammad, son of Ḥasan alʻAskarī; and Muhammad, son of Ismāʻīl, respectively), Imamis see his coming at the
end of time, while Ismāʻīlīs saw it as imminent, and in fact, believed that the Mahdī had
come, according to some sects, just before and in the early years of the tenth century. In
931 C.E. the Ismāʻīlīs of Bahrain under Abū Ṭāhir Sulaymān, son of Abū Saʻīd,
believed that the Mahdī had arrived among them in the form of a Persian slave. Since
the Mahdī was present to decide questions of law, Islamic law was abolished. The
Mahdī issued rules that were considered strange and even repulsive, and began to
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execute Qarmaṭī notables. Abū Ṭāhir realized that the man was an imposter and had him
killed.39
During the following century, Ismāʻīlīs continued to rule in Bahrain, and had
established a type of welfare state in which several members of one family ruled as a
council. Al-Aḥsā’ in eastern Arabia was made the capital, and an army was comprised
of Ismāʻīlīs themselves (rather than slaves or captives). It seemed that everyone
participated in periodic attacks against non-Ismāʻīlīs, creating a sense of an egalitarian
order. Islamic law and ritual had disappeared, and the only existing mosques were for
visitors. In 1070 C.E., al-Aḥsā’ was conquered by the Sunni tribe of ʻAbd al-Qays and
held for seven years, after which the Qarmaṭīs under Abū Ṭāhir were defeated.40
The extent to which the general population adopted Ismaʻīlī beliefs is difficult to
trace. Moojan Momen suggests that the general trend is that native Bahrainis, or as they
are called in contemporaneous Arabic sources, the Baḥarna or the Baḥārina, adopted
Ismāʻīlī beliefs after the arrival of the Qarmaṭīs, and then gradually embraced Imami
Shiism. Juan Cole likewise speculates that Bahrainis were predominantly Ismāʻīlī at
least until the fourteenth century, basing his view in part on the fact that the traveler Ibn
Baṭṭūṭa described the inhabitants of Qaṭīf in 1331 as “extremist Shiis” (rāfiḍīyya
ghulāt), reasoning that this is how a Sunni would describe Ismaʻīlīs.41 Cole suggests
that there were remnants of Ismaʻīlī beliefs even into the nineteenth century.42
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Juan Cole writes that because the Qarmaṭīs lacked their own religious and legal
institutions, they looked to the schools of Iraq for qualified individuals to serve in
positions such as qāḍī ‘l-quḍāt (chief judge) and the muḥtasib.43 Because the Qarmaṭīs
of Bahrain under Abū Ṭāhir and then Saʻīd ibn Mughammis are reported to have had
little use for law, it is likely that Cole is referring to the later Qarmaṭī tribe, the Banū
Jarwān, which held Bahrain from 1305 – 1363. Shii biographical dictionaries testify that
several Bahraini scholars of this period held legal posts. For instance, Shaykh Aḥmad
ibn ʻAbdallāh Ibn al-Mutawwaj al-Baḥrānī (d. 764/1363), who is discussed below,
served as muḥtasib. The institutionalization of these positions allowed for the spread of
Imami beliefs in Bahrain. Given that these scholars emigrated from Iraq, they were
most likely familiar with the ideological trends current in the Iraqi cities at that time.
Until the Ghayba (Occultation)44 of the twelfth Imam in 874 C.E., Imamis looked to
their Imams to answer legal questions. It was not until several decades later that,
realizing that the Ghayba might last longer than was initially anticipated, scholars began
establishing methods of addressing legal issues.
The theory of the Imamate, that the Imams were the legitimate successors to the
Prophet because they were designated as such, and because they alone were maʻṣum
(infallible), led to a nearly exclusive focus in early Imami jurisprudence on the akhbār
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(sg. khabar) or Hadith of the Imams.45 Because it was also believed that the Imams
alone had the ability to interpret the Qur’an and the Hadith of the Prophet, the Imams’
akhbār often took precedence over the primary texts themselves.46 So-called
“rationalist” methods used by Sunnis, especially qiyās, were rejected, in part because
many akhbār exist in which the Imams denounce it. Imamis dismissed rationalist
methods also because certainty (qaṭʻ) can only be achieved by referring to the words of
the Imams, while the use of reason can only yield probability (ẓann).47 Hence, these
early scholars were often referred to as “muḥaddiths” (scholars of Hadith), as opposed
to faqīhs (jurists) or mujtahids (Muslim jurists capable of independent reasoning). The
performance of the duties of the office of imam were also prohibited during the Ghayba
because of the exclusive nature of the Imams’ authority, along with the fact that the
Shia during this period lived under Sunni rule and often practiced taqiyya
(dissimulation). Therefore, early treatises argued against holding Friday prayer, the
collection of taxes, and the declaration of jihād. These were the views of the scholars of
the Iraqi cities from the time of the Ghayba until approximately the mid-eleventh
century when the work of Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Ṭūsī (d. 460/1067), known as
Shaykh al-Ṭāʻifa, brought rationalism to the fore.
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By al-Ṭūsī’s time, Imami scholars had begun to accept limited rationalist
positions. It was no longer practical to continue waiting for the return of the Mahdī to
address the growing body of legal issues for which no khabar (singular of akhbār)
existed.48 Two scholars of the tenth century referred to as al-Qadīmayn (the Two
Ancients), Abū Muḥammad Ḥasan ibn ʻAlī ibn Abī ʻAqīl al-ʻUmānī al-Hadhhā’ (first
half of the 4th/10th c.) and Abū ʻAlī Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn al-Junayd al-Kātib alIskāfī (middle of the 4th/10th c.) employed proto-rationalist methods that, in the case of
the former, became a standard Shii rationalist position, but in the case of the latter,
caused his works to be abandoned. Ibn Abī ʻAqīl rejected the khabar al-wāḥīd (tradition
that is not widely transmitted; pl. akhbar āḥād) as invalid and gave precedence to
Qur’anic principles over traditions that conflicted with them. While Ibn al-Junayd
upheld the validity of akhbar āḥād, he exercised a kind of qiyās in which he interpreted
traditions by referring to other similar traditions, and attempted to discover the rationale
(ʻilla) behind various precepts.49
During the following century, rationalist methods, especially the rejection of
akhbar āḥād, gained more legitimacy through the work of al-Shaykh al-Mufīd, Abū
ʻAbd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Nuʻmān al-ʻUkbarī al-Baghdādī Ibn alMuʻallim (d. 413/1022), and Abū al-Qāsim ʻAlī ibn Ḥusayn al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā (d.
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436/1044). However, it was their student, al-Ṭūsī, who established a satisfactory middle
ground between the traditionalists and the rationalists by justifying the use of some
rationalist methods in order to validate akhbar āḥād. Al-Ṭūsī’s methodology and
opinions remained the dominant Twelver doctrine for at least a century and a half.50
Al-Ṭūsī studied and taught first in Baghdad, and later in Najaf. His work, and
that of his students made these two cities the centers of Shii thought. After the sack of
Baghdad and the invasion of the central Islamic lands by the Mongols in 1258, most
Shii scholars of Baghdad and Najaf either fled or were killed. As centers of Shii
scholarship, these cities were replaced by Ḥilla, located south of Baghdad, and Jabal
ʻᾹmil, a mountainous region in what is present-day southern Lebanon.
Along with Ḥilla, Bahrain and the Gulf also escaped the Mongol invasion. The
Qarmaṭīs regained control there under Saʻīd ibn Mughammis until 1305. The Banū
Jarwān, another Qarmaṭī tribe, captured Bahrain that year and held the islands until
approximately 1460. During their rule, the Banū Jarwān paid tribute to the Sunni king
of Hormuz, a kingdom founded by a confederation of Arab tribes that controlled gulf
trade routes from the tenth to the fifteenth centuries at which point they allied with the
Portuguese.51 The rulers of Hormuz were content to allow the existing local Shii
administration to govern, and did not curtail the activities of the Shii ʻulamā’.
Biographical dictionaries attest to the continued maintenance of Shii religious and
judicial offices, and to the fact that Bahraini scholars followed ideological trends
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present in the Iraqi cities and Jabal ʻᾹmil. Shaykh Aḥmad ibn ʻAbdallāh Ibn alMutawwaj al-Baḥrānī (d. 764/1363) served as muḥtasib and was consulted on legal
matters. Another Imami scholar, Shaykh Nāṣir al-Dīn Ibrāhīm ibn Nizār al-Aḥsā’ī
served as chief judge, and was a distinguished teacher.52
Bahraini legal thinking of this period seems to reflect current trends in Ḥilla as
well as Jabal ʻᾹmil. There was a vibrant exchange of scholars and ideas between
Bahrain and the two cities. Many Bahraini scholars studied in one of those cities before
taking up their posts in Bahrain. Shaykh Aḥmad had studied in Ḥilla, and was called a
renowned mujtahid, a title he would not have been given had he been a traditionalist.
He was referred to by one biographer as “the leader of the Imamis in his time.”53
Alternately, it seems Bahraini scholars were sought out by those in Jabal ʻᾹmil and
Ḥilla to enrich their own institutions. Because of his scholarly renown in theology,
Maytham ibn ʻAlī al-Baḥrānī (d. 681/1282) traveled to Ḥilla at the request of the
scholars there. The period of Qarmaṭī rule was one of intellectual prosperity for
Bahrain’s Shii community. Juan Cole suggests that the Twelver community of
fourteenth century Bahrain and eastern Arabia may have enjoyed more independence
and institutional prominence than any other Muslim community at that time.54
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Sunni Tribal and Portuguese Rule: 1460 – 1602 A.D.

In the mid-fifteeenth century, the situation changed drastically for Bahrain’s
Shiis. The leader of the Banū Jarwān was killed, and his lands were confiscated by a
Sunni Bedouin tribe, the Banū Jabr. The ruling family of Hormuz still claimed the
greater Gulf region as their empire, and therefore, the Banū Jabr required a cession from
them for Bahrain. This was granted at first, but thereafter was disputed for the better
part of the remainder of Hormuzi rule. The Banū Jabr took an active role in asserting
their Maliki Sunni orientation in their new territory. They replaced the Shii head of the
market police and the qāḍī ‘l-quḍāt with Sunnis, and appointed several Maliki judges
while forcing the conversion of some of the Twelver judges.55
In the meantime, the Gulf region attracted the attention of the Portuguese who
were interested in taking over the spice trade that passed through Hormuz. Bahrain’s
pearling industry was also an attractive prize. In 1515, they conquered Hormuz, but
faced greater resistance from the Banū Jabr. It was not until 1521 that they were able to
take Bahrain. Interested only in reaping economic benefits, the Portuguese ruled
Bahrain through Hormuzi governors and did not become involved with the local
population. With the exception of the remains of a fort outside Manama, the Portuguese
had no lasting effect on the culture, language, or methods of government. No significant
changes were made to the judiciary or the local administration. Sunnis continued to hold
major offices, appointed by the Hormuzi governors, and Shiism was discouraged.
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Despite the Sunni tribe’s persecution of Shiis, it appears that a small number of
Twelver ʻulamā’ continued to engage in scholarship and advise the Shii community on
legal and theological issues. A few extant works have come down to us from the region
in this period, although none that could rival either the works of the thirteenth and
fourteenth centuries or those of later centuries when the island becomes a center of
Akhbārī thought. In his compilation of extant Shii works on law, Modarressi lists only
one Bahraini scholar from this period, Muḥammad ibn Ḥārith al-Manṣūrī al-Baḥrānī (d.
after 952/1545), author of Al-Sayfiyya, on dogmatics and prayer, and Mas’ala fī ishtirāṭ
istiqrār al-ḥayāt fī l-dhabīḥa.56 In his biographical dictionary, ʻAlī al-Baḥrānī mentions
a Bahraini muftī: Shaykh Ḥusayn ibn Shaykh Mufliḥ (d. 933/1526) received his ijāza
(academic degree) from the prominent Safavid scholar ʻAlī al-Karakī and composed
fatwas on various issues, collected the fatwas of his father, and wrote many works on
fawā’id (lessons in legal issues).57
During this time, major changes were taking place northeast of the Gulf. The
Safavids defeated the Sunni Tīmūrids and took control of parts of Persia in 1501. The
Safavid leader, Ismāʻīl, proclaimed Twelver Shiism the religion of the state and began
taking steps to eradicate Sunnism. Because they lacked a navy and were occupied with
defending their northwestern border against the Ottomans, the Safavids could not
conquer the Gulf. Therefore, they allied themselves first with the Hormuzis, and later
the Portuguese, and Bahrain remained under Sunni control for another century.
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During the reign of the first two Safavid rulers, Ismāʻīl and Shāh Ṭahmāsp
(1533-1576), Twelver ʻulamā’ were recruited from Jabal ʻᾹmil and the shrine cities of
Iraq to form a religious establishment that would be fully supported by the state. A
major figure responsible for setting the state’s new religious policy was Shaykh ʻAlī ibn
ʻAbd al-ʻAlī al-Karakī (d. 1534). Originally from a town at the foot of Mount Lebanon,
al-Karakī studied with prominent Shii authorities in Jabal ʻᾹmil and Najaf, and also
studied with Sunni scholars in Damascus, Jerusalem, and Cairo. After receiving an ijāza
from ʻAlī ibn Hilāl al-Jazā’irī, the leading Shii jurist in Najaf, he was imprisoned by the
Tīmūrid authorities in 1508. Shāh Ismāʻīl freed him and brought him to Khurasan,
where he joined the Safavid court and was given the authority to create a Shii religious
establishment.58 Despite the fact that al-Karakī’s position was never formally
institutionalized, he was granted authority over all other religious officers, as well as all
state functionaries.59
Al-Karakī’s initiatives affected thorough and far-reaching changes in the way in
which Twelver Shiism was practiced. One of the first directives al-Karakī issued was
that a prayer leader be appointed in every town and that Friday prayer be resumed. In
the years after the Occultation of the twelfth Imam, many Shii scholars advocated the
suspension of formal practices until his return. These practices included the collection
and distribution of zakat and al-khums, the collection of the land tax, kharāj, and the
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holding of Friday prayer. The prayer leaders were instructed to bless the Safavid rulers
during the sermons. Public cursing of Abū Bakr and ʻUmar, the first two Sunni caliphs
was also encouraged. Al-Karakī also instituted the collection of kharāj, or land tax, and
forbade the practice of taqiyya, which is the dissimulation of Shii beliefs in order to
protect oneself from Sunni persecution.60 Legal questions were referred to Twelver
mujtahids who were trained in uṣūl al-fiqh and who established rationalism, or what is
also referred to as the Uṣūlī (from uṣūl al-fiqh) school of legal thought as orthodoxy
under the Safavids. At first, these scholars were either recruited from other Shii centers,
or Persians were sent to those centers to study. Eventually, however, the Safavids built
their own network of madrasas (religious colleges), and Isfahan became a prominent
center of Shii learning. This development effected a major change in Shii religious
education. While Sunnis had had an extensive madrasa system in place since the tentheleventh centuries, Shiites transferred knowledge through master-apprentice
arrangements in which students gathered around individual scholars. The Safavids
established the first structural framework for Shii learning in which a formal legal
curriculum was taught.61 The Safavid madrasa system, along with the official
recognition of mujtahids as the predominant legal authorities, promoted the institutional
development of the Twelver professional legal madhhab and the cultivation of a
religious hierarchy of Shii ʻulamā’.
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Safavid Rule: 1602 - 1717

In 1602, the Safavids conquered Bahrain. Although a thorough study of the
effects of the Safavid administration on Bahraini society has never been done,
biographical dictionaries of some of Bahrain’s own ʻulamā’ provide some insight into
developments in this period. Entries of Bahraini scholars under Safavid rule are
numerous, and confirm that as in Persia, a complete institutional framework was set up
that promoted Uṣūlī Twelver Shiism. The town of Bilād al-Qadīm was made the capital,
from which affairs of the islands were managed. Appointments were made to the
positions of shaykh al-islām (chief judge), ra’īs (chief religious dignitary), muḥtasib
and imam (Friday prayer leaders). Often one or more of these positions were held by the
same individual, simultaneously or consecutively. ʻUlamā’ were given full control over
the operation of the courts and the policing of the markets. The Safavid state sent
funding for the patronage of mosques, individual ʻulamā’, and the founding of
madrasas. Another important source of income for the ʻulamā’ were the dividends
earned from the management of awqāf: lands, properties, or funds endowed by private
individuals for the benefit of either the founder’s family or for the public. Additional
wealth came from the pearl industry. Many mujtahids engaged in pearl trading, acting
as wholesalers, and became individually wealthy. Much of this wealth ended up helping
to fortify the Shii establishment in the form of furthering a scholar’s own studies or
contributing to mosque or madrasa funds.
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Early in the 1600’s, the first Imami Shii religious office in Bahrain was
instituted. Shaykh Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan ibn Rajab al-Baḥrānī al-Maqābī al-Rūwaysī
(d. mid-1600’s) was appointed as imam to lead the Friday prayers, the first to do so in
Bahrain after “its opening to the untroubled [Safavid] empire.”62 Al-Rūwaysī wrote in
support of Friday prayer as a religious obligation, and was also an accomplished legal
scholar and teacher. As well as being named imam, he was also appointed as the first
shaykh al-islām.63 After al-Rūwaysī, ten additional scholars served in the position of
shaykh al-islām during this period, ending with Aḥmad ibn ʻAbdullāh al-Bilādī (d.
1725).64
Even though the individual that held the position of muḥtasib received his salary
from the ruler, those who held this office in Bahrain enjoyed a great amount of
independence and acted as a substantial check on local government authority. Shaykh
ʻAlī ibn Sulaymān al-Baḥrānī al-Qadamī (d. 1064/1654) was known primarily for
spreading the study of Hadith in Bahrain, so much so that he was known as “Umm alHadīth” (Source of Hadith). He assumed the position of muḥtasib, and performed it
with excellence, restraining the power of the governor and those who were corrupt. He
was said to “spread the carpet of justice,” and to have eradicated numerous heresies
(bidʻa).65 Sayyid Hāshim ibn al-Marḥūm Sayyid Sulaymān ibn Sayyid Ismāʻīl (d.
1108/1697) was also a muḥaddith (a scholar of Hadith) who took up the post of
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muḥtasib. He was said to be of the most pious nature, and also checked the authority of
kings and officials.66
The Safavids’ political stability allowed for considerable mobility of scholars
and also ideas between Persia and Bahrain. Bahraini scholars became well-known for
the quality of their jurisprudence throughout the Shii Muslim world, and their opinions
were sought by Persian jurists as well as the Safavid administration. The jurists of
Isfahan sometimes submitted legal questions to the ruler, who then referred the queries
to Bahraini jurists. Shaykh Ḥasan al-Damistānī was one such jurist who was often
consulted.67 In another example, the decision of a local qāḍī, Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad alIṣbaʻī, was questioned by Bahrain’s shaykh al-islām at the time, ʻAlī ibn Sulaymān alQadamī (d. 1654). Al-Qadamī sent a query regarding the case to the jurists in Shiraz
and Isfahan, who upheld al-Iṣbaʻi’s decision.68 Until this time, Jabal ʻᾹmil had been the
predominant Shii center of learning. The political stability and financial prosperity
enjoyed by Bahraini scholars under the Safavids during the seventeenth century,
however, allowed Bahrain to rival, and perhaps even supplant Jabal ʻᾹmil as Shiism’s
intellectual center.69
One family in particular, the Ᾱl ʻAṣfūr, became known for their erudition. From
the village of Dirāz, on the northeastern coast of the main island, the Ᾱl ʻAṣfūr engaged
in pearl diving and trading, and date farming, as well as legal scholarship. The most
prominent member of the family is Yūsuf al-Baḥrānī, who is regarded as Bahrain’s
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greatest legal scholar, and one of the most influential proponents of the Akhbārī school
of the eighteenth century.70 Yūsuf was born in 1107/1696 in the village of Māḥūz, in the
northeastern corner of the main island. His family was staying there while his father
Aḥmad (d. 1132/1720) studied with Shaykh Sulaymān al-Māhūzī. Aḥmad was an
accomplished scholar in his own right. He wrote several works on matters such as
prayer formulas, marriage, divorce, and purity issues. He also collected responsa from
various prominent shaykhs, such as ʻAbd al-Imām al-Aḥsā’ī, ʻAlī ibn Luṭf Allāh alBaḥrānī, Nāṣir ibn Muḥammad al-Khaṭṭī al-Jārūdā, and Sayyid Ḥusayn al-Aḥsā’ī. Many
of his works are still extant. As well as studying with his father, Yūsuf also studied the
Qur’an with his grandfather Ibrāhīm.
While Yūsuf was born into a time of intellectual and financial prosperity for
Bahrain’s Shiis, it is during his lifetime that we begin to see this idyllic era of Safavid
Bahrain crumble. Although Safavid rulers were generous in their financial support of
the local Bahraini institutions, they did not provide the islands with much physical
security. They set up a nominal headquarters on the coast that was guarded by just a few
garrisons. The Safavids were also not skilled in naval maneuvers, so when Arab tribes
of the gulf, who were historically a seafaring people, began actively seeking a foothold
on Bahrain, the Safavids had difficulty fighting them off. In his autobiography, Yūsuf
writes that when he was five years old, war broke out between Persian Sunnis referred
to as the Hawala (Persians) and the ʻUtūb, which was a confederation of Sunni Arab
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tribes from eastern Arabia and what is today Qatar.71 The Hawala were successful in
fighting off the ʻUtūb, but soon after that another attack came, this time from the
southern Gulf. Yūsuf writes that the Khawārij (Arab tribes from what is present-day
Oman who adhered to Ibāḍism, a branch of Khārijism) came three times in as many
years, finally defeating the Hawala. It was a tragic event with a great amount of
violence. Many of the elite fled the island to Qaṭīf, among them Yūsuf’s father and
some other family members. Yūsuf was among those who remained in Bahrain for the
following two years.
Beginning with the invasion of the Khawārij, Bahrain entered a period of
political instability that would last throughout the eighteenth and most of the nineteenth
centuries. Yūsuf fled, though he also returned to Bahrain several times throughout his
life, trying to maintain his family’s businesses there. Eventually he was overcome with
debt and began a new life in a Persian village called Fasā. He fared well there. The local
governor, Mīrzī Muḥammad ʻAlī took a liking to him and exempted him from the land
tax (kharāj). After a time, war came to Fasā as well, causing Yūsuf to flee. He finally
settled in Karbala, where he studied and taught, and wrote most of his several-volume
work of uṣūl al-fiqh, Ḥadā’iq al-nāḍira fī aḥkām al-ʻitra al-ṭāhira (Gardens of splendor
on the rules of the pure and the unpure), before passing away in 1186/1772.

71

The Hawala had controlled Gulf sea routes under the loose governance of the Banū Khālid of al-Ḥasā,
and were considered subjects of the Ottomans. Their centers were located on the Persian side of the Gulf,
but they were present on the Arabian side as well. The eventual victory of the ʻUtūb represents the
ascendance of the Arabian side of the Gulf, which is connected with the rising influence of the Ᾱl Saʻud.
See Ingham, B. “ʻUtūb.” Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis,
C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel and W. P. Heinrichs. Brill, 2010. Brill Online. UNIVERSITY OF
PENNSYLVANIA. 02 January 2010
<http://proxy.library.upenn.edu:3678/subscriber/entry?entry=islam_SIM-7780>

54

The Shii Religious/Legal Divide: Uṣūlī vs. Akhbārī

Yūsuf al-Baḥrānī is best known for his role in spreading a school of legal
thought, Akhbārism, that opposed the rationalism that was initiated by Muḥammad ibn
al-Ḥasan al-Ṭūsī (d. 460/1067), Najm al-Dīn Abu al-Qāsim Jaʻfar ibn Al-Ḥasan al-Ḥillī
(d. 676/1277), known as al-Muḥaqqiq, and Ḥasan ibn Yūsuf Ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī (d.
726/1325), known as al-ʻAllāmah, and institutionalized by al-Karakī and the Safavids.
As described above, this school of thought advocated the use of reason and came to be
called “Uṣūlism,” after the term uṣūl al-fiqh. In Uṣūlism, a religious scholar who is
recognized by the community as having adequately studied the Qur’an, the traditions of
the Prophet and the Twelve Imams, and the consensus of Shii jurists can act as a
representative of the Hidden Imam. This representative, having the title mujtahid, can
perform tasks that were only to be carried out by the Imam before the Occultation, such
as the rendering of legal judgments, the collection and distribution of alms, the
declaration of holy war, and leading Friday prayer. In the rendering of legal judgments
specifically, the Uṣūlī school of thought accepted four sources of law: the Qur’an, the
traditions, the consensus of the Shii jurists (ijmāʻ), and the mujtahid’s own use of reason
(ʻaql). When the Safavid rulers came to power and undertook to establish the Uṣūlī
version of Twelver Shiism as orthodoxy, they reinstituted public religious activities of
the kind that were within a mujtahid’s competence. They also initiated the persecution
of Sunnis.
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Another effect of Safavid rule that was seen as negative by some Shiites was the
rapidly growing authority of the clergy. According to the Uṣūlī conception, the Shia
community was divided into two parts: mujtahids, and laymen who were to follow the
mujtahids. The mujtahids retained ultimate authority in matters of doctrine and law.
Because the Safavid state initiated the first centralized, politically stable Imami
government, new questions arose that the Imamis had to confront, such as the
application of the land tax (kharāj), and the limits of the clergy’s own authority vis a vis
the political authority of the ruler. The mujtahids were allowed a great amount of
autonomy in responding to these concerns.72 This, combined with their close ties to
political power, afforded the mujtahids an inviolability that Shiite clerics had rarely, if
ever, experienced in any other period. According to one account, the head cleric was
among the king’s closest advisors: “The king enquired about religious problems and
scientific subtleties through him…and in assemblies and gatherings, he would sit above
the ʻulamā’ and close to the seat of the king. He was required to be in attendance in the
company of the victory-favored (king) in all journeys.”73
The Sunni backlash against Safavid policies and the growing power of the
mujtahids engendered disapproval from traditionalist-minded Shii scholars. These
scholars found fault with the methods of the mujtahids, which relied more and more on
the use of their own reason and, as the conservative scholars saw it, less on authoritative
sources. In 1622, Shii scholar Muḥammad Amīn al-Astarābādī (d. 1033/1623 or
1036/1627) wrote a treatise titled al-Fawā’id al-madaniyya that refuted the use of logic,
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reason and the specific jurisprudential methods based on them, such as istiḥsān and
istiṣḥāb. Al-Astarābādī argues for an exclusive focus on the traditions of the Imams.74
This treatise revived a debate that had existed earlier between traditionalists and
rationalists. At the core of the debate was a difference in concepts of religious authority.
Traditionalists believed that after the Occultation, the only authorities on which legal or
religious investigations could be based were the Qur’an and the traditions, the akhbār,
of the Prophet and the Imams, thus they were sometimes called the Akhbāriyya. They
disapproved of holding Friday prayer during the Occultation and the performance of
other Shii religious obligations such as the collection of kharāj and khums. Devin
Stewart argues that the Akhbārīs’ position was not just against the use of reason, but
also against the adoption of Sunni methods. Stewart explains that because Shiis were a
minority in most areas in the Muslim world, many of them accepted Sunni rationalist
methods, or even joined Sunni madhhabs while practicing taqiyya. He contends that
those who rejected these methods, the traditionalists or Akhbārīs, did so not only on
doctrinal grounds, but also as a movement against the professionalization of the
madhhabs and the corresponding elevation of the role of the mujtahid. In analyzing the
early history of Shii legal thought, Stewart sees the work of the tenth and eleventh
century Baghdadi scholars (al-Shaykh al-Mufīd, al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā, and al-Shaykh alṬūsī), and especially al-Murtaḍā’s acceptance of ijmāʻ (consensus) as a legitimate
source of law as efforts to establish their own Shii madhhab modeled after that of the
Sunnis. The traditionalists/akhbāriyya disapproved of this effort because the effect of
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the madhhab is to separate the Muslim community into two halves: scholars and
laymen, and raises the scholar to a position of authority similar to that of the Imams.
Stewart argues that Al-Astarābādī’s work is a refutation of the Sunni system, and that
this point is often neglected by scholars who tend to focus on Shii law as a discrete
phenomenon, separate from the inter-sectarian context in which it developed.
Scholars disagree about the origins of Akhbārism. Most recently (2007,
Scripturalist Islam), Robert Gleave argued that we cannot speak of a definitive
movement or school of “Akhbārism” until al-Astarābādī, and that Shii sources after alAstarābādī’s time name him specifically as the founder of the school.75 Gleave also
argues that early traditionalist scholars that may have been referred to as “akhbāriyya”
had concerns that were different from those of al-Astarābādī and his students. In this,
Gleave refutes the work of scholars such as Andrew Newman, whose 1986 dissertation
details the “development…of the Rationalist (Uṣūlī) and Traditionalist (Akhbārī)
schools…from the Third/Ninth to the Tenth/Sixteenth century,” clearly presupposing
the origin of Akhbārism in the ninth century.76 Newman begins by analyzing “the
Akhbārism of the first century following the occultation,” as it is represented in the
akhbār chosen for inclusion in two of the “Four Books” of Shii Hadith, that of
Muḥammad ibn Yaʻqūb al-Kulaynī (d. 329/941) and Muḥammad ibn ʻAlī al-Qummī (d.
381/991-992).77 Modarressi notes that the term “akhbāriyya,” is used as early as the
tenth century to describe those traditionalist scholars who stressed reliance on the
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Qur’an and the reports (akhbār) of the Prophet and the Imams as the only legitimate
sources of doctrine and practice. Some of these traditionalists were more extreme in
their views than others, arguing that all reports are valid, and that any attempt to
question their authenticity entails the use of reason, which they firmly rejected. Others
recognized the limited use of methods of Hadith criticism, but otherwise refrained from
extrapolating from either the Qur’an or the Hadith on any given matter. All of these
scholars were referred to at times as “akhbāriyya,” or “ahl al-ḥadīth,” or even
“ḥashwiyya,” and contrasted with Sunni scholars who advocated rationalist methods
such as qiyās, or Muʻtazilī theologians, whether Sunni or Shii, who used rationalist and
philosophical methods to interpret scripture. Newman argues that the dispute involves
not only a disagreement over sources, but also over the nature of the authority of the
ʻulamā’ during the Occultation: whether members of the ʻulamā’ are allowed to stand in
for the Imam in leading Friday prayer, collecting taxes, and the implementation of
criminal punishments (al-ḥudūd). He sees a continuity between this early dynamic, and
that which existed later. With regard to the considerable influence extended by the work
of al-Astarābādī, those who argue for a continuous Akhbārī trend refer to al-Astarābādī
as initiating a “Neo-Akhbārism.”
Whether Al-Astarābādī initiated Akhbārism itself or merely a revival of an older
debate, his ideas gained rapidly in popularity. He lived in Mecca at the time of the
completion of al-Fawā’id, but his ideas spread quickly throughout the region, especially
to the shrine cities of Iraq. Akhbāri thought became so dominant in this region that
scholars writing about the arrival there of the renewer of Uṣūlism, Muḥammad Bāqir al-
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Bihbihānī (d. 1205/1791), say that one could not even carry Uṣūlī books in open view:
“Before his arrival, the land of Iraq, especially the two Holy places of martyrdom, were
full of the sect of the Akhbārīs…so much so that if one of them wished to carry a book
[written by] our fuqahā’…he carried it in a handkerchief.”78 Akhbārī ideas also found
fertile ground in the Gulf. Yūsuf al-Baḥrānī credits Shaykh ʻAlī ibn Sulaymān (d. 16534) as being “the first to spread ʻilm al-ḥadīth [the science of Hadith] in Bahrain.”79
Akhbārism would take hold in Bahrain and remain dominant there until well into the
twentienth century. However, when Yūsuf al-Baḥrānī was born, Uṣūlism still prevailed.
Yūsuf’s father and grandfather were Uṣūlis, and schooled him in classical works on
grammar and morphology. His other teachers in Bahrain included Aḥmad ibn ʻAbdallāh
al-Bilādī (d. 1137/1725) and ʻAbdallāh ibn ʻAlī (d. 1148/1735).80 In Qaṭīf he studied
with Shaykh Ḥusayn al-Māḥūzī (d. 1181/1767), who was also from Yūsuf’s village, but
lived most of his life in Qaṭīf. After Bahrain had been laid waste by the Omani tribes
and Yūsuf’s family’s businesses had been destroyed, he migrated to Persia where he
taught in a madrasa and became a Friday prayer leader. It was there that he wrote his
risāla.81 However, he was again pursued by war, and spent several years roaming before
finally settling in Karbala. In Persia and Iraq Yūsuf would have found himself
surrounded by Akhbārī thought. In his initial works, he advocated a strict Akhbārism,
but gradually established a moderate view such that Uṣūlī biographers claimed him as
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one of their own, calling him an ex-Akhbārī, and citing arguments in Yūsuf’s works in
which he challenges Akhbārī views.82 In Ḥadā’iq al-nāḍira, although he rejects the use
of ijmāʻ, ijtihād and ʻaql, he accepts some Uṣūlī positions, such as the permissibility of
Friday prayer, and advocates lay persons’ reference to the ʻulamā’.83
Although Yūsuf lived out the entirety of his professional life abroad, he
remained in close touch with his relatives who had stayed in Bahrain. He mentored and
taught two of his nephews and judging them worthy, issued each an ijāza: Khalaf, son
of his brother ʻAbd ʻAlī, and Ḥusayn, son of his brother Muḥammad.84 Ḥusayn
remained in Dirāz and produced such highly regarded scholarship that prominent
members of the ʻulamā’ praised his excellence and diligence in teaching, writing, and
studying, and considered him a “renewer” (mujaddid) of his age.85 Through his teaching
and influence, Dirāz became a well-known center of Akhbārī thought. Ḥusayn regularly
debated the scholars of the city of Bilād, who continued for a time to ascribe to
Uṣūlism.86
The revival of the Uṣūlī-Akhbārī debate coincided with the start of the
weakening of Safavid rule. The later Safavid rulers became immersed in the enjoyment
of their wealth and had less interest in the running of the state than earlier leaders had.
The Afghans were encroaching from the north, and the ʻIbāḍis of Oman were gathering
strength to the south. The Omanis, together with some Sunni tribes in the region,
invaded Bahrain in 1717. In 1722 the Safavids fell to the Afghans. The arrival of the
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Omanis signaled the end of the extensive Shii legal establishment and period of
freedom of religious and legal thought. The Omanis immediately began applying heavy
taxes on the Shii population and replacing Shii officials.87 Not only did these forces
curb Shii intellectual freedoms, they also hurt local Bahraini commerce, in which the
ʻulamā’ were actively engaged. This drove some Bahraini ʻulamā’ to emigrate to Persia
or the shrine cities of Iraq. The Ᾱl ʻAṣfūr’s businesses, for example, were bankrupted
by the effects of the invasion.
Despite the political turmoil of the eighteenth century, some Shii scholars stayed
in Bahrain and continued to produce works on theology and jurisprudence. Akhbārī
thought became predominant for a time in all the Shii centers of learning as well as in
Bahrain, although it was never exclusive. There was still a measure of intellectual
diversity on the islands, with some families remaining Uṣūlī, traces of Ismāʻīlī beliefs,
and some interest in the esoteric ideas of Shaykh Aḥmad ibn Zayn al-Dīn al-Aḥsā’ī.
Juan Cole suggests three reasons for Akhbārism’s rise to prominence in Bahrain.
Politically, Akhbārī beliefs accommodated non-Shii governance better than Uṣūlism
did. Denying the validity of public Shii religious obligations, and reserving religious
authority to the sacred texts (and not an active clergy), Akhbārīs could exist
comfortably under non-Shii rule. Geographically, Akhbārism became tied to certain
Bahraini towns, such as the Ᾱl ʻAṣfūrs’ hometown of Dirāz. Cole also argues that there
is a generational aspect to Bahrain’s move toward Akhbārism. The sons of Safavid-

87

Cole, Sacred Space, pp. 52-53.

62
appointed Uṣūlī officials were disappointed by the failure of the Safavids, and thus
rejected the ideology of their fathers.88
Towards the end of the eighteenth century, Uṣūlī thought enjoyed a reawakening
with the work of al-Bihbahānī (d. 1791). Akhbārism died out throughout most of the
Shii world except for Bahrain. The Ᾱl ʻAṣfūr family remained proponents of this
school. The work of Shaykh Ḥusayn Ᾱl ʻAṣfūr (d. 1802) became well-known. His thesis
in jurisprudence, Sadād al-ʻibād wa rashād al-ʻubbād (The propriety and integrity of
the pious) is still used by Bahraini jurists today.89 Shaykh Khalaf Ᾱl ʻAṣfūr served as
the Shii community’s chief judge for almost half a century, from the mid-nineteenth to
the early twentieth centuries. Shaykh Khalaf’s grandson, Shaykh Muḥsin, served as a
judge in the senior sharīʻa court for ten years and continues today to produce works on
jurisprudence.

The Arrival of the Sunni ʻUtūb Tribes and the Beginning of British Involvement:
1783 - 1869

The period between Safavid rule and the establishment of the rule of King ʻῙsā
in 1869 was one of political turmoil for Bahrain. Aware of the islands’ strategic position
on various trade routes, as well as the potential wealth to be gained from its pearling
industry, Persian, European and Arab tribal powers vied for control. The Omani Arabs
88
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had developed a strong navy modeled after that of the Portuguese and became a
significant force in the Gulf. They captured Bahrain from the Safavids in 1717 and a
number of other islands to the east of Bahrain. After Nādir Shāh established a new
government in Iran in 1737, his forces recaptured Bahrain and held it as a province
maintained by local Arab governors.90 Although Nādir Shāh’s government was Shii, it
pursued a policy of ecumenism by appointing both Sunnis and Shiis to office, and
promoting friendly relations between the sects. This was not an easy task after the
Sunnis suffered the discriminatory policies of the Safavids and while the Sunni
Wahhābī movement was emerging on the Arabian peninsula pursuing the violent
suppression of Shiis. Ultimately, Nādir Shāh’s policies were unsuccessful and his
administration was defeated by Karīm Khān Zand in 1750. Bahrain remained under
Persian control, again governed by local members of the Ᾱl Madhkūr tribe, a Sunni
tribe of Omani origin, until the arrival of the ʻUtūb tribes in 1783.91
After the defeat of the Portuguese in the mid-seventeenth century, the Dutch had
taken over the spice trade in the Gulf. This was short-lived, however, as the British East
India Company arrived and quickly gained strength. Because all commercial activity in
the Gulf at the time was carried out via seafaring operations, the British saw any other
powers with capable navies as competition, such as the Omanis and the Arab tribes.
They therefore allied themselves with Iran, which had no navy. This arrangement was
successful for a time, but as the British exerted more control over the Gulf, they met
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with increasing resistance from Arab tribal forces. A period began in which tribes
fought each other for territory, “pirates” pillaged freely throughout the Gulf, and the
British made various attempts to secure their hold on trade and commerce by forging
various alliances with particular tribes.
The ʻUtūb was a federation of Sunni tribes indigenous to eastern Arabia and
what is now Qatar. Having long been involved in seafaring activity, the ʻUtūb were in
an excellent position to compete for control over trade and pearling in the Gulf. In the
early eighteenth century two of the ʻUtūb tribes, the Ᾱl Jalāhima and the Ᾱl Khalīfa,
established themselves in Kuwait under the rule of the Ᾱl Ṣabāḥ tribe. From there, they
began to send pearling vessels into the waters around Bahrain. Sometime around 1760,
they were forced out of Kuwait and resettled in Zubāra on the northwestern coast of
Qatar.92 By the late eighteenth century, a rivalry had developed between the tribes of the
ʻUtūb. Not long after settling in Zubāra, the Ᾱl Khalīfa built up successful trade and
pearling businesses such that Zubāra became a prominent commercial center. This drew
the resentment of other ʻUtūb tribes who expected to share in the profits of these new
enterprises. When the Ᾱl Jalāhima seceded and began to build a navy of their own, the
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Ᾱl Khalīfa attacked them and killed their chief, a move that made the Ᾱl Khalīfa
undisputed leaders of the ʻUtūb.93
The Ᾱl Khalīfa also had to contend with the Omani tribes. In 1782, Oman
launched an attack on Zubāra. The Ᾱl Khalīfa were successful in repelling this attack. A
Kuwaiti fleet had been on its way to assist the Ᾱl Khalīfa when news of the Omanis’
defeat reached them. The fleet then changed course and sailed to Bahrain and captured
the fort at Manama. The Ᾱl Khalīfa and its allies then claimed Bahrain and Zubāra for
themselves. Early in 1783, Shaykh Aḥmad ibn Khalīfa94 became the first member of the
family to rule Bahrain.95
Shaykh Aḥmad spent most of the year in Zubāra and ruled Bahrain through
agents. It was a prosperous time for the Ᾱl Khalīfa. Most of the Indian trade between
southern Iraq and Oman passed through Bahraini ports. Very little is known about the
details of Aḥmad’s rule, but Khuri ventures that he managed it as an occupied territory
in much the same way as the Persians did before him, collecting taxes and demanding
that the local population pay tribute. He most likely did not become directly involved
with Bahraini society. The Ᾱl Khalīfa, along with the other tribes that were part of the
ʻUtūb confederation followed their own system of government which consisted of tribal
councils that decided the political, economic, and social concerns of the tribe based on
customary rules.96
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The Ᾱl Khalīfa’s success attracted once again the attention of the Omanis and a
new force in the Gulf, the Wahhābīs. In 1795, the Wahhābīs attacked Zubāra and the Ᾱl
Khalīfa were forced to retreat to Bahrain the following year, the year that Shaykh
Aḥmad died. He was succeeded by his two sons, Sulaymān and ʻAbdullāh, who took
charge of Manama and Muharraq respectively. Khuri writes that the fall of Zubāra
initiated a new era in Bahrain, one in which the Ᾱl Khalīfa began to exert direct control
over the islands.97 This did not result in good fortune for either the local population or
successful trade endeavors for the Ᾱl Khalīfa. The two branches of the family
represented by Shaykh Aḥmad’s sons competed for wealth and power and the support
of the other ʻUtūb tribes, and appeared more interested in this power struggle than in the
success of their new territory. Even after the deaths of Sulaymān (1825) and his son
Khalīfa (1834), Khalīfa’s son Muḥammad continued the feud with his great uncle
ʻAbdullāh. To fund their activities, the Ᾱl Khalīfa levied heavy taxes on local farmers
and merchants, and even resorted to extortion and confiscation of property. The
situation continued to grow worse as Muḥammad came to gain greater support from the
other tribal chiefs as well as from Wahhābī tribes in Arabia. In 1834, he attacked
ʻAbdullāh and forced his retreat to the Eastern coast of Arabia. Thereafter, he began to
indulge in excessive practices of oppression and violence. A British agent of the
government of India who was charged with monitoring affairs in Bahrain described the
situation there as follows: “Piratical outrages were frequent; the Resident’s advice was
asked only to be disregarded; agreements were broken as soon as made; trade
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languished; the common people were oppressed, and took every opportunity that
presented itself of flying from the hands of the oppressors.”98 By 1843, trade had
declined to half of what it had been during Aḥmad’s rule.99
In the meantime, Britain was becoming a military as well as a commercial force
in the Gulf. Their trade operations and those of their allies were continually being
interrupted by piracy carried out mainly by the Ᾱl Qawāsim, a tribe that controlled the
Straight of Hormuz and exacted tolls from all passing ships. The British refused to pay
the tolls, and instead sent a military force to attack the Ᾱl Qawāsim and the coast of
Oman, which they referred to as the “Pirate Coast.” After soundly defeating the Ᾱl
Qawāsim and subduing the Pirate Coast, the British imposed the General Treaty of
Peace on several ruling shaykhs in the Gulf. Signatories agreed to refrain from acts of
piracy and intertribal warfare in exchange for British protection.100 The 1820 treaty
recognized the Ᾱl Khalīfa as rulers of Bahrain and began a relationship in which Britain
gradually came to exercise more and more control over Bahrain’s affairs. The Political
Residency at Bushire sent one of its Indian assistants to Manama to open and maintain
an office in 1829.101 Britain helped to protect Bahrain from external threats, yet the
feuding between the two branches of the Ᾱl Khalīfa continued unabated. As was
described above, any agreements made between the Ᾱl Khalīfa and the British were
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largely ignored, and ʻUtūb tribes continued to engage in piracy, which disrupted British
trade operations. In an effort to control the situation, in 1861 the British navy seized two
of Muḥammad’s war vessels and encouraged him to sign a treaty that declared all
previous agreements in force.102 In it, Muḥammad also agreed to refrain from piracy,
acts of war, and slavery in exchange for British protection from external threats.103
Although Muḥammad did sign the treaty, he did nothing to alter his activities. He
continued to engage in acts of piracy and violence, most notably the murder of his
brother ʻAlī, who had begun working with the British toward Muḥammad’s
overthrow.104
Finally in 1869, a British task force again seized Muḥammad’s war vessels, fort,
and weaponry, and publicly burnt the vessels. After interviewing local merchants and
some of the minor tribes’ chiefs, finding that they would agree to be ruled by a member
of ʻAlī’s branch of the Ᾱl Khalīfa, the British sought out Shaykh ʻῙsā ibn ʻAlī who was
responsible for the Ᾱl Khalīfa territory in Qatar. They invited him to accept the position
of sole ruler of Bahrain under their protection, and he accepted. On the second of
December, 1869, ʻῙsā took up residence in Bahrain and began the period of active Ᾱl
Khalīfa rule. In treaties concluded in 1880 and 1892, Shaykh ʻῙsā promised to consult
the British authorities before entering into negotiations with any other state or
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government, and that he would not sell, cede, or mortgage any part of his territory to
any but the British government.105
We know little about how the local population fared during this period. We do
know from Yūsuf al-Baḥrānī’s Lu’lu’at al-Baḥrayn that from the time of the Omani
invasion in 1717, many Shii businesses suffered first from heavy taxation by the
Omanis, and that many Shiis left Bahrain for this reason. Later on, British records
repeatedly refer to oppression of the local population by the ʻUtūb tribes in the form of
extortion, confiscation of property, and piracy. The pearling industry, which was run by
Shii ʻulamā’ during the Safavid period, was gradually taken over by members of the
ʻUtūb tribes. These developments had a negative effect on the Shii religious
establishment of madrasas and centers of legal education. We do have the sources of
some of the Shii ʻulamā’ who remained in Bahrain during this period and continued to
produce works of jurisprudence, such as Ḥusayn Ᾱl ʻAṣfūr (d. 1802) and ʻAbdullāh alSitrī (d. 1864). However, there is a clear decline in, at the least, the quantity of Shii
scholarship coming from Bahrain, if not also the quality.
While indigenous Shiis remained the majority of the population, there was an
increase in migration of traders, merchants, and workers from India, Iran, Iraq and other
areas to Bahrain during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. This
demographic change resulted in a diversity of religious beliefs as well as religious
practices, including in the realm of religious law. Fuad Khuri writes that by the end of
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the nineteenth century, four major Islamic legal schools were represented. Along with
the indigenous Shia whose origins are unclear but thought to be Safavid, Arab Shiis
came to Bahrain from Eastern Arabia, especially the town of al-Ḥasā. All of these Shiis
followed the Jaʻfarī school of law. The Ᾱl Khalīfa and the other tribes of the ʻUtūb
alliance followed the Mālikī maddhab. Other Sunnis from Arabia also began to arrive at
this time from the area of the Najd, but these Sunnis were urban and non-tribal, and they
followed the Ḥanbalī school of law. A Sunni group of Persian descent called the
Hawala came to Bahrain when trade routes shifted from the eastern to the western coast
of the Gulf, and also to work in the pearling and later the oil industry. Many Hawalas
consider themselves to be descended from Arabian tribes, yet their family names and
linguistic history are Persian. Hawala Sunnis are also distinguished from the Arabian
Sunni tribes because they follow the Shāfiʻī madhhab.106 Non-Muslim immigrants also
comprise part of the population, therefore small communities of Hindus, Jews, and
Christians begin to form during this period. Because there was a lack of political
stability and centralization of rule, members of both the Muslim and the non-Muslim
communities followed the dictates of their own religious traditions in matters of law.107
As Muḥammad Ᾱl Khalīfa’s behavior became more erratic and oppressive
throughout the 1860’s, British authorities became concerned for the welfare of their
Indian subjects who had migrated there. As part of the “Friendly Convention” of 1861
mentioned above, Muḥammad was deprived of judicial competence over British
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subjects living in Bahrain. Any disputes involving British subjects of a civil, criminal,
or commercial nature would now be handled by the Political Resident.108 This
agreement was the start of British involvement in Bahrain’s judicial affairs.

The Modern Period

Ᾱl-Khalīfa Rule and Bahrain as a British Quasi-Protectorate:
The Rule of Shaykh ʻῙsā 1869 - 1923

The rule of Shaykh ʻῙsā lasted from 1869 until 1923. By making Bahrain a
signatory to the treaties of 1820, 1880, and 1892, Britain legitimized Ᾱl Khalīfa rule
and established physical boundaries to the territory controlled by the ruling family.
Foreign companies were granted concessions to operate in Bahrain in exchange for
rents paid to the Ᾱl Khalīfa. This influx of foreign wealth provided the ruling family
with resources independent of local markets, thus abrogating the need to cooperate with
Bahraini merchants.109 The Ᾱl Khalīfa operated a feudal-type estate system in which
prominent members of the family were given a specific section of palm groves to
manage. The head of each estate had his own staff consisting of a tax collector, guards,
and an on-site manager who dealt directly with the laborers who were mostly Shii
peasants. There was no central oversight or standardization by the ruler, so each Shaykh
108
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levied taxes and rents as he saw fit, which were enforced by physical coercion. The
cities of Manama and Muharraq were each ruled by an amīr and a group of fidāwīs,110
which were similar to a police force that executed the will of the ruler and/or the Sunni
qāḍī.111
For the Sunnis, justice was administered in most cases by tribal chiefs or by the
ruler himself as a function of regularly held councils, majālis (sg. majlis). The councils
discussed and issued decisions on many different kinds of matters – trade, prices,
wages, treaties with foreign powers, marriages of political significance, as well as legal
issues involving contracts, disputes, and criminal offenses. The ruler’s council was the
highest authority in the country and issued decisions on matters of national political or
economic importance, such as the management of the ports, the distribution of palm
groves, pearl diving rights, and the recruitment of forced labor. It also acted as an
appellate court when local councils could not resolve a particular conflict. There was no
hierarchy among the local councils. Each managed the affairs of its respective tribe or
branch of a tribe.112
When a dispute occurred involving a foreigner and a Bahraini, an informal joint
court was held in which the British agent and Shaykh ʻῙsā or his representative together
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decided the case. The British agent could also refer civil disputes between foreigners
and Bahrainis to an arbitrator.113 Other courts that operated at this time were the Majlis
al-ʻUrf and the Salifat al-Ghawṣ. The Majlis al-ʻUrf, also called Majlis al-Tijāra, was a
type of trade council that was comprised of three or four prominent merchants that met
upon request to rule on cases involving foreign trade. 114 Khuri writes that the council’s
decisions were based on a set of Kuwaiti laws called qanūn al-safar that was published
around the turn of the nineteenth century. The Salifat al-Ghawṣ dealt with loan
payments, debts, and disputes involving the pearling industry. It was established by the
Ᾱl Khalīfa, who appointed the judge of the court in agreement with the chiefs of the
pearling tribes. Whereas cases involving debt were usually referred to qāḍīs to be dealt
with under sharīʻa, which had developed extensive rules regarding this issue, the judges
appointed by the Ᾱl Khalīfa for this court reportedly had no background in Islamic law,
and based their decisions simply on “conventional wisdom, political instincts, and
personal whims, generally taking the side of the powerful to avoid conflict.”115
The last type of court existing at this time is the sharīʻa court. There are no
known court records and little written material concerning the operations of the sharīʻa
courts during the period preceding the rule of Shaykh ʻῙsā.116 Most likely, the followers
of each school of law referred their legal concerns to a local qāḍī. It was only during the
rule of Shaykh ʻῙsā that formal appointments begin to be made. For Sunnis, two qāḍīs
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were appointed, one for Muharraq and one for Manama, although the Manama judge
seems to have been in a primary role. Both qāḍīs were of the Mālikī school. ʻAbd alRaḥmān ibn Shaykh ʻAbd al-Latīf (b. 1837), originally from al-Ḥasā, served as
Muharraq’s qāḍī, while Jasīm al-Mihza (d. 1927)117 was appointed as the Manama
judge. British sources also mention the latter’s brother, Aḥmad, as a Manama qāḍī who
worked together with Shaykh Jasīm. The qāḍīs held court in their own homes and dealt
with cases of family law and sometimes petty crimes. Cases involving both a Sunni and
a Shii were referred to the Sunni judges.118 Their decisions were ostensibly based on
sharīʻa, although Khuri writes that the Sunni qāḍīs conceded to tribal law when
possible. Their rulings on minor cases were final, but major cases could be appealed to
the ruler. In fact, Khuri argues that the Sunni qāḍīs, and especially Jasīm al-Mihza,
ruled in conjunction with the ruler, and calls their role “an accessory function” of tribal
government.119 British sources attest to the close relationship Shaykh Jasīm held with
members of the Ᾱl Khalīfa and repeatedly call his integrity into question.120 The qāḍīs
worked closely with the ruler, and their decisions were enforced by the ruler’s fidāwīs.
There was no such relationship between the ruler and the Shii qāḍīs.121
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The sources are unclear about the state of the sharīʻa courts and the qāḍīs for the
Shia during this period. Hassan Radhi notes that two qāḍīs were appointed by Shaykh
ʻῙsā for the Shia: Muḥammad ʻAlī ibn Shaykh ʻAbdullāh (b. 1826) and Aḥmad ibn
Shaykh Salmān (b. 1841).122 However, Khuri writes that there were many Shii qāḍīs,
nearly one for every village or neighborhood. Unlike the Sunni qāḍīs, the Shii qāḍīs’
rulings were not enforced by the ruler’s fidāwīs, but rather by the consensus of the
community. Their decisions were reportedly based entirely on sharīʻa, and were final
for all cases, with no appeal process linked with the ruler.123
Khuri contrasts the type of authority held by the Sunni qāḍīs with that held by
the Shiis. Whereas the Sunni qāḍīs derived their authority from their appointment by the
ruler, the Shii qāḍīs derived theirs from the community. While the ruler did reportedly
appoint two Shii qāḍīs, it is to the local qāḍīs who emerged spontaneously from the
community that people actually turned to have their issues resolved.124 In addition to the
local village qāḍīs, multiple sources attest that one Shii qāḍī rose to prominence above
the others, and was regarded by Shiis as the highest religious authority on the islands.125
This was none other than a member of the Ᾱl ʻAṣfūr family, Shaykh Khalaf Ᾱl ʻAṣfūr.
Shaykh Khalaf’s authority had not been sanctioned by the Ᾱl Khalīfa. It was not until
the British became involved in Bahrain’s domestic affairs that he was recognized as the
“head qāḍī,” and formally appointed. When Charles Belgrave arrived in 1926 to take up
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the position of legal adviser to the ruler, he was struck by the reverence with which
Shiis held Shayhk Khalaf: “He had a tremendous reputation among the village people.
They used to fall on their knees and kiss the hem of his robe, and when he visited the
villages they brought out the best of everything for his delectation.”126
There was a significant difference in the area over which the Sunni qāḍīs had
control versus that of the Shii qāḍīs. The Sunni qāḍīs handled basic personal status
issues such as marriage contracts, divorce settlements, and child custody agreements,
while the tribal chief was the dominant authority figure who was consulted on nearly all
issues. Even when the case was handled by the qāḍī, the final authority rested with the
head tribal chief, the ruler. The ruler and the other tribal chiefs managed the economic
resources held by the tribe, and their leadership arose from the consensus of the tribe.
For Shiis, the qāḍīs played this role. They handled all manner of disputes, they
controlled the economic resources of the Shii community in the form of waqf estates,
and they advised the community on trade, commerce, and even political affairs.127
This arrangement necessarily determined the sources used in the adjudication of
cases. Scholars have documented the fact that sharīʻa has never been the exclusive
source of law used by Islamic societies. Adjudication of legal issues has always been a
process of negotiation between local customary laws, tribal rules, ruler’s edicts,
126

Charles Belgrave, Personal Column, London: Hutchinson of London, p. 27.
Khuri, Tribe, pp. 82-84. In summarizing Khuri’s work on the role of the Shīʻī qāḍī in Bahrain, Mahdi
Abdalla al-Tajir notes that while Khuri correctly demonstrates that Shīʻī qāḍīs played a more active role
in the community than did their Sunnī counterparts, not all Baḥārnah (native Shīʻite) leaders were qāḍīs
or jurists. Al-Tajir specifically refers to Shīʻī community leaders during the years 1920-1945 who were
pearl merchants, landowners and others. Although the present discussion covers the period immediately
prior to that to which al-Tajir refers, his point is worthy of consideration. See Mahdi Abdalla alTajir,Bahrain 1920-1945: Britain, the Shaikh, and the Administration, London, New York, Sydney:
Croom Helm, p. 16.
127

77
Qur’anic principles, substantive laws recorded in fiqh manuals, and in the modern
period, Western, secular codes.128 The degree to which various sources are used is
constantly in flux and changes with political and historical circumstances. Because
court records are largely inaccessible in Bahrain up to the present day, it is nearly
impossible to determine what the specific formula was for either of the sects in any
specific time period. Khuri’s work, which was completed from 1974-1975 and covers
the period from 1869 to roughly Bahrain’s independence in 1971, gives us the only
detailed study on the sources of law used in any period of Bahraini legal history.129
His work reveals that for Bahrain during the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries there was a significant difference in the degree to which the Sunni community
referred to sharīʻa versus the Shii community. At least until the British reforms of the
1920’s, tribal or customary law appears to be the primary source of legal decisions for
the Sunni community. The tribal chief, who was generally not a religious scholar, was
the central figure who held wide jurisdiction over the tribe’s affairs. Decisions in his
council were made according to custom or tribal law: “rarely if ever did religious law
take precedence over tribal dictates” for the Sunnis.130 For issues involving trade or
commerce, Sunnis were referred to the Majlis al-ʻUrf, and for disputes involving
pearling, to the Salifat al-Ghawṣ. In neither case were those settling the disputes
schooled in sharīʻa. Pearling cases often also involved Shii petitioners, as nearly all
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pearl divers were Shii, while most boat owners were Sunnis. Shii petitions to the British
agency attest to the fact that these cases were not settled according to Islamic law:
Much oppression is done in the diving question in this
town of Bahrain. Such proceedings are contrary to the
Mohammedan Law. Although we are Shiah but we are
in concurrence with all the Islamic religions agree to
the decision of Sunni judges in this matter. When one
of the divers complains to the Government and demands
his dues from the Nakhoda [boat owner] they refer him
to the diving Salifah Court, that is two wicked Arabs who
do not distinguish right from wrong. Anyhow, they decide
the case in favor of the oppressors – the diving Nakhodas –
and by these reasons they damage the rights (of the divers).131
For the Shii community, the person who held a central position similar to that of
the Sunni’s tribal chief was the head qāḍī. For the period in question, this person was
Shaykh Khalaf. Shaykh Khalaf, who was a religious scholar, acted as an appeals judge
for local qāḍīs dealing with personal status issues as well as handling the other areas
that for the Sunni community were handled by the tribal chief. Reportedly, all of these
issues were dealt with according to sharīʻa in the Shii community.

1904 Incidents – Dispute Over Jurisdiction

Britain’s interest in Bahrain until this point had remained mostly commercial.
The port at Manama was a thriving stop on Gulf trade routes, although not run as
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efficiently as the British would have liked. The pearling industry was also seeing a
successful return. The British had offered protection against foreign invaders, but
pursued a policy of the least intervention necessary in domestic affairs.132 Regarding
judicial matters, the local British agent had jurisdiction over British subjects living in
Bahrain and European foreigners as per the “Friendly Convention” of 1861. An
informal joint court was convened to handle cases between British and Bahraini
subjects. In the fall of 1904, two incidents occurred that both caused the British to
reconsider the extent of their jurisdiction and raised the issue of religion in the
determination of judicial competence. The incidents both involved clashes between
Sunnis who were Bahraini subjects and Shiis who were Qajar subjects. Although these
Shiis were technically “foreigners,” the Bahraini ruler claimed them as belonging to his
jurisdiction by reason of their being Muslim. These incidents forced a redefinition of the
relative spheres of judicial authority between Britain and Bahrain, and between
Muslims and non-Muslims.
On September 29, 1904, a fight took place between the employees of a German
trading firm and a number of fidāwīs in the employ of a member of the Ᾱl Khalīfa
family, Shaykh ʻῙsā’s nephew ʻAlī.133 The Ᾱl Khalīfa at this time regularly engaged in
132
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the forced labor of Bahrain natives and/or migrant workers from India, Africa, or other
parts of the Gulf. At first a privilege of the ruler and tribal chiefs, as the Ᾱl Khalīfa’s
power became more secure with British support, numerous members of the family
began to engage in this practice. Whenever labor was needed for the completion of any
project or task, members of the Ᾱl Khalīfa would simply gather the required number of
laborers and force them to do the work free of charge for whatever length of time was
necessary. Shaykh ʻῙsā’s nephew ʻAlī was known for his abuses of this system, as well
as for practicing other forms of oppression of the native Shii population in particular.
The September incident reportedly occurred when some of ʻAlī’s fidāwīs entered the
German firm and attempted to commandeer some of the firm’s own workers as forced
labor. A Shii employee of the firm attempted to turn them away, explaining that the
servants were already otherwise engaged. Fighting then broke out between the fidāwīs
and the firm’s employees. Hearing loud voices, a German employee who was working
on the second floor came downstairs, and after attempting to break up the fight was
severely beaten by the fidāwīs.
Immediately afterward, the incident was reported to the British Political
Resident, Major Cox. Cox contacted Shaykh ʻῙsā, and it was agreed that because the
incident involved both Bahrainis and British-protected citizens, a decision would have
to be arrived at jointly. After completing an investigation, Cox proposed that a fair
settlement would entail the flogging and imprisonment of the fidāwīs, a sum of
No. 248 From Captain F.B. Prideaux, Assistant Political Agent, Bahrein, to Herr Robert Wonckhaus, 28
October 1904; From Herr Robert Wonckhaus to Captain F.B. Prideaux, Assistant Political Agent,
Bahrein, 30 October 1904, Records of Bahrain: Primary Documents, 1820-1960, Vol. 3: 1892-1923,
Archive Editions, 1993, pp. 182-190.
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compensation paid by ʻAlī to the German firm, and in consideration of the additional
offenses reportedly committed by ʻAlī, his expulsion from Bahrain for a period of four
years. Shaykh ʻῙsā agreed to the monetary part of the settlement, and promptly
forwarded the compensation to the German firm. However, he resisted both the arrest of
the fidāwīs and the expulsion of his nephew. When the fidāwīs were finally brought in,
Shaykh ʻῙsā refused to allow any of his staff to administer the flogging, and a British
subject was eventually instructed to do so. Understanding that the expulsion of a
member of the ruling family was a sensitive matter, Cox engaged in a lengthy process
of negotiation with Shaykh ʻῙsā over ʻAlī’s fate.
Shortly thereafter, another incident involving ʻAlī occurred on November 14.134
A clash between Arab Sunnis, and Shii Qajar subjects and native Shiis broke out in the
Manama bazaar. It was never determined decisively who threw the first blow, but the
skirmish began when the servant of a Qajar trader passed one of ʻAlī’s fidāwīs in an
alleyway. The two began fighting, and others quickly joined in. The end result was that
two members of the Qajar trader’s family were beaten nearly to death, and seven other
Shiis were badly injured. The case was reported to Cox and to Shaykh ʻῙsā. Cox
immediately began interviewing witnesses and arranging for testimony to be given by
those injured and the doctor who attended them. Within a few days, Shaykh ʻῙsā
134
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submitted to Cox an istishhād, or written testimony, from Sunni witnesses and ʻAlī’s
fidāwīs drawn up by the Sunnī qāḍī Shaykh Jāsim al-Mihza. The istishhād affirmed that
the witnesses had seen the Qajar subjects attacking and beating Sunni Bahrainis. Cox
replied that if the istishhād was to be admissible, the witnesses must also appear in court
to be cross-examined. Shaykh ʻῙsā at first refused to call the witnesses, saying that the
Sunnis would not appear in the presence of Shiis. Cox persisted, indicating to ʻῙsā that
the istishhād held even less weight in this case because some of the Shii witnesses had
reported seeing Shaykh Jāsim himself urging Sunni worshippers to leave his mosque
and to “Kill, kill the moguls135!!”136 ʻῙsā relented and sent the Sunnis to Cox for crossexamination. Cox’s determination was that the Sunnis had been primed on what to say
and that the Shiis were in the right. The neighborhood in which the clash took place was
a Sunni neighborhood in which the Qajar Shiis were considerably outnumbered. The
family that was attacked maintained a well-known and successful cargo-landing
business, while ʻAlī and his fidāwīs were already notorious for their repeated acts of
oppression and violence. The injuries of nine Shiis had either been witnessed by Cox
himself or attested to by the physician, while ʻῙsā could not produce one Sunni who
suffered any wounds. Cox told ʻῙsā that despite his own religious biases, he must see
justice done for the Shiis. ʻῙsā responded that he would agree to send the case to the
sharīʻa court to settle.
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The Qajar subjects were then ordered to appear before the Sunni sharīʻa court –
presided over by Shaykh Jāsim himself. They refused, arguing that since the qāḍī
himself was involved in instigating the violence against them, it was a foregone
conclusion that they would be found guilty and sentenced to flogging or imprisonment.
Being Qajar subjects, they also contacted their government in Tehran seeking
assistance. Tehran contacted the British agent in Bahrain and requested that justice be
done for their subjects. Cox again met with Shaykh ʻῙsā and explained that sending the
case to the sharīʻa court was not a workable solution. The Qajar Shiis could not expect
to receive justice from a Sunni qāḍī, especially Shaykh Jāsim. Furthermore, the British
agent pointed out, no Muslim can be compelled to attend a sharīʻa court if he did not
wish to, and the Qajar Shiis absolutely refused. In a communication to Cox, the
Assistant Political Agent Captain Prideaux wrote:
Sheikh Isa, I think, should be told emphatically that
no disputes between Shiahs and Sunnis are henceforth
to be referred to the Shara Court, any more than disputes
between Hindus and Mahommedans are. The Shiahs, who
are mostly Persians,137 in the absence of the Shah’s Consular
representatives naturally look to us for protection, and as
the British Government are interested in the welfare of all
classes in Bahrein, they cannot view with equanimity the
injustice even of making Bahrein Shiahs (who are all Persian
by origin) submit to the jurisdiction of a religious Court
other than their own. All such cases should be adjudicated
upon by the Chief himself [Shaykh ‘Isa] or by an impartial
Mejlis.138
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Ironically, it is the British who remind the Muslim ruler about the voluntary nature of
Muslims’ appearance in sharīʻa court. ʻῙsā remained obdurate, and told Cox that even if
the British government seized Bahrain, which he knew they were capable of doing, he
would not consent to the trial of the Qajar Shiis except in his own courts. In the
meantime, ʻῙsā’s nephew ʻAlī remained in Bahrain and continued to evade punishment
for the incident at the German firm as well.
A discussion then ensued between Cox and the Foreign Office in India about
how to resolve the deadlock. The British State Department advised the continued use of
diplomacy. However, Cox reported that every tack had been tried, and ʻῙsā would not
budge. Meanwhile, Tehran continued to apply pressure on the British to see justice
done. Finally a decision was reached by the British to present ʻῙsā with an ultimatum:
either he would punish the Sunni offenders as well as his nephew ʻAlī, or British
warships would take military action. The ultimatum was delivered on February 25,
1905, together with a show of naval force at the Manama port.

Bahrain Order-In-Council 1913/1919

The British response to the incidents of 1904 initiated a new phase in BahrainiBritish relations in which Britain took an active role in managing Bahrain’s domestic
affairs. The use of the threat of force demonstrated to the Ᾱl Khalīfa that Britain meant
to direct the course of the country’s future. During negotiations over the punishment of
ʻAlī and his fidāwīs, Shaykh ʻῙsā had been reminded by Cox that it was the British who
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sought him out to rule, and that without their support he would not be in a position of
leadership. Somewhat cowed after these events, ʻῙsā for a time became more tractable to
British “advice.”139
Because the number of British subjects and other foreigners in Bahrain was
steadily increasing, and in light of the difficulty of resolving the 1904 cases, the British
saw the need to define more clearly their judicial authority. In 1907 the Foreign Office
began to recommend the establishment of an Order-In-Council that would not only
outline Britain’s jurisdiction over its own subjects, but would also determine procedure
in Bahraini courts whenever a British subject or a foreigner was involved. Britain was
still concerned to maintain an image to the international community of minimal
involvement in Bahrain’s internal administration and therefore they did not want to
appear to issue the Bahrain-Order-In-Council (hereafter, BOIC) unilaterally.140 In 1909,
the Foreign Office instructed the agent in Bahrain to acquire an official statement from
Shaykh ʻῙsā asking the British to assume jurisdiction of foreigners. ʻῙsā wrote the
statement, but after asking the British to exercise authority in all cases in which
foreigners only are concerned, he added, “but not in other cases; and in cases that occur
between foreigners and my subjects, it is necessary that you and I settle them jointly.”141
In these last phrases, ʻῙsā wanted to maintain some control over cases such as those in
139
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1904 in the context of the Joint Court. Thus, a dual-authority system was established in
which the British agency and the Bahraini ruler shared authority.
The letter was considered sufficient to meet the need for which it was requested.
However, the Foreign Office expressed concern that the term “foreigner” needed to be
defined in the final draft of the BOIC.142 ʻῙsā would not likely take issue with Britain
handling cases of Europeans or subjects of Christian powers, but there was some
ambiguity in the case of subjects of Muslim rulers such as those of the Qajar Shah or of
Turkey, and especially in the case of subjects of other Arab rulers in the Gulf such as
those of Oman, Kuwait, Qatar and Arabia. Britain considered itself responsible for the
well-being of subjects of any country that it had friendly relations with while they were
in areas under British protection. Because these subjects were Muslim and Arab, ʻῙsā
believed he could claim jurisdiction over them in his own courts. Not only was it a
political matter, it was also financial. Traditionally, a court fee (khidma) of
approximately 10% of the amount involved was charged for each case. ʻῙsā claimed a
right to these fees, and went so far as to convince King ʻAbd al-ʻAzīz ibn Saʻūd to grant
him jurisdiction over the subjects of the Najd and al-Ḥasā during their stay in
Bahrain.143 The lack of a clear definition of who falls under the term “foreigner” also
allowed for this system to be abused by Bahraini subjects who could claim to be
subjects of other rulers because of their heritage. Before the BOIC was completed in
1913, many Bahrainis did in fact take advantage of this situation. The British agent
142

IOR: L/P&S/10/28 & 82, No. 3134 of 1910, From Major P.Z. Cox, Officiating Political Resident in
the Persian Gulf, to The Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, 27 November 1910, Enclosure
No. 4 of No. 67 of 1911, From Foreign Department, Government of India, to The Earl of Crewe, K.G.,
Secretary of State for India, 8 June 1911, Records of Bahrain, Vol. 3, pp. 435-437.
143
Radhi, Judiciary, p. 29.

87
freed slaves, protected women who had been accused by their families of committing
“honor crimes,” and excused merchants who had committed acts that violated tribal
custom, but did not violate Indian codes followed by the British.144
In the final draft of the BOIC, “foreigner” was defined as “any person not a
British or Bahrein subject,” a definition which gave the British the widest possible
jurisdiction over merchants, migrant workers, and arguably recent immigrants.145
Although it was completed in 1913, World War I prevented the British from putting the
required time and resources into enforcing the BOIC. It was not until 1919 and 1920
that the new courts outlined in the document were established.146
In cases that involved only British subjects and foreigners, the British Political
Resident acted as a High Court Judge and the Political Agent as the Sessions Judge as if
they were operating in a full British protectorate. Appeals in some cases could be made
to the Governor General of the Foreign Department in India. If both the individuals
were Muslim, the case could be referred to the Bahrain sharīʻa courts. However, the
BOIC specifies that in such cases, a representative of the Political Agent must be
present at the hearing to record the proceedings, the qāḍī’s decision must be ratified by
the Political Agent, and final appeal rests with the Political Agent. The Order designates
any insult to religion a criminal offense punishable by imprisonment and/or a fine. This
article offered additional protection to Qajar and Arab Shiis from religious persecution
by the Sunni tribes.
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Cases involving a British subject or a foreigner and a Bahraini subject were
referred first to the Joint Court which consisted of the Political Agent and Shaykh ʻῙsā.
Cases concerning questions of local custom could be referred to the Majlis al-ʻUrf,
while pearling disputes could be sent to the Sālifa Court. Civil cases could be referred to
an arbitrator, or if they involved questions of inheritance, wills, or points of Islamic law,
they could be referred to the sharīʻa court (under the supervision of a representative of
the Political Agent). Any Muslim witness could be sent to the sharīʻa court for the
administration of an oath. Appeals in cases that were sent to the Majlis al-ʻUrf or an
arbitrator could be made to the Political Agent, while appeals from the Sālifa court
could be made to the Joint Court.147
The content of these reforms did not meet with the favor of the Ᾱl Khalīfa or
their tribal allies. One of Shaykh ʻῙsā’s sons, ʻAbdullāh, became a voice of protest
against the reforms. ʻAbdullāh had been gaining prominence by working closely with
his father to gain administrative experience. He earned the support of the tribal leaders,
and at the same time he worked with the British agency to assist them on various
projects. While Ḥamad had been named heir apparent in 1898, ʻAbdullāh desired to
supplant his brother in that position. The British agency considered supporting him in
this and even invited him for a visit to London in 1919 during which he was given an
audience with the King. However, it became evident that ʻAbdullāh’s interests did not
match up with those of the British. ʻAbdullāh had developed very close ties with the
Sunni tribal leaders, and wished to maintain the system that ensured their – and the Ᾱl
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Khalīfa’s – dominance.148 During his meeting in London, he made a series of requests
on behalf of his father that included the return of jurisdiction over non-Bahraini Arabs,
and the ability to choose the Bahraini members of the Majlis al-ʻUrf without
interference from the Political Agent. The latter request was prompted by a
disagreement over some actions ʻῙsā had taken earlier in the year when he appointed
new members to the Majlis without consulting the British agency. He signed the
request: “ʻAbdullāh ibn ʻῙsā Ᾱl Khalīfa, The Successor.”149 All of the requests were
denied. The first was denied because the British had concluded agreements with the
other Arab rulers of the Gulf which granted them the right to protect Arab subjects
while in Bahrain. The second was denied because it contradicted the rulings of the
BOIC.150

Administrative Reforms of the 1920’s

Municipal Councils
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While the institution of new laws regarding jurisdiction over foreigners,
however defined, limited the Ᾱl Khalīfa’s sovereignty, these changes were insignificant
compared to those that occurred beginning in 1920. By this time, Shaykh ʻῙsā had
become no more than a figurehead while Ḥamad had assumed the responsibilities of
ruler. Despite the continued resistance of ʻῙsā and ʻAbdullah, Ḥamad was crowned by
the British in 1923 in front of an assembly of tribal leaders, prominent merchants, and
religious officials.
In 1920, the British brought an end to the amīr-fidāwī system and replaced it
with municipal councils which managed major towns and cities. The head council, that
of Manama, was made up of eight members – four appointed by Shaykh ʻῙsā and four
by the Political Agent, and a president nominated by Shaykh ʻῙsā. The municipality
structure was vastly different than the previous system under the amīrs in which the
amīrs were appointed by Shaykh ʻῙsā, hired their own fidāwīs, taxed at will, and were
responsible to no one for their expenditure. The amīrs were exclusively chosen from
either the Ᾱl Khalīfa family or the Sunni tribes. The appointment to these positions,
which were recognized by the British as well, served only to institutionalize the
limitless authority the ʻUtūb enjoyed over the native population since the time of their
invasion in 1783. As such, the weight of taxation fell heavily on the native population
and hardly at all on the tribes. The new system was modeled exactly on the British
structure in which each municipality was a self-contained financial entity. The revenue
required to maintain the town was collected in the form of taxes from residents. All
residents were taxed equally, and every resident had a voice in determining how the
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taxes were spent as well as the right to demand to examine the municipality’s accounts
at any time.151 This system drastically altered the position of the native Bahrainis vis a
vis the ruling authority. Instead of being subjects of a feudal and largely arbitrary
power, residents now became something more like citizens, to whom some rights were
granted. Native Shiis were now placed on par with the Sunni tribes. All would be taxed
equally and would be equally subject to the now bi-national courts of justice.

Domestic Courts

British reforms of Bahrain’s domestic courts also shifted relations toward more
equality between the Sunni tribes, native Bahrainis, and foreigners. The Majlis al-ʻUrf
was restructured to include an equal number of Bahraini and foreigners – five of each.
The Political Agent chose the foreigners, and while ʻῙsā chose the Bahraini members,
his choices had to be approved by the Political Agent. The Sālifa Court was left under
the charge of ʻῙsā until 1923 when it was abolished. The Majlis al-ʻUrf was enlarged to
eleven, and then to twenty-two members in order to take over the pearling cases.152 The
result was a dual-authority system in which neither the Ᾱl-Khalīfa nor the British had
full control, but all major decisions were made jointly, and power was constantly being
negotiated.
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Regarding the sharīʻa courts, the Sunni courts were not greatly affected. British
agents at times offered suggestions regarding the appointment of specific qāḍīs.153
However, the Ᾱl Khalīfa still had ultimate control over the appointments, which is as it
had been before the British were involved. The Sunni qāḍīs began to receive “official”
salaries from the government, but this also was not a significant departure from their
pre-British position in which their well-being resulted from their close ties with the Ᾱl
Khalīfa. Either way, their loyalties lay with the rulers.
The Shii sharīʻa courts, on the other hand, were considerably affected. As
oppressive as the ʻUtūb tribes had been when they first conquered Bahrain, they did not
interfere with the native Shii community’s ability to choose and maintain their own
local qāḍīs (except, of course, that they taxed Shii landowners and businesses so heavily
that the flow of income to the madrasas, mosques, and religious scholars from these
sources was nearly cut off). When the British began to advise Bahrain’s rulers on
domestic affairs, for the first time in Bahrain’s recent history, or perhaps ever, the Sunni
authorities, together with the British, took control over the appointment of Shii qāḍīs.
A report filed by British Lieutenant Colonel E. L. Ross in 1882 described the
state of the sharīʻa courts at that time.154 The ruler had appointed two Sunni qāḍīs, one
for Manama and one for Muharraq. The Manama judge was Shaykh Qāsim Ᾱl Mihza,
born in 1849, whom we met above in reference to the 1904 incident. Shaykh Qāsim
adjudicated cases according to the Mālikī madhhab, which is the madhhab of the Ᾱl
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Khalīfa. The Muharraq judge was Shaykh ʻAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Shaykh ʻAbd al-Laṭīf,
born in 1837 in al-Ḥasā, from which he fled to Bahrain. He also followed the Mālikī
madhhab. The Sunni qāḍīs’ decisions on minor cases were final. On major cases,
however, their decisions were appealable to the ruler. For Shiis, Lt. Colonel Ross writes
that two qāḍīs were appointed by the rulers: Shaykh Muḥammad ʻAlī ibn Shaykh
ʻAbdullāh, born in 1826 in Jidd ʻAlī, and Shaykh Aḥmad ibn Shaykh Salmān, born in
1841. Although the two qāḍīs are said to have been appointed by the rulers, the report
states that they did not receive salaries, but relied solely upon gifts and donations from
Shii petitioners. Although the British understood this monetary compensation to be
informal, the Shii petitioners as well as the qādīs most likely considered it as al-khums,
a Shii institution according to which a percentage of one’s income is paid as a tax to
religious scholars who will spend it on behalf of God. Also, there was no appeals
process for the Shiis. All decisions by the Shii qāḍīs were final.
Whether or not the two Shii qāḍīs mentioned in Ross’s report actually carried
authority within the Shii community is not clear. Other sources refer repeatedly to
Shaykh Khalaf Ᾱl ʻAṣfūr’s prominence during this period, and his very high standing
among Shiis. A rivalry apparently developed between the Shii qāḍī and Shaykh Ḥamad
Ᾱl Khalīfa. The “bad relations” between the two were described in a letter from
Lieutenant-Colonel L.B.E. Haworth, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, to the
British Foreign Secretary, dated March 1927. Haworth writes that Ḥamad met with him,
requesting the removal of Shaykh Khalaf from the island. Ḥamad swore that he himself
had no problem with Shaykh Khalaf, but that the Shii community did. He produced a
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petition which had apparently been signed by hundreds, in which the Shii community
protested the injustice of Shaykh Khalaf’s activities, and requested that cases be
referred to a different qāḍī, whom they named (Sayyid ʻAdnān al-Musāwī). Haworth
then called Shaykh Khalaf in for a meeting. Rather than exile the qāḍī, he recommended
that the qāḍī go on an extended pilgrimage. Shaykh Khalaf agreed, and Haworth
instructed Ḥamad to treat him with honor and friendship until his departure. The qāḍī
that had been named in the petition then assumed Shaykh Khalaf’s position. Haworth
admits that he himself has doubts about the new Shii qāḍī, “as I have yet to meet an
honest [Shii cleric],” but writes that, “He is at any rate the choice of his sect.”155 It is
difficult to determine whether the “hundreds” of Shiis who signed the petition were
truly representative of the entire Shii community, given that they numbered almost
100,000 at the time.156 That Ḥamad endorsed the new qāḍī is also no indication that the
Shii population agreed. Evidence that mitigates against Ḥamad’s claim is first, that the
new qāḍī died unexpectedly in January of 1928, shortly after his appointment,157 and
second, in May of 1929 Shiis lodged another petition with the British agency, this time
protesting the exile of Shaykh Khalaf.158 Whether the new qāḍī was or was not indeed
the Shiis’ choice, what is clear is that the community now required the sanction of the
Sunni-British government to “elect” their judges. Indeed, the qāḍīs were warned at the
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gathering during which British Political Resident Lieutenant-Colonel S.G. Knox
announced Shaykh ʻῙsā’s abdication and Ḥamad’s crowning that he who interferes with
the maintenance of justice will be dismissed from his appointment. Knox also warned
against the constitution of spontaneous authority: “Attempts by unauthorized persons to
usurp executive or judicial authority will be resented and punished, particularly attempts
by persons who constitute themselves leaders of any community as has been done in the
past.”159
The result of these changes was that religious legal authority became subsumed
under the authority of the state, and hence, Sunni and Shii religious legal authority
became politicized in a way that it had not been in the past. The role of the qāḍī was no
longer limited to local communities, but was now a function of the centralized state.
The relationship between the Shii layperson and his/her qāḍī was no longer a direct one,
in which the qāḍī was chosen by the community, and the petitioner paid the qāḍī
directly for his services. In the new configuration, the primary relationship is between
the litigant, who was now a citizen, and the state. The qāḍī had become a representative
of the state, speaking and acting on its behalf. If an individual wanted to register a
marriage, the only choice open to him was to go to the state’s qāḍī. And of course, the
qāḍī receives his salary from the state, not from the petitioner.
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Waqf

As the British agency set out on its course of pursuing domestic reforms, local
agents examined Bahrain’s infrastructure and public works. They ascertained that the
country was in great need of a number of improvements in the way of, for example,
schools, roads, bridges, hospitals. Having analyzed ʻῙsā’s management of funds and
discovering that not only had he been “squandering” it on “unnecessary luxuries” as
well as giving handouts to Ᾱl Khalīfa family members and Bedouins, but that his wife
had also been literally burying a percentage of the ruler’s revenue in the ground for
several years, the agency determined that a thorough overhaul of the country’s finances
was in order.160 One area that was considered a potential source of funding for public
works was that of waqf endowments. The waqf endowment is the formal
immobilization of property from a donor and the assignment of its dividends to specific
purposes. Two main types of waqf distinguish between those that benefit the Muslim
community in general or groups of an indeterminate number and continue perpetually,
such as in the form of mosque construction (waqf ʻāmm); and those which are
designated for specific, named individuals such as family members, who will eventually
pass away (waqf khāṣṣ or waqf ahlī).161 Waqf endowments in Bahrain, as in most
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Muslim societies, were traditionally managed by the qāḍīs and were administered
according to sharīʻa. During the 1920’s and 1930’s, the British completed a cadastral
survey which showed that of the three major types of agricultural land holdings, Shii
waqf held 33.6%, 17.9%, and 19.2%, while Sunni waqf held .7%, .7%, and 2.2%,
respectively.162
There is no formal documentation of how waqf revenues were used by the qāḍīs,
but the expenses they submitted to the British agency included maintenance of mosques
and their grounds, salaries of muezzins, and salaries of property administrators. Arguing
that this revenue could, first, be better managed by an executive committee, and second,
be better spent on what the British considered to be “public works” (as opposed to
“religious uses”), in 1925 Political Agent Major Daly attempted to remove waqf
endowments from the control of the qāḍīs and subsume them under the central authority
of the government.163 This idea was completely antithetical to the system under which
Bahrainis had been operating for centuries. The idea that the Bahrain government,
which in the 1920’s was not just a Muslim government, but a government ruled jointly
by the Sunni Ᾱl Khalīfa and a foreign, non-Muslim power, would assume control over
what many saw as a religious right aroused furious opposition from the population.
Daly decided not to press on with this particular reform, at least not for the
moment. Waqf endowments continued to be administered by the qāḍīs. For the Sunnis,
this was Shaykh Jāsim, and then in 1926, “the three ʻAbd al-Latīfs.” For the Shia, it was
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Shaykh Khalaf until he was replaced by Sayyid ʻAdnān, again, in 1926. After Sayyid
ʻAdnān died in 1928, no Shii qāḍī was appointed for some months, and the waqfs were
temporarily entrusted to his executor, Shaykh Muḥammad ʻAlī al-Madānī. Finally, it
seems al-Madānī himself was appointed as the qāḍī for the villages, and Shaykh
ʻAbdullāh ibn Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ was appointed for Manama. Shaykh ʻAlī, as al-Madānī
was called, specified that as qāḍī, he wanted nothing to do with the waqfs. Shaykh
ʻAbdullāh on the other hand asked to be put in charge of them. British Adviser Charles
Belgrave persuaded Shaykh ʻAbdullāh to settle for being named president of a
committee that would administer the waqfs. He agreed to this, but the “country people”
apparently objected to his presidency. Finally, British sources say that “government
decided” that neither qāḍī would control the waqfs, but that a committee of six villagers
and four Manama residents would take charge,164 although the qāḍīs were given the
authority to appoint these members. A Waqf Department was also created to oversee
both Sunni and Shii waqfs, which was headed by the ruler’s brother, Shaykh
ʻAbdullāh.165 British sources praise Belgrave’s actions in transferring the Shii waqfs to
a government committee and write that great progress was made thereafter: “the new
arrangement has proved so satisfactory that there is little doubt that the Sunnis will soon
bestir themselves and take over their Waqfs from the three Qadhis. When this is done it
should be possible to open many primary schools all over the island at no extra cost to
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the State.”166 Despite the fact that the Shii community had so strenuously objected to
the removal of the waqfs from the qāḍīs, British sources record that there were repeated
accusations against the qāḍīs of misappropriation of waqf property. By 1930, sources
say the Shii community came to accept the fact of the new committee overseeing the
waqfs because they could now see the efficiency and impartiality with which it handled
the resources.167
The bureaucracy that was planned by the British agents and the Ᾱl Khalīfa was
built slowly due to continuing local political struggles. Sectarian clashes continued
intermittently throughout the twentieth century. For a time, the spread of Arab
nationalism gave village Shiis and Sunni anti-imperialists groups a common cause.
Especially in the 1950’s, Sunni groups and Shiis stood together against British
occupation and the tribal rule of the Ᾱl Khalīfa. However, the groups that constituted
the opposition lacked formal organization and internal cohesion. Ultimately, they were
not successful in attaining any significant political authority for themselves, and the Ᾱl
Khalīfa maintained its rule.
As for the sharīʻa courts, they remained under the control of the qāḍīs. Britain
appointed Charles Belgrave in 1926 to be the ruler’s political advisor. Among
Belgrave’s many tasks was the management of the country’s courts. Belgrave focused
on continuing the reforms of the criminal, commercial, and diving courts, while
allowing the sharīʻa courts to continue much in the same manner as before. In his
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memoir, Belgrave writes that the ruler left the matter of appointing qāḍīs almost entirely
in his [Belgrave’s] hands, and that the ruler’s policy was to “conform as much as
possible to the wishes of the people.”168 Periodically, Belgrave and the ruler instituted
certain regulations for the qadis to follow, such as the number of days per week they
must hear cases, and the hiring of clerks.169 The actual process of deciding cases,
however, was left to the discretion of the judges. In this way, the Shii community
retained autonomy over some of their own affairs.

CONCLUSION

The character of political rule in Bahrain did not remain constant throughout the
islands’ history. Power was held variously by Shii and Sunni sovereigns. The Banū
Jarwān set up Shii institutions which they staffed with Imamis from the shrine cities of
Iraq. When control of the Gulf was seized by the Sunni Hormuz, Shii officials in
Bahrain retained their positions because the Hormuz were content to have the local
governors pay tribute. This situation changed, however, when the Sunni tribe of the
Banū Jabr captured Bahrain. The Banū Jabr dismissed Shii officials and replaced them
with Mālikī Sunnis. Shiism was discouraged, and many Shiis fled Bahrain. Meanwhile,
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the Safavids came to power and eventually captured Bahrain in 1602. This initiated an
era of great intellectual and financial prosperity for the Shiis of Bahrain during which
the Ᾱl ʻAsfūr family produced one of the greatest Shii legal scholars the region has
known. In 1783, this idyllic time ended when the ʻUtūb federation of Arabian Sunni
tribes invaded and conquered Bahrain. Not only were Shii legal and religious
institutions dismantled, but heavy taxes and extortion destroyed Shii businesses and
commerce, and the local pearl trade which had been built and maintained by native Shii
merchants and scholars was taken over by the Sunni tribal chiefs. However, despite
these unfortunate events, Shiis remained somewhat autonomous with regard to their
legal and religious life. While a Shii no longer served in the positions of muḥtasib and
shaykh al-Islām, Shiis could still choose their own qāḍīs. They could still pay him a
tithe for concluding a contract or settling a dispute. Shii qāḍīs still controlled endowed
properties (those that were not confiscated). Throughout this period, Sunnis and Shiis in
Bahrain retained separate institutions to deal with communal legal and religious issues.
The islands existed under one or another patrimonial state in which sectarian communal
prerogatives remained discrete.
The changes that took place leading up to and during the 1920’s effected a
transition of Bahrain from a pre-modern, patrimonial state to a modern nation-state. For
family law, this meant different things for the Sunnis than for Shiis. With the exception
of the removal of waqf endowment from their control, Sunni qāḍīs operated in much the
same manner after the reforms as they had before: their jurisdiction did not change
significantly and their role vis a vis the ruler remained the same. The role of the Shii
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qāḍī on the other hand underwent a total transformation. Before the reforms, the Shii
qāḍī served not only as judge and religious expert, but also as municipal administrator,
business consultant, political advisor, and general community leader. His jurisdiction
included everything but foreign affairs. After the reforms, qāḍīs were appointed by the
Sunni-British state rather than being chosen by the Shii community, they were paid
salaries by the state instead of receiving tithes from the Shii petitioners, their
jurisdiction was reduced to a fraction of what it had been, and their control over waqf
endowments was stripped. Unlike the Sunni waqf which retained a negligible amount of
land holdings, the Shii waqf holdings were significant. The qāḍī managed these, and
therefore controlled the maintenance of mosques, wells, and other public works that
were enjoyed by the Shii community. The role of the qāḍī, and thus the structure of the
Shii community was drastically altered such that by the time the reforms were complete,
the only thing Shiis still had agency over was family law. Given this state of affairs, it is
not surprising that today they would so stridently resist the removal of this last
communal prerogative.
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CHAPTER 3: THE SHII ʻULAMᾹ’

Since the government’s first attempt at establishing a codified family law (for all
citizens) in 2003, Bahrain’s Shii ʻulamā’ have opposed the government having any
hand in the drafting of rules governing the family. Like ʻulamā’ in many other Muslimmajority states, Bahrain’s clerics argue that the state has no authority over matters that
are, they argue, the province of God. However, unlike ʻulamā’ in other countries,
Bahrain’s Shii ʻulamā’ are also arguing against having their family law determined by
government officials who are of a different sect. The ʻulamā’ have declared that the
only way they would accept a government-sponsored family law is if an amendment
was made to the constitution prohibiting anyone but the highest Shii religious authority,
the marjaʻ, the right to approve and subsequently amend that law. The marjaʻ currently
followed by the majority of Bahraini Shiis is Ayatollah ʻAlī al-Sīstānī, who resides in
Iraq. Therefore, the ʻulamā’ are not only claiming religious authority over family law,
but they are looking to a secular authority, the constitution, to safeguard it. In addition,
while the Bahraini constitution defines political authority that is limited to a specific
territory, the religious authority the ʻulamā’ would like it to protect extends beyond
those borders. So far, this demand has not been met.
Adding to the complexity of the issues surrounding Bahrain’s family law is the
fact that not all Shii ʻulamā’ reject the government’s proposed law. The islands’ Shiis
adhere to two different schools of legal Shii thought; Usuli and Akhbari. Usulis are the
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majority, and reject the law, while the minority Akhbaris actually support the law. One
possible explanation for Akhbaris’ support of the law is their close political relationship
to the ruling family. However, another explanation is that Akhbaris and Usulis each
have sound doctrinal reasons for taking the positions they have. Akhbaris have
traditionally argued for the exclusive authority of the religious texts and for strict
reliance on the reports (akhbār) of the Prophet and the Imams. Usulis, on the other
hand, insist on the need to refer to a qualified legal scholar (mujtahid or marjaʻ). It is
crucial, Usulis argue, that this scholar be living. Given these doctrinal positions, the
Bahraini Usulis’ insistence on preserving the control of the marjaʻ over family law
seems to be rooted in their concept of religious-legal authority. Until now, the Shii
ʻulamā’ have enjoyed nearly exclusive control over the sharīʻa courts. It has only been
in the last six years that the possibility that this prerogative will be removed from them
has become real. Therefore, it is only recently that they have had to legitimate their
authority over this area. By examining khuṭab (Friday sermons), written statements in
the press, and on-line publications, the following chapter looks at the ways in which the
Shii ʻulamā’ define religious-legal authority. It also demonstrates that through their
insistence on a constitutional guarantee, the ʻulamā’ are constructing an authority that is
a hybrid between secular political and religious authority.

AUTHORITY BASED ON TRADITION
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Throughout the eight years during which the Bahraini government endeavored
to pass a codified family law, the majority of the country’s Shii Usuli ʻulamā’
consistently opposed this move. Primarily, members of the ʻulamā’ object to individuals
who are not religious specialists having a role in drafting and maintaining the law. Part
of the argument of Bahrain’s Shii Usuli ʻulamā’ is similar to that of ʻulamā’ elsewhere
in that they claim legal authority based on their participation in an Islamic tradition that
includes the adherence to a particular course of study, method of legal reasoning, and
acquisition of certain personal characteristics that specifically link ʻulamā’ in the
present with authoritative figures of the past. While this conscious linking with the past
has at times been understood as a move that is in opposition to modernity, scholars have
pointed out that, on the contrary, tradition often serves as a modality of change.170
Faced with the possibility of losing control over family law issues, Bahrain’s Shii
ʻulamā’ are struggling to define their role against that of the state in a way that situates
them squarely within a religious framework that legitimates that role and grants it
authority. In his study on contemporary ʻulamā’, Muhammad Qasim Zaman writes that
this process of definition is on-going: “The ʻulamā’’s tradition is not a mere inheritance
from the past, even though they often argue that that is precisely what it is. It is a
tradition that has had to be constantly imagined, reconstructed, argued over, defended,
and modified.”171 In the written statements analyzed below, Bahrain’s Shii ʻulamā’

170

Marilyn Robinson Waldman, “Tradition as a Modality of Change: Islamic Examples,” History of
Religions, Vol. 25, No. 4, Religion and Change: ASSR Anniversary Volume (May, 1986), pp. 318-340.
171
Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 10-11.

106
review and reassert their place within the Islamic legal tradition in order to justify their
exclusive control over family law.
In response to the formation of the 2003 drafting committee, which consisted of
the Minister of Justice, the head of the Legislative Committee, and three women
lawyers, as well as judges of the sharīʻa courts (three Sunni and three Shii), ʻAbdullah
al-Ghurayfī, a prominent religious scholar and imam of the Masjid al-Imām al-Ṣādiq in
Manama, published an essay rejecting the law in the May 23rd issue of his weekly
newsletter. Speaking on behalf of other leading Shii ʻulamā’, al-Ghurayfī rejected the
transfer of jurisdiction over matters of personal status from the sharīʻa judges to the
Parliament. Although the law was drafted in part by religious scholars, it would be
ratified and enacted by the legislature. It would also then be subject to amendment by
the same body. Members of Parliament, al-Ghurayfī said, do not possess the necessary
qualifications to give an opinion on matters fiqh and sharīʻa that are the province of the
fuqahā’ (jurists) and the mujtahids (jurists qualified to exercise independent reasoning):

It would be Parliament who would decide for us the
legality of rules in our marriages, divorces, and our
personal status matters. And they would decide for us
the ḥalāl and ḥarām, what is permitted and what is
forbidden, what to accept and what to reject. They
would be the ones to apply one fiqh opinion and reject
others, and to give weight to one judgment of ijtihād
and dismiss others. They…do not possess the competence
to do so: “Say: Was it God who gave you permission, or
do you invent falsehoods About God?” [10 (Yūnus):59].172
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Even if Parliament passes a law that is consistent with sharīʻa today, he argues, they
will have the ability to amend it in the future so that it may someday contradict sharīʻa.
While the Shii ʻulamā’ had made clear their position on the family law, the
government sought the opinion of the general public prior to its 2005 initiative. In 2004,
the SCW commissioned a study to be done on the public’s knowledge of and position
on the family law debate. Of the 1300 respondents, 73.7% said that a codified family
law is needed in Bahrain. However, a full 98% believed that such a law should be
drawn from sharīʻa.173 In responding to the poll results, as well as to the Shii clerics’
arguments, the ruler staffed the 2005 drafting committee exclusively with religious
scholars, however, as mentioned above, he did not consult with the ʻUlamā’ Council.
The exclusion of the UIC from the drafting process, as well as the fact that the SCW
campaign assumed the responsibility to teach the public about family law angered Shii
authorities.
In a lengthy interview with al-Mīthāq, a Bahraini weekly, Shaykh ʻĪsā Qāsim,
the head of the UIC, attacked the campaign. He said that while SCW officials assured
the public that the proposed family law would be derived from sharīʻa and that its
statutes (aḥkām) would be based on sharīʻa principles (mabādi’), they are using these
technical legal terms as if they understand them, but they do not have a grasp of these
terms. He explained that:

There is a considerable difference between basing
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a law on mabādi’ and basing it on aḥkām. Aḥkām are
a type of detailed explanation (tafṣīl) that is based
on the foundation of mabādi’. Mabādi’ are groupings
broader than the matter of aḥkām found in a particular
topic (bāb). Mabādi’ al-Sharīʻa are principles that govern
every chapter of fiqh, and every chapter of fiqh is a
secondary grouping that is based on the foundation
of the mabādi’ of Islam. This confusion of terms greatly
obscures the truth.174
Qāsim said that it is not from general principles such as justice, charity, and honor (to
which the SCW seem to be referring when they say the law will be based on mabādi’)
that specific rulings (aḥkām) are derived. It is through the process of ijtihād, which can
only be carried out by those who are authorized and upon whom it is incumbent (almukallafīn), that rulings are deduced.
The UIC also published a lengthy statement on their website penned by a
leading member of the council, Shaykh Muḥammad Ṣunqūr on January 26, 2006 that
offered religious and legal justifications for the UIC’s opposition to the new law.
Ṣunqūr writes that Islam has already detailed rules for every legal exigency that could
befall a person. It has covered marriage, divorce, spousal support, child custody, child
support, paternity, inheritance, and many other issues. He refers to the sixth Shii Imam
and putative founder of the Imami school of law, Jaʻfar al-Ṣādiq, saying that there is no
matter that has not been addressed:

Islam encompasses all of life, the great and the small,
and offers a judgment for every occurrence: {Nothing
have we omitted from the book} [6 (al-Anʻām):38], and
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}We have sent down to you the book explaining all things{
[16 (al-Naḥl):89]. Thus Islam has rules related to the
administration of justice, for instance it has rules related
to markets and human relations, rules for war and peace,
personal relationships, society, and nation. It has rules
for al-ḥudūd (capital crimes), al-qiṣāṣ (retaliation), al-diyya
(indemnity for bodily injury), and “even the penalty for
a scratch,” as Imam al-Ṣādiq taught.175
Considering all of this, Ṣunqūr argues, it would seem superfluous to import and
apply a completely different system of law, especially a system that was neither
developed by Muslims nor based in religious belief of any kind. Furthermore, this
proposed Western code does not even remain faithful to its own society’s beliefs, but
rather it responds to politics and short-term interests. This kind of law does not have any
relation to Islam, which is not just a system of law, or a set of beliefs, but an entire way
of life. Ṣunqūr admits that Bahrain has already adopted some civil laws, such as penal
and commercial law, for instance, but that this is no justification for accepting yet
another civil law. This is especially true when, “this law would consider Islam [the
sharīʻa] only one source of legislation among many, because

God is the only reality,

and because whatever else they invoke besides Him is falsehood

[31 (Luqmān):30].

Thus, we do not accept that there are tributaries of legislation in Bahrain that are a
mixture of truth and falsehood under any guise.”176 Ṣunqūr stresses that this is not just a
matter of choosing one law over another. God revealed His law, and it is not for humans
to pick and choose which parts suit him and which do not, as is expressed in the
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following Qur’an verse:

Then is it only a part of the book that you believe in, and you

reject the rest? But what is the reward for those among you who behave like this? And
on the Day of Judgment those of you who act thus will be rewarded with disgrace in
this life and with grievous punishment on the Day of Resurrection

[2 (al-Baqara):85].

“Thus as Muslims,” Ṣunqūr writes, “we cannot hold any view except that which enjoins
adherence to what is set forth in the sharīʻa.”
Not only is it essential to limit the law to what is found in the sharīʻa, but it is
also crucial that a qualified individual interpret the religious texts. Ṣunqūr argues that
the texts’ meanings are not clear, and that only a person with extraordinary mental,
spiritual, and moral capabilities can comprehend them. That individual is the mujtahid.
A mujtahid must be knowledgeable about the Arabic literary sciences such as naḥw
(grammar); ʻilm al-ṣarf (morphology); ʻilm al-bayan (rhetorical language), ʻilm almaʻanī (semantics), ʻilm al-badiʻ (figures of speech, rhetoric, and the art of style); and
logic; in addition to the sciences of the Qur’an, tafsīr, and the study of uṣūl al-fiqh
(legal theory) and the manner of textual authentication. The mujtahid must also follow a
specific process of deduction. His examination must be limited to sharīʻa sources:

It is not for him to derive judgments from himself.
No judgment possesses the character of religious
legitimacy unless it is based on the Qur’an and Sunna,
and provided that this is done by means of the methods
and tools that establish definitive proofs on the condition
that the methods are connected with the Qur’an and Sunna.
Unless he has attained that level of aptitude, and unless he
is, in addition to all of that, at the highest level of piety,
devotion, and fear of Allah, only then is there a guarantee
that he will not issue fatwās by following whims or under
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some other pressure or by using some other evidence.
Unless he possesses all of that, he is not competent to
deduce sharīʻa judgments from its sources.177
In this way, Ṣunqūr illustrates the contrast between the qualified legal scholar
carefully deducing judgments, and the elected (or appointed) politician who assures the
public in a cavalier manner that the codified law will be consistent with sharīʻa. To the
government’s pledge that the legislative council will only ratify the law if the ʻulamā’
approve, Ṣunqūr responds, “God’s law does not require anyone’s approval.” In the
legislative council, God’s law would also be subject to revisions, additions, and
deletions. Although the council will supposedly be assisted by religious scholars, after
the council members have heard what the scholars have to say, they can still choose,
using whatever background they want, whether or not to follow the scholars’ advice.
“And then what happens if the members of the council disagree on what to choose?”
Ṣunqūr asks, “Will they subject the laws of God to a majority vote?” It is not the
specialization of politicians to deal with religious law. It is foolishness for anyone other
than the physician to attempt to cure the illness. Implying that the council’s real
intention is to contravene sharīʻa, Ṣunqūr writes, “Ijtihād is the use of methods of
definitive proofs with the intention of understanding the divine text, not opposing it.”178
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AUTHORITY BASED ON SECT

When Bahrain’s Shii ʻulamā’ argue that they are the rightful possessors of
authority over family law because of their participation in the Islamic legal and
religious tradition, implied in this argument is the corollary that if authority derives
from knowledge of and expertise with a certain set of texts and methodologies, then not
only are laypersons excluded from that authority, but so are those who engage with a
different set of texts and methodologies. By this, of course, is meant Sunnis. Bahrain’s
native population has historically been predominantly Shii. The current ruling family,
the Ᾱl Khalīfa, only arrived in Bahrain in 1783. Together with other Sunni tribal allies
from central and eastern Arabia, the Ᾱl Khalīfa conquered Bahrain by force. The
British, arriving in 1829, took the Ᾱl Khalīfa for the rightful rulers of the islands, and as
such concluded their treaties with and gave their political and military support to the
heads of the Sunni family. More than two centuries later, the Ᾱl Khalīfa still rule
Bahrain, despite the fact that the Shiis remain a majority of the population. The manner
in which the Ᾱl Khalīfa have dealt with the Shii population and the issue of sect is and
has been the major political concern for Bahrain’s Shiis for over a century.
In the January 26, 2006 statement, the ʻulamā’ make clear that not only is the
survival of the sharīʻa court at stake, but so is the very preservation of their sect. As
well as taking the side of those who advocate secularism, the government is also
threatening to impose Sunni laws on the country’s Shiis: “Just as the Sunnis would not
accept the Shiis to impose the specific rules of their sect upon them, we will not accept
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the government or the Sunnis to impose on Shiis the particular laws of their madhhab
through this Parliament.”179 This is the true goal of those who support the government’s
law, to eliminate Shii law altogether:

These people made clear their ambition to work
towards a secular law, or one that is a mixture of
secular and religious teachings. They expressed
this goal at the beginning of their movement, and
called for a unified law that covers both Shiis and
Sunnis. This means the promotion of one sect at
the expense of the other. Sunnis and Shiis differ
in some provisions concerning marriage, divorce,
custody, living expenses and others. Thus, we refuse
to stand by and keep silent. Our faith is more valuable
to us than our blood.180
In an earlier version of the same document, the UIC addressed an argument that
supporters of the law had made, that Iran, a Shii-majority country had a codified family
law. The UIC responded that there are great differences between Iran and Bahrain. First,
the Parliament:

Iran has a completely elected Parliament that represents
the people. Here, half of the assembly is appointed by the
ruler and passes whatever laws it wishes. As for the other
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half, called the Majlis al-Nuwwāb, it does not reflect the
reality of the will of the people. The electoral districts are
sectarian in that they make one thousand people in some
neighborhoods equal to thirty-three thousand in others.
Second, the constitutional court: “There is a council [in Iran] called the Council for the
Protection of the Constitution that has the power to repeal any law that was passed by
Parliament that contradicts sharīʻa. Here, there is nothing which guarantees the Islamic
nature of the laws, and the evidence testifies to this;” and third, the source of law: “In
Iran, the Islamic sharīʻa is the only source of legislation. Here, it is only one of the
primary sources besides other sources. Because of this, many laws are contrary to
sharīʻa and they are unjust.” 181 To develop a codified law under such circumstances,
namely circumstances in which those who are developing the law both represent the
will of the people, and are legally obligated to derive that law exclusively from the
sharīʻa, means that the resulting law would not likely compromise either Islam in
general, or inappropriately blur sectarian distinctions.

Substantive Differences

Beyond the threat of the loss of general autonomy Shii judges currently hold
over sharīʻa court proceedings is the issue of the specific rules themselves, as well as
the methodology used to develop them. Ṣunqūr explains that there are significant
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differences between the types of sources that are used to derive law in the Sunni schools
and the Jaʻfarī school. Although both sects agree that the primary sources of law are the
Qur’an and the Sunna, they differ with regard to other sources that can be used. In cases
in which no text exists that addresses the case at hand, the Sunni schools accept reliance
on qiyās (analogical reasoning), as well as al-istiḥsān (juristic preference) and almaṣlaḥa (ruling in the interest of the public good), and other methods that use
subjective reasoning. Ṣunqūr says that the Shiis have rejected these methods
categorically. More than five hundred accounts exist from Imām al-Ṣādiq and others
that refute these bases. The extent of the divergence in actual rulings that is produced by
these differences in methodology cannot be underestimated.
Even though the Sunni and the Shii schools agree that the Qur’an and Sunna are
the two primary sources of law, their theories on what counts as authoritative reports
making up the Sunna conflict. When determining the soundness or weakness of a
particular report, one of the main criteria is the legitimacy of the transmitter. In this, the
Sunnis do not accept those considered authoritative by Shiis, and vice versa. These
reports are often the bases for deriving sharīʻa rulings and fatāwā, therefore generating
greatly diverging results between the sects: “Shiis use the sayings of the twelve imams
as proofs because these sayings are immune to error (maʻṣūma), and they are the most
important means of learning the noble path and its meaning…This basis is not accepted
by the Ahl al-Sunnā.” After discussing these differences in legal theory, Ṣunqūr gives
several examples of the discrepancies in rulings that are produced by these differences.
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He compares the views of the Sunnis schools to that of the Jaʻfarī, and then discusses
what is found in the new family law draft.

Guardianship (Wilāya)

Regarding the subject of guardianship (wilāya), Ṣunqūr explains that the Sunni
schools of Imām Shāfiʻī and Imām Mālik (the two schools followed by most Bahraini
Sunnis) grant guardianship to the father of the bride, then to the paternal grandfather,
then to the full brother, then to the brother’s son, and on to the son (of the bride). This is
different from the Jaʻfarī school, he says, in which the father and the paternal
grandfather are the only acceptable guardians. The Jaʻfarī also distinguish between a
virgin and a woman who has previously been married (thayyib). Guardianship only
holds for the virgin. For the woman previously married, she is the guardian of herself
and requires no one’s permission, and no one can interfere in her contract. In the draft
of the family law, Ṣunqūr points out that Article 16 stipulates that the consent of a
guardian is not necessary. Then he says that in Article 11, the guardian is specified as
the father, then the paternal grandfather, then the full brother. Neither article, he says,
specifies the difference between a virgin and a thayyib. Ṣunqūr only notes these
discrepancies, and does not comment on them. However, as he offers them as examples
of irreconcilable differences, we have to assume that they are significant enough to
stand as proof that the Sunni and the Jaʻfarī schools require completely separate laws to
address their adherents’ personal status issues.
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Child Custody (Ḥiḍāna)

Ṣunqūr says that for the majority of Sunnis, after a divorce, custody of the young
child goes to the mother. They disagree as to what happens when the child reaches the
age of majority. As for the Jaʻfarī school : “According to the Imāmiyya, the most
accepted view is that the mother has the right of custody of the children, male or female,
in the interim [during the waiting period], and after that the mother has the right of
custody of the girl up to the age of seven, unless she marries again. As for the boy, the
father gets custody after the interim.” Ṣunqūr again does not emphasize or analyze what
the exact differences between the schools are that are of concern.182 Even when he
addresses the draft law, he does not express why the law is inappropriate. In discussing
the opinions of the Sunni and Jaʻfarī schools, he talks about the right of custody before
and after the age of majority. In the following in which he looks at the draft law, he only
mentions the right of custody before the child reaches the age of majority (in which
there is little dispute that it goes to the mother). This section of the draft law only
addressed what happens if the mother is not available:

It is stated in Article 119 of the draft of the family law:
182
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“In the case of separation custody goes to the mother,
then to the maternal grandmother, then to the paternal
grandmother, then to the father.” The appearance is
that this arrangement is based on [the assumption that]
it [custody] does not revert to the second arrangement
[to the grandmother] except if the first is not possible
[for example, if the mother is dead] or if she does not
have legal capacity. Otherwise, according to the
continuance of the stipulation, the right of custody
is fixed to the first arrangement.183
The mention of the grandmothers in the draft law could be what Ṣanqūr finds unsuitable
because according to majority Jaʻfarī opinion, custody goes to the father if the mother
dies, remarries, or is legally incompetent. If the father dies or becomes incompetent, it
then goes back to the remarried mother, and then to the paternal grandfather. The
grandmothers are only then reached.184

Divorce (Ṭalāq)

Ṣunqūr points out that while Jaʻfarī law stipulates that a divorce cannot occur
while the wife is menstruating, for Sunnis, divorce can occur whether or not the wife is
menstruating. As for the divorce pronouncements, Jaʻfarī law requires that the words
“She is divorced” be pronounced three times, and that the husband may not return to the
wife in between the pronouncement of these sentences. Saying the words “She is
irrevocably divorced” is not sufficient to effect the divorce. Regarding the Sunni
schools, Ṣunqūr simply states, “The majority of the Egyptian fuqahā’ of the Sunnis hold
183
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the view that the divorce by the three pronouncements effect a definitive divorce.” He
does not explain whether this means that for Sunnis, the statement “She is irrevocably
divorced” is effective or not, or whether Sunnis hold that the husband can return to the
wife in between the three statements or not.185 Ṣunqūr does not address the family law
draft on this matter.

Inheritance (Turāth)

A critical difference between Sunni and Shii law involves inheritance due to the
children of the deceased, especially to daughters when there are no sons. Ṣunqūr
explains that in this situation, Sunni law prescribes that the brothers of the deceased
inherit along with the daughters. For instance, if there is one daughter, she will receive
half, and her uncle will receive half. If there are two daughters, they will each receive
one third, and their uncle will receive one third, and so on.186 This differs greatly from
Shii law which does not recognize the right of the ʻaṣaba, or the closest male blood
relative to the deceased, to inherit along with the children of the deceased. In the above
example, Ṣunqūr writes, “the single daughter will receive half as her lawful share, and
the second half by return (bi-al-radd).” This discrepancy regarding the rights of the
ʻaṣaba originates in the respective schools’ approach to the interpretation of the Qur’an
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verses that address inheritance. The rules of succession existing prior to Islam
privileged the ʻaṣaba over the immediate family and direct descendents of the deceased.
The Sunni schools held that the Qur’an verses were revealed in order to mitigate this
system by allocating definite shares to the spouse and children (often termed the
“Qur’anic heirs”), but not to fundamentally change it. Shii scholars, on the other hand,
did conclude that these verses constituted the establishment of a new system that
favored close relatives (and women) over the extended family. Noel Coulson argued
that the Shii view “reflects a fundamentally different idea of family ties and
responsibilities,” 187 and Joseph Schacht saw in the Shii interpretation “the
consequences of their dogmatic-political doctrines.”188 By this is meant the ideology of
succession that initially and essentially set Shiis apart from Sunnis, that the succession
of leadership of the Muslim community should devolve based on bloodlines rather than
community consensus. The practical effect of this divergence can be as radical as one
group of relatives inheriting the whole of the estate, while others get nothing at all.189
For this reason, Bahraini Sunnis have been known to convert to Shiism toward the end
of their lives, particularly those having only daughters.190
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These few examples of disparities between Sunni and Shii law, Ṣunqūr writes,
“are only the tip of the iceberg. The differences between the madhhabs on personal
status are many and significant. No one among the Ahl al-Sunn (Sunnis) accepts
obligations that their madhhab rejects, just as the Shiis would not accept this.”191
Therefore, a unified law would necessarily deny one sect’s rights to live according to its
principles.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE

A UIC statement published on November 9, 2005, the day of the Seef highway
demonstration, clarified that codification of the law, per se, is not what the ʻulamā’
oppose. Rather, it is that the process of codification will be carried out by individuals
who have not attained the level of piety and legal-religious education required to deal
with these sensitive and complex issues. Even if the draft committee is comprised of
religious scholars, the law will thereafter be subject to amendment, revision, and/or
eradication by Parliament. In addition, the UIC argues that simply enacting a codified
law will not solve all the difficulties plaguing the sharīʻa courts. Egypt and Lebanon
have codified law, but they still have many problems, among them high divorce rates.
The UIC offered the government a solution to the problem of codification. They
agreed to support the new law as long as, first, it is drawn exclusively from sharīʻa, and
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second, an article is added to the constitution stipulating that the enactment of the law,
as well as any future changes to the law, must first be approved by the Shiis’ highest
religious authority, the marjaʻ. The UIC suggested the following wording for the article:
“He who has the right to enact and amend articles of the law is the marjaʻ.”192 For
members of the UIC, that authority is Ᾱyatollāh ʻAlī al-Sīstānī who resides in Iraq. If
enacted, the constitutional guarantee would radically change Shii legal authority in
Bahrain. As the system exists today, the Ᾱl Khalīfa appoint the judges to the sharīʻa
court who then make rulings according their own personal examination of sharīʻa
sources. Although the judges are Shii, they are individuals who have a positive
relationship with the Sunni rulers. The UIC has made no formal demand regarding the
process of the appointment of judges (although they have certainly criticized it).
However, if the constitutional guarantee were to be enacted, those judges would be
constrained by Bahraini law to apply only those statutes that have been approved by
Ᾱyatollāh ʻAlī al-Sīstānī, an Iraqi national.
Some observers have stated that the constitutional amendment is an
impossibility. MP ʻAbd al-Nabī Salmān described the ruler’s unwillingness even to
discuss the constitution: “This by-law [the UIC’s proposed constitutional guarantee]
cannot be changed by Parliament, or even the king. This won’t happen. It is a sensitive
issue. Once we start talking about changing the constitution, the king closes his ears.”193
Salmān and others have suggested that the UIC is using the amendment regarding the
family law as a pretext to open up the constitution for further reform. “What they really
192
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want is to affect constitutional law,” stated Sunni sharīʻa scholar Niẓām Yaʻqūbī who
served on the 2005 draft committee and helped to write the Sunni component of the
family law.194 The UIC has discovered an issue that strongly resonates with the Shii
population; one with which they have been able to mobilize that population against the
Ᾱl Khalīfa in a manner that not even the repression of the 1990’s did. There can be no
doubt that the UIC, as well as most Bahraini Shiis, would like to see the reinstatement
of the 1973 Constitution, or at least some readjustment of the current document.
Despite the great amount of support the UIC enjoys, not all Bahraini Shiis are in
agreement. Some Shiis such as Shaykh Muḥsin Ᾱl ʻAṣfūr support the family law, and
do not back the UIC’s demand for the constitutional guarantee. The next section
explores possible explanations for this divergence.

THE USULI-AKHBARI DIVIDE

Within Imami Shiism, two schools195 of legal thought have historically
competed for dominance. One of the key disagreements between them concerns the
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proper sources of law. Both agree that the primary sources are the Qur’an, and the
hadith, or akhbār. For Imami Shiis, the hadith includes not only the reports of the
Prophet Muhammad, but also those of the twelve Imams. For scholars referred to as
Akbaris, these are the only valid sources of law. Akhbaris do not accept ijmaʻ, or the
consensus of legal scholars. They also reject the use of reason in deducing rules, such as
qiyās (analogical reasoning), istiṣlāḥ (reasoning dictated by consideration of public
interest), and istiḥsān (juristic preference based on practical considerations). One or
more methods of legal deduction in which the jurist uses reason have been referred to
by Muslim scholars, as well as non-Muslim scholars of Islam, broadly as ijtihād,
although the term has become imprecise and requires some qualification. Akhbaris
generally reject all methods of ijtihād, and therefore also reject the role of the jurist who
performs these actions, the mujtahid. The other group of scholars, referred to as Usulis
(taken from the phrase “uṣūl al-fiqh,” or legal theory), do accept some methods of legal
reasoning as well as the consensus of legal scholars as legitimate sources of law. Usulis
not only accept the role of the mujtahid, but have institutionalized the process of
referring to the mujtahid for all legal questions. This process is called taqlīd, and
dictates that every lay person must seek the opinion of a qualified mujtahid in all legal
matters. A mujtahid who has attained a superior status then acquires the title of marjaʻ.
Members of the laity can decide which marjaʻ to follow, or can follow more than
one.196
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Currently, most Bahraini Shiis are Usuli. The members of the UIC are Usuli and
follow the preeminent marjaʻ of Najaf, Iraq at this time, Ᾱyatollāh ʻAlī al-Sīstānī. But
not all Bahraini Shiis are Usuli. In fact, from the eighteenth century until very recently
(the 1980’s), Bahrainis have been predominantly Akhbari.197 The country has produced
some of the most well-known Akhbari scholars such as Yūsuf al-Baḥrānī (d.
1186/1772), and has been considered an Akhbari stronghold by scholars of Islamic
law.198 Bahraini sources interviewed for this project attributed the upsurge in Usuli
thought during the 1980’s to the 1979 Iranian revolution which inspired many Bahraini
Shiis.
Scholars of Islamic legal reform in the Middle East and South Asia have noted
that there is a relationship between the school of legal thought, or madhhab, and the
degree to which Western codified legal systems have been resisted by members of the
ʻulamā’.199 Where legal scholars are given wide latitude in the ability to perform ijtihād,
codified systems are strongly opposed. On the contrary, schools that require conformity
to the existing legal tradition tend to concede rather easily to the imposition of a
197
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codified law. For instance, in Saudi Arabia where Hanbali scholars are at liberty to
interpret the texts freely to derive rulings, codification has been vehemently opposed. In
contrast, the Hanafi ʻulamā’ of Pakistan accepted codification without incident. The
reason for this, it has been argued, is that the act of codifying law is not terribly
dissimilar from the method of deriving rules used by schools such as the Hanafi. Both
processes select rules from already extant sources. Muhammad Qasim Zaman, whose
work centers on Pakistan remarks: “Modern initiatives toward codification, then, can be
thought of as continuing the already well-established practice of adhering to the texts
and doctrines recognized as authoritative in one’s school of law.”200
According to this theory, the Akhbaris’ emphasis on the texts of the akhbār and
their rejection of ijtiihād would make them more amenable to codification. As long as
the rules being chosen for codification are derived from established texts that have been
inspired by the Imams, the authority of those texts, and therefore the Imams, is not
threatened. For the Usulis’, however, authority rests with the mujtahid and especially,
the marjaʻ who is believed to represent the Twelfth Imam. The practice of taqlīd
dictates reference to these experts in any religious or legal matter (it is crucial that they
be living experts). Codification would therefore involve the transfer of the authority
enjoyed by the experts to the text. Usulis, then, have a strong doctrinal basis for
rejecting efforts at codification.
These assumptions are borne out in the respective Usuli and Akhbari positions
on the family law. Discussed at length above were the Usulis’ objections to the law and
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their efforts to protect the authority of the marjaʻ. When asked about the UIC’s demand
for the constitutional mandate for Sīstānī’s approval, Shaykh Muḥsin Ᾱl ʻAṣfūr of a
prominent Akhbari family replied, “Why should we look to Najaf (Iraq)? We have two
hundred years of experts here in Bahrain that are of a higher standard than those from
Najaf.”201 Shaykh Muḥsin described the quality of the scholarship of those in his
family, including Shaykh Yūsuf al-Baḥrānī, mentioned above, and Shaykh Ḥusayn Ᾱl
ʻAṣfūr (d. 1216/1801). Shaykh Muḥsin said that over half the Shiis in Bahrain use the
works of Yūsuf and Ḥusayn. Two theses in particular are used regularly: Ḥadā’iq alnāḍira fī aḥkām al-ʻitrah al-ṭāhira written by al-Baḥrānī, and Sadād al-ʻibād wa rashād
al-ʻubbād written by Ḥusayn Ᾱl ʻAṣfūr. “Even the Usulis use Shaykh Yūsuf and
Shaykh Ḥusayn,” Shaykh Muḥsin said. His comments are corroborated by Attorney
Ḥasan ʻAlī Raḍī in his study of the judiciary in Bahrain. He cites the same two works of
the Ᾱl ʻAṣfūr along with a third, Muʻtamad al-sā’il by ʻAbd Allāh al-Sitrī, and writes,
“The Shia in Bahrain still rely on the remaining books of their jurists, particularly the
books of the above mentioned three jurists.”202 Shaykh Muḥsin himself has compiled a
collection of rulings on family law using the authoritative Akhbari sources, and
especially those of his family members. He offered this collection to the government to
use in the Shii sharīʻa court, but they have not expressed an interest in doing so. Still,
Shaykh Muḥsin supports the family law initiative.
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Apart from these ideological bases for Akhbari support for codification, there
are political motives as well. The Ᾱl ʻAṣfūr family has had a close and agreeable
relationship with the Sunni ruling family. The benefits of this relationship have been
mutual. Members of the Ᾱl ʻAṣfūr have received prestigious and lucrative
appointments, while the Ᾱl Khalīfa have been guaranteed a government-friendly Shii
sharīʻa court, and token Shii support for its initiatives. This situation has begun to
unravel of late due to the work of the women activists described below in the following
chapter.

CONCLUSION
Bahrainis have been debating the enactment of a codified family law since the
early 1980’s. Currently, there are two divisions in the nation’s courts: a civil court that
takes criminal, commercial, and civil cases, and a sharīʻa court that handles cases
related to the family and personal status. The sharīʻa court is further divided into Sunni
and Shii sections, treating the kingdom’s two major sects separately, as each sect
follows its own school of legal thought. Activists have charged that both sharīʻa
sections are in need of reform; that the courts are inefficient, inconsistent in their
rulings, that judges are not properly trained and that some are corrupt. Bahrain’s
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previous king, ʻῙsā b. Salmān Ᾱl Khalīfa, disregarded these charges, and was reluctant
to change the system. It has only been since his son, Ḥamad, was crowned in 1999, that
the rulers have taken serious steps toward the implementation of such a law. Although
the government is an authoritarian regime, Ḥamad has twice suspended his plans to
promulgate a new law, once in 2003 and again in 2006. From all accounts, it was
because of the opposition generated by the Shii ʻulamā’ that the government halted its
plans.
As members of the UIC, Shii clerics argued that the state does not have the
authority to oversee family law. If the state were to issue a codified law, this law would
be drafted and promulgated by men who are not trained in Islamic jurisprudence;
legislators and government officials. Even if the government allowed religious scholars
to draft the law, it would still have to be promulgated, and could be amended in the
future, by these secular authorities. These are “God’s laws,” they argue, and not to be
tampered with by those who are not “men of religion.” A second, not insignificant issue
is that Bahrain’s ruling family is Sunni, and has demonstrated an interest in furthering
Sunni (minority) domination over the kingdom’s majority Shii population. Sunni and
Shii family laws have many elements in common. However, Shii ʻulamā’ are concerned
that the government would not preserve those elements that are specific to Shii law,
since government representatives have expressed approval for a unified law which
would be used for all Bahrainis irrespective of sect.
In public statements, the ʻulamā’ clarify that it is not codification itself that they
oppose, but only the involvement of secular authorities in the codification of the
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sharīʻa. They offer that they would accept a codified law under three specific
conditions: first, that the law would be drafted exclusively by religious scholars; second,
that it would be submitted to the Shiis’ highest religious authority, the marjaʻ, before
promulgation, namely Ᾱyatollāh ʻAlī al-Sīstānī, who resides in Najaf, Iraq; and third,
that the Bahraini constitution be amended to include a guarantee that the law could not
be altered in any way without prior approval of the marjaʻ. Thus, at the same time they
are claiming the superiority of the religious authority of the marjaʻ over the secular
authority of the state, the ʻulamā’ are looking to that same secular authority to safeguard
the authority of the marjaʻ. By issuing these demands, the ʻulamā’ claim the
predominance of religious authority over that of the state and at the same time seek to
safeguard that authority by enshrining it in the very (secular) authority it claims to
supersede. In addition, they ask that the state’s authority, one that is limited to its
geographic and political borders, be used to sanction a religious authority that extends
beyond those borders, in this case to Iraq. Through the debate over the new law, the Shii
ʻulamā’ are redefining the meaning and scope of religious authority by proposing an
extra-territorial jurisdiction that is challenging the sovereignty of the Bahraini state.
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CHAPTER 4: Women Activists Claiming Women’s Rights

Bahrain’s Shii ʻulamā’ have claimed that they have authority over the sharīʻa
court and, specifically, over the family law. They base this claim on their participation
in an Islamic tradition of a particular course of study and the cultivation of a prescribed
type of piety. They also argue that the authority of their highest Shii religious official,
the marjaʻ, supersedes that of the state in matters of Islamic law. Therefore, the Shii
ʻulamā’ oppose the state-sponsored law. They prefer instead either the maintenance of
the current system in which sharīʻa judges have exclusive authority to issue rulings
based on individual consideration of Islamic jurisprudence, or the establishment of a
codified law that is drafted, maintained, and amended solely by Shii religious
authorities.
Standing opposed to the Shii ʻulamā’ are Muslim women activists. The activists
contend that the sharīʻa courts are not giving Bahraini women their legitimate rights
under the sharīʻa in matters of marriage (nikah), divorce (ṭalāq), child custody (ḥaḍāna)
and maintenance (nafaqa). They believe that the government’s codified law, while
admittedly not perfect, would give women the best chance of receiving some, if not all
of these rights. Although the administration of Islamic law has been almost exclusively
conducted by men, contemporary Bahraini women activists claim authority to play a
part in determining the future of the sharīʻa court. The grounds upon which they do so
differ from those of the ʻulama’. As Muslims, they claim rights that are granted to them
in the sacred Islamic texts, the Qur’an and hadith. By engaging with the texts
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themselves, the activists show that the sharīʻa courts have been denying women their
legitimate Islamic rights. As citizens, they claim rights found in the Bahraini
constitution, which declares all citizens equal in regard to legal rights and protections.
As members of a global Muslim community, they draw upon contemporary global, as
well as local or regional (Arab) Islamic ideals of justice. As humans, the activists assert
that the denial of their rights in the aforementioned areas constitutes a human rights
violation, citing international human rights documents such as the United Nations
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention on the Elimination of all
forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).
The strategies by which Bahraini Women activists pursue their goal of attaining
women’s rights are similar to those of the ʻulamā’: they engage in public debate, give
press interviews, hold discussion sessions in the salons (majālis) of prominent members
of society, organize and submit petitions to the government, hold conferences and
seminars, lobby the government, hold public demonstrations, and engage in other forms
of political activism. Through analyzing the strategies of two women’s NGOs, Lajnat
al-Aḥwāl al-Shakhṣīyya, The Personal Law Committee (hereafter PLC), and Lajnat al‘Arīḍa al-Nisā’iyya, The Women’s Petition Committee (hereafter WPC), this chapter
examines the ways in which Bahraini women are challenging the authority of the male
religious elite as well as that of the state. In answering the central question of the
dissertation, namely, how is religious authority determined in contemporary Bahraini
society, the chapter assumes a Foucauldian view of power in which power is relational
rather than exerted exclusively from above. Drawing on the work of Leila Abu-Lughod,
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this chapter considers the activity of the two NGOs as a “diagnostic of power;” as
activity that reveals shifts in relations of power.203 The Bahraini NGOs’ activity reveals,
first, increased involvement of lay people in a discourse, that of Islamic law, once
restricted to religious specialists. This was made possible in part by the opening not
only of a public sphere in which ordinary individuals participate in debate about public
issues,204 but also of a “religious public sphere” in which those individuals participate in
religious discourse.205
Second, the NGOs’ activities demonstrate Muslim women’s agency in a maledominated arena. While contemporary Bahraini women are by no means the first
Muslim women to seek their legitimate rights in the sharīʻa court, the activists
examined here are the first in the modern history of Bahrain to engage in the process of
legal reform in an organized manner. Their activities have yielded demonstrable effects
on policy-making with regard to the judiciary and legal procedure. Lastly, as a result of
specific demands made by the NGOs, the state has begun to provide wives with certain
rights that Islamic jurisprudence dictates are the responsibility of the husband, such as
proper nafaqa and sakan. In this, the activists have caused the state to play a more
significant role in the “Islamic” family.
In the course of striving toward their goal of a codified family law, Bahraini
women activists pursue strategies of political activism: calling for their rights as
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citizens, petitioning and lobbying the government, etc. In analyzing the relationship
between Islam and politics, Dale Eickelman points out that political struggles are not
just struggles over power. They are also struggles over the meaning of symbols.206 The
sharīʻa court has become an iconic symbol of Islamic authenticity, therefore those who
determine the role that court plays also help to determine the meaning of Islam in
society. Also, as Saba Mahmood has demonstrated, it is not just women’s overt
resistance to existing power structures that results in the shifting of power relations.
Women’s performance of piety in activities that serve to re-inscribe religious norms can
be just as transformative as performing those activities which are deliberately political,
and at times even more so.207 As much as the ʻulamā’ may accuse them of being so,
most Bahraini women activists are not secularists seeking to imitate the West by
throwing out religion. They are committed Muslims who believe that the solution to the
problems in the sharīʻa courts exists not in eliminating religion, but rather in enforcing
it.

Claiming rights as Muslims
“Islam gave us and preserved for us all of our rights. All of our rights are found in the
Holy Qur’an”208
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In a speech delivered to the members of the Executive Women’s Society in
April of 1986, lawyer and member of the PLC, Lūlwa al-ʻAwaḍī explained that the
growing crisis in the country’s sharīʻa courts was caused predominantly by one thing:
the religious courts’ failure to follow the rules of religion. The rules of sharīʻa allow a
woman to divorce her husband on several grounds including his failure to support her,
and his mistreatment of her.209 Despite these rules, which al-ʻAwaḍī claimed are
accepted as majority opinions in all schools of Islamic law, Bahraini judges force
women to pay their husbands in order to acquire the divorce, as if they are at fault (i.e.,
to avail themselves of a khulʻ210 divorce): “Regarding our Sharia courts, we have never
seen any judgment which has adopted any of these reasons as a cause for divorce.”211
Regarding the wife’s maintenance after divorce, al-ʻAwaḍī said that the courts generally
award women too small an amount, a practice that she said violates the principles of
Islam.
Al-ʻAwaḍī and the other committee members studied hundreds of sharīʻa court
decisions.212 The committee analyzed decisions in cases relating to twelve specific
issues:
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1) al-wilāya fi ʻaqd al-zawāj (guardianship in the contracting of
marriages)
2) taʻaddud al-zawjāt (polygamy)
3) nafaqat al-zawja (wife’s maintenance)
4) al-ṭāʻa (wife’s obedience of the husband)
5) sinn al-zawāj (minimum age of marriage)
6) ṭalāq al-mukrah wa al-hāzil wa al-sakrān (divorce [initiated by the
husband] under compulsion, in jest, and while drunk)
7) al-ṭalāq al-thulāthī bi-lafẓ wāḥid (triple divorce in one
pronouncement)
8) al-ṭalāq bi-l-ḥukm al-qaḍā’ī (judicial divorce)
9) mutʻat al-zawja al-muṭlaqa (temporary marriage of the divorced
woman)
10) khulʻ (divorce at the insistence of the wife in which she pays
compensation)
11) ḥiḍānat al-awlād (child custody)
12) nafaqat al-awlād (child maintenance)213
The rulings were examined according to two basic criteria: whether they agreed with
Qur’anic injunctions and/or majority fiqh opinions, and whether they were similar to
rulings of the courts of other Muslim countries. The committee summarized their results
and submitted their findings to the Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs along with a
set of specific recommendations for reform. They argued that despite the fact that there
are many valid interpretations (al-ijtihādāt) to choose from, judges in Bahrain’s courts
generally choose the ruling that is hardest on women.214 One example is the unusually
frequent use of the khulʻ divorce by Bahraini judges. The report references Qur’an
2:229 which reads: “It is not lawful for you to take back any of your gifts [from your
wives] except when both parties fear that they would be unable to keep the limits
prescribed by God. There is no blame on either of them if she give [him] something for
213
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her freedom.”215 The report then explains that a majority of jurists have found it
permissible to grant women a divorce in cases in which she simply does not love her
husband, and prefers to pay him in exchange for her freedom, either by returning the
marriage gift (mahr) or by offering him a specified sum of money. In support of the
widespread contemporary agreement on the matter, the report cites laws of other
countries that allowed the khulʻ divorce: Iraqi Article 46, Article 102 of the Jordanian
law, Articles 95 to 103 of the Syrian law, Laws 61 to 65 of Morocco. The committee
then explains that in the case of Bahrain, the khulʻ divorce appeared to be used in most
cases in which the wife initiated the divorce, even when her grounds included being
beaten by her husband or his mistreatment of her, and criticizes this practice: “This is
not legal. It contradicts the most widely accepted rules of sharīʻa.”216 The committee
reported that out of 360 total divorce cases examined from the year 1982, 139 of them
were khulʻ, an unusually high number.217
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The PLC therefore advocated a unified law that would standardize which
interpretations would be used and that could be applied in both the Sunni and the Shii
sharīʻa court. Undersecretary of the ministry Shaykh ʻAbd al-Raḥman ibn Rashīd Ᾱl
Khalīfa rejected the committee’s recommendations, and denied the claim that women
are dealt with in an unjust manner: “Judges presently apply Sharia rules which make no
distinction between men and women and do not discriminate in favor of the former.”218
Shaykh ʻAbd al-Raḥman instead accused the activists of misunderstanding the sharīʻa,
or of trying to introduce legislation that contradicts Islam. He maintained that the judges
are strictly bound by the Qur’an, the Sunna, and the interpretations of the Imams,219 and
that the fact of differing interpretations is the logical result of such a process: “The
words of the Qur’an and the teachings of the Sunna are clear and without contradiction,
and any differences that may exist between the interpretations of the Imams are natural
and such as exist in all authoritative and vital legal traditions.”220
Despite the fact that the PLC continued to base their recommendations on the
Islamic texts, their support for a single law that would apply to both sects aroused the
opposition of the Shii ʻulamā’. In 2003, after Ḥamad announced the formation of a
family law drafting committee, the fear that this law would be the destruction of the
madhhabs became a familiar refrain. Members of the Shii ʻulamā’ accused the
government and the women activists alike not only of importing secular codes from the
as abuse or abandonment. See Leila Al-Atraqchi, “The Women’s Movement and the Mobilization for
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West, but also of seeking to eradicate differences between the madhhabs. As was
discussed in Chapter 1, the king’s 2003 decree came shortly after the wave of sectarian
violence of the 1990’s. Sectarian tensions were thus especially pronounced at this time.
In addition, the government agency charged with Bahraini women’s affairs, the
Supreme Council for Women, announced their support for a unified law.
Although the government eventually conceded to the ʻulamā’ on the point of
keeping Sunni and Shii law separate, the PLC maintains that a unified law for both sects
would not only ease the suffering of Bahraini families better than separate laws could
do, but that a unified law would also reduce sectarian tension, and be fully Islamic at the
same time. When asked what the PLC’s position is on how interpretations should be
chosen for such a unified law, a PLC representative issued the following statement:
It is necessary in my opinion to choose for the personal
status law the most lenient [rulings] that the madhhabs
arrived at, because the foundation of the sharīʻa is the
easing [of burdens], not the amplification of them. The
[rulings] arrived at by the master mujtahids of the madhhabs
were derived in consideration of the time and place in
which they lived. If they had lived in our time, they would
have arrived at [rulings] that befit our time and circumstances.
For there is no text but the Qur’an, and ijtihād does not lend
power to it [my italics].221
The members of the PLC speak with authority and confidence about their understanding
of the way in which Islamic texts are to be used. Their perspective is modernist in that
they consider past rulings and jurisprudence inappropriate for specifically modern social
and historical circumstances, viewing them as inapplicable to their own context. They
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argue that applying a centuries-old ruling to a modern case which involves completely
changed social conditions is not only inappropriate and a cause of unnecessary
suffering, but also contrary to the intention of the Qur’an. They urge an unyielding
focus on the Qur’an, its purpose, and its principles, and continuous reappraisals of such
in light of ever-changing social, economic and political conditions. As the word of God,
the Qur’an is the only enduring authority needed to pursue a way of life that accords
with God’s will. In the last line of the above statement, the PLC is implying that by
placing such a high value on past fiqh rulings, which are human interpretations (as well
as male human interpretations), the ʻulamā’ are revering human scholars above God.

***************

Family law activist and founder of the Women’s Petition Committee Ghāda
Jamshīr also shares a modernist approach to the question of the sources of Islamic law.
In December of 2005, Jamshīr appeared on the talk show “al-Iḍā’āt,” which airs on the
Dubai-based network al-Arabiyya, to discuss the work of her organization toward the
goal of a codified family law.222 Jamshīr had recently received a great amount of media
attention, both in Bahrain as well as regionally, due to three cases lodged against her in
the Bahraini criminal court. In May of 2005 judges in the sharīʻa court accused Jamshīr
of defaming them in remarks she made in person, in materials distributed to the public,
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and in one case, during a private telephone conversation.223 While the case was
eventually dismissed and all charges against her were dropped, the publicity her case
received served to re-ignite public debate over the state of the sharīʻa courts and the
possibility of the codification of family law.
During the course of the interview, Jamshīr made several claims concerning the
current practice of Islamic law. She argued that those who represent Islam, or the
“leaders of Islam” (al-qā’imīn al-Islām) pretend to uphold Islam, but their actions are
contrary to Islam in one of two ways.224 Either they engage in practices that are
dishonest, such as when judges accept bribes, or they follow jurisprudence that no
longer applies to contemporary life and that, on the contrary, creates hardships,
especially for women. The first part of the argument is rather straightforward: a judge
who accepts bribes would be considered unjust by any standard. The second part of the
argument, disputes the judicial philosophy used by the judges. Like the PLC, Jamshīr’s
approach is modernist in that she denies the applicability of past rulings to the
contemporary era, and advocates a re-reading of the primary Islamic texts in light of
changed social and economic circumstances.
The host of the show, Turkī al-Dakhīl, focused on asking Jamshīr to respond to
the assumption that those who defend women’s rights are opposed to Islam. Jamshīr
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stated that this assumption is exactly what she aims to correct. She takes to task those
who make this assumption for their definition of Islam: “people attribute [certain]
customs to Islam incorrectly, while Islam is innocent of this.”225 Specifically, Jamshīr
argues that it is male scholars who are invested with the responsibility of maintaining
Islamic institutions, such as the sharīʻa court judges, that are misrepresenting Islam:
“Islam honors women. The Prophet, peace be upon Him, said, ‘No one honors women
except the honorable, and no one humiliates them except the dishonorable.’ He also
said, ‘Be merciful with fragile women.’ Where is all of this? I see nothing of it.”226
Asserting that these male scholars grant men their rights, while ignoring those of
women, she stated, “The Holy Qur’an was not revealed to the Prophet (PBUH) only for
men…We are equal in rights and obligations.”227
Al-Dakhīl asked if Jamshīr could provide specific examples of the judges
denying women their rights. She then brought out a stack of documents which were
presumably sharīʻa court decisions and proceeded to describe four actual cases. In the
first case, from the Jaʻfarī court, a couple signed a marriage contract after which the
wife discovered that the husband suffers from Hepatitis B. She then sought to divorce
him on the grounds that he would endanger her health and the health of any children
that would issue from the marriage. According to the Jaʻfarī school, these are adequate
grounds for awarding the wife a divorce; one in which she would retain her right to
nafaqa.228 Instead of granting the wife the divorce, Jamshīr explained that the Jaʻfarī
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court suspended the case and reportedly sought to classify the divorce as a khulʻ
divorce.
In the fourth case, also a divorce case from the Jaʻfarī court, the judge awarded
custody of the couple’s five daughters to the husband upon the girls’ reaching age
seven. Because the husband was judged to be at fault, the wife was granted nafaqa and
sakan. However, the wife surrendered these rights in exchange for permanent custody
of her daughters. Jamshīr expressed outrage at the conditions that would force a woman
to abandon her basic rights in order to keep her children, explaining that now this
woman has no money, has begun to beg in the streets, and has applied for welfare
housing from the government. This custody ruling, it should be noted, accords with
standard practice in the Jaʻfari as well as some of the Sunni schools.229 The mother is
granted temporary custody until the child reaches a specified age, usually on or near the
age of puberty, after which the husband is given permanent custody. Jamshīr considers
this ruling exceedingly unjust, contrary to Islamic principles, and simply the result of
biased male interpreters: “The mother is the one who conceives, delivers, raises [the
children] and suffers. The Prophet (PBUH) said, ‘Your mother, your mother, your
mother, and then your father.’ When a child is seven years old, they deprive him of his
mother and give him to the father for what reason? Did the Qur’an say so? There is no
sūra that stipulates this. There are only the results of ijtihād and fatwās.” The
interviewer then interrupted to take issue with this last comment, and Jamshīr
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continued, “We are not bound by ijtihād and fatwās…we are only bound by the Qur’an
and the Sunna. We should only choose those rulings which fit our era.”230
What is perhaps Jamshīr’s most distinctive strategy for advocating for the
government’s codified family law is the organization of public demonstrations outside
the sharīʻa court buildings. Like women activists in other Muslim countries, Bahrain’s
women activists hold demonstrations in which the activists proclaim their positions on
legal reform. What make Jamshīr’s demonstrations unique is that they are comprised
mostly of the court litigants themselves, both Sunni and Shii women who were ruled
against in divorce or child custody cases. A factor that has made it difficult for women
activists to prove their claims is that Bahrain’s sharīʻa court rulings are not published.
There is no public record to which Bahrainis can refer to compare judgments or assess
the performance records of judges. While being interviewed on legal procedure in the
sharīʻa courts, lawyers I spoke with expressed frustration at this fact. Attorney Jalīla alSayed maintained that the foremost problem in the sharīʻa courts is inconsistency in
rulings.231 She described the process lawyers go through upon taking a case. She said
that first, the jurisdiction to which the case belongs must be determined, Sunni or Shii.
This depends on two factors: the husband’s sect, and the court that endorsed the
marriage certificate. Then the lawyer must find out which judge will be hearing the
case. Cases are distributed to judges at random. Then the lawyer must examine that
judge’s precedents if he/she is able to gain access to them.
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Attorney Muhammad al-Muṭawwaʻ explained that lawyers must be familiar with
all the madhhabs. In the Shii court, the judges follow several different religious
authorities (marjaʻs): Ᾱyatollāh Khomeinī, Shīrāzī, Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥusayn
Faḍlallāh, ʻAlī al-Sīstānī and Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr.232 Al-Sayed said that, “They
[the lawyers] can go online and look at statements the marjaʻ made and print them out
and use them as a fatwā. People have also done this by letter. Mostly lawyers do this (as
opposed to litigants).”233 Al-Muṭawwaʻ explained that the litigant’s own marjaʻ is
irrelevant: “The lawyer cannot force the judge to accept a ruling from a marjaʻ just
because that is who the litigant follows. As lawyers, they know the judges after working
with them extensively, so once they find out which judge the case is going to, they can
prepare their case based on that judge’s ideology.”234 It is the same for the Sunni court.
There are judges from all four of the major Sunni madhhabs, therefore lawyers must
research texts from all four schools.
As al-Muṭawwaʻ said, after working in the sharīʻa courts for a long period of
time, each lawyer accumulates his/her own records, but otherwise, he/she is dependent
upon other lawyers for sharing information. Al-Sayed said that some lawyers do not
consider sharing information about specific judges’ inclinations to be appropriate, and
thus keep their experiences confidential. Finally, once the lawyer has assembled the
judge’s previous rulings, he/she faces the difficulty that there is inconsistency even with
regard to the same judge’s rulings on the same issue:
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They don’t feel obliged to follow precedents, even from
their own court, or their own decisions. They make
decisions at their own discretion. For instance, in the
case of a battered woman who is seeking divorce using
battery as the grounds, there may be a case in which she
presented a medical certificate stating that she suffered
such and such injuries, and that may be enough in one
case. However, in the next case, the judge may require
two witnesses to the battery. Obviously if it happened
in their home, it will be difficult to get witnesses.
Because maybe in the other case, the neighbors heard
the woman say “don’t hurt me- don’t break my arm,”
and then heard the man say “I will break your arm,”
and then the certificate says that she did indeed suffer
a broken arm.235
In addition to the problem of inconsistency, there is the issue of impartiality:
“Judgments are to some extent subjective. Objectivity is not enough. Rulings depend on
who the litigant is, who the judge is, the social rank of the litigant, and their gender. The
case of a woman is harder to be substantiated than that of a man.”236
After listening to the heartbreaking stories of hundreds of women who lost
custody of their children, were thrown out of their homes, or who had been waiting up
to a decade for their divorce cases to be resolved, Ghāda Jamshīr took matters into her
own hands. In 2002, she began organizing demonstrations in which those women who
were able and willing stood in front of the department of justice buildings holding signs
that displayed the name of their judge, the case number, and the decision received.237
The decisions were frequently accompanied by the litigants’ own assessments of the
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rulings in which they qualified the rulings as unjust, procedurally incorrect, or
incompatible with Islam.
While attending one such demonstration on June 4, 2005, I photographed some
of the signs held by the demonstrators. Photo 1 shows two signs that refer to the same
case, case #142 of 2005. The signs are being held by the litigants’ children, and were
ostensibly written by them.
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Photo #1
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The sign on the left gives the case number at the top and then reads: “Does this woman
who sacrificed her life and her youth on behalf of her children deserve to be kicked out
of her house? Who will see that justice is done for this woman?” The second sign also
gives the case number and then reads: “From the children of this oppressed woman: We
demand the re-consideration of my mother’s right to full support (nafaqa) and housing
(sakan) from the Jaʻfarī court of first instance. Where are our rights?” What is
interesting to note about the second sign is the way in which the mother’s rights are
expressed. The term nafaqa refers to a husband’s support of his wife, and is a standard
element of the Islamic marriage contract. It includes what are considered to be
reasonable expenses for food, housing, clothing, and related items required to maintain
the wife in a manner consistent with that of her own family. Following a divorce in
which the wife was not judged to be at fault due to disobedience (nushūz) or because
she initiated the divorce without cause (khulʻ), all schools of law agree that the husband
should continue to provide the wife with nafaqa for a specified time period.
As mentioned above, housing, sakan, is considered a normal and in most
situations the most essential component of nafaqa. These are considered a Muslim
woman’s basic rights within Islam. The woman involved in Case #142 was reportedly
denied these rights, and the words referring to them are highlighted on the second sign
by being enclosed in what appears to be embellished parentheses. When Qur’anic text is
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included in most Arabic documents whether they be religious documents or otherwise,
the text is usually enclosed by such embellished brackets to indicate the sacred nature of
the quotation. It is quite possible that the person who wrote the second sign sought to
emphasize the sacred nature of these rights, therefore making the statement that the
judge who decided the case did not comply with Islamic law.
These demonstrations received a great amount of media attention, and threw a
national spotlight on what had been an exclusive arena to which only male sharīʻa
officials were privy. One case in particular received so much attention that it elicited a
surprising response from the king. Jamshir publicized the custody case of Badriyya
Rabīʻa, a mother who lost custody her two children to her husband, who had reportedly
bribed the court. The case was so embarrassingly mishandled by the Sunni sharīʻa court
that the king dismissed six judges who had been granted lifetime appointments.
Despite receiving a great amount of criticism and even threats for her actions,
Jamshīr passionately believes in her right as a Muslim to fight injustice. In the
introduction to her book, The Executioner and the Victim, Jamshīr explains that her
committee has taken upon itself the task of defending the many women who suffer
injustice in the sharīʻa courts. The committee has assumed this task despite the fierce
opposition it has encountered. Jamshīr writes that although it has been a dangerous
endeavor, the committee feels it must continue for the sake of the victims, and that its
work is supported by the hadith of the Prophet (Peace Be Upon Him): “He amongst you
who sees something abominable should change it with the help of his hand. If he does
not have enough strength to do it, then he should do it with his tongue. If he does not
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have the strength to do that, then he should abhor it in his heart, and that is the least of
faith.”238 Since creating the WPC in May of 2002, hundreds of women have come to
Jamshīr for help: for legal assistance, for advice, or just for someone to hear their
stories. One of those women had a story like many others: Fāṭima al-Ḥasan239 lost
custody of her daughter during her divorce. She is only allowed to see her during short
visits three times a week, and even then she sometimes shows up at her husband’s
residence to find that he sent their daughter to his sister’s house, conveniently
“forgetting” about Fāṭima’s visit. While losing custody of one’s child is already a heartrending state of affairs for any mother, Fāṭima’s situation is made even worse by the
fact that during one of her visits with her daughter, the girl told her mother that during
the times her father sends her to her aunt’s house, a male relative there abuses her. At
the time of the interview, Fāṭima had been through three lawyers, none of whom had
been able to help her. She implied that her husband has some connection with the court
which has allowed him to manipulate the case in his favor.240 In Jamshīr’s view, if a
mother losing her child and then being prohibited from taking action while that child is
being abused does not qualify as “something abominable,” surely nothing does.
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Claiming rights as citizens
“Citizens are equal before the law in rights and duties. There shall be no
discrimination between them because of gender, origin, language, religion, or
creed.”241
During the almost three decades that women activists in Bahrain have been
fighting for a codified family law, they have run up against notions of femininity that
frame their public activism as dishonorable, disobedient and unsightly. A telling
question put to Ghāda Jamshīr by the al-Arabiyya interviewer was the following:
“Don’t you think the results would be better if your voice was a bit lower?”242 While it
can surely be said that Jamshīr has held nothing back (see Chapter 1, section on Jamshīr
and the PLC), The Personal Law Committee, which has taken a much more moderate
approach, has received nearly as much condemnation by those who would silence
women who speak in public on the issue of Islamic law. After voicing their support for
King Ḥamad’s 2003 initiative to form a family law drafting committee, members of the
PLC were treated to a tirade of angry criticism from religious scholars. Farīda Ghulām
Ismaʻīl, a member of the PLC, expressed sadness and anger at some of the ʻulamā’’s
responses to her organization’s efforts: “They say we want to get rid of the men of fiqh,
that we are lovers of the Tunisian experiment243…that we are lost and feverish, panting
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for Western ignorance…that we are sick and confused.”244 She explained that despite
the activists’ repeated assurances that they were committed to preserving the sharīʻa
and the doctrinal specificities of both sects, the ʻulamā’ accused them of being
secularists and of attempting to destroy the sects. On the contrary, she said, “we agree
with the ʻulamā’ that sharīʻa needs further study and discussion, but we disagree that
they are the only ones who can legislate on it.” Like Ghāda Jamshīr, members of the
PLC believe that ordinary Muslims, lay people, have the right to engage in legal
discourse and participate in steering the course of legal reform. Initially a small
committee of lawyers and NGO officials, the PLC grew to become a broad organization
in which women from all socio-economic strata, and both sects, participate. As well as
grounding their claim to rights in Islamic texts, the PLC also looks to the modern
political authority of the Bahraini state as a source of rights.
While the PLC has engaged in public demonstrations, their approach is
characterized by a dogged persistence in proceeding through existing legal and political
channels. Since their founding in 1982, the Committee has continued to pursue their
cause through standard NGO strategies such as gathering petitions for submission to the
government, meeting with government officials to discuss their demands, formally
submitting specific recommendations to the ruler, garnering the support of religious
scholars sympathetic to reform, and forming coalitions with other Bahraini NGOs as
well as networking with women’s NGOs in other Arab and Muslim countries (see
Chapter 1, section on the PLC).
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A key strategy used by the PLC especially in the context of its communications
with the government is to claim the right to equality which is granted to them as citizens
by the Bahraini constitution. In a statement submitted to the king in 2003, the PLC
writes:
We, the civil organizations, turn to you with a call,
Honorable King Ḥamad ibn ʻῙsa ibn Salmān Ᾱl Khalīfa
of the Kingdom of Bahrain, to carry out your constitutional
responsibility to protect the rule of law, the constitution,
human rights and institutions and their freedoms. We hope
that Your Honor will enact what is in Article Five of the
constitution: “The family is the basis of society, and it is
founded on religion, morality, and patriotism. The law
preserves its legal status.”
and in Article Eighteen:
“People are equal in human dignity, and citizens
(al-muwāṭinun) are equal before the law in rights and
duties. There shall be no discrimination between them
because of gender, origin, language, religion, or creed.”245
Looking at Article Eighteen first, on its face, the wording would seem fairly
straightforward: citizens are equal before the law. Like most Arab countries, upon
independence from colonial powers, Bahrain wrote and promulgated a constitution.
Although there is no necessary relationship between constitutions and democracy,246 the
constitution came to symbolize progress, democracy, and liberalism. As a legal
instrument that provides a basic framework for governing, it was widely assumed that
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the purpose of the constitution was to limit state power and to establish the relationship
between the state and its legal subjects. The citizen, according to early twentieth century
Western political theory was the individual who freely entered into a contract with the
state. This citizen, who was represented as a generic, universal person, enjoyed a variety
of political, civil, and social rights in exchange for certain specified duties: obedience to
the laws of the state, submission of taxes, etc.247 Termed “the social contract,” after
Rousseau’s 1762 treatise of the same name, this relationship was considered a triumph
in that it freed individuals from the tyranny of oppressive forms of government. In The
Sexual Contract published in 1988, Carole Pateman demonstrated that while the social
contract did in fact provide the individual with more rights and freedoms vis a vis the
state, that individual was a gendered one. Because women were defined as the legal
property of either their fathers or their husbands, women did not share in equal rights as
citizens.248 In her work on women, kinship, and the state in Lebanon, Suad Joseph takes
that analysis even further, and details the specific ways in which Middle Eastern states
act to qualify the citizen as male.
The state defines the rights and duties of its citizens in part through legislation.
There are many examples of state laws and policies in the Middle East that privilege
men, such as those that permit men to pass citizenship on to their wives and children,
but prohibit women from doing the same. Such laws exist despite states’ claims to treat
all citizens equally. The Bahraini state has recently acknowledged the difficulties faced
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by Bahraini women who marry foreign men by granting citizenship to over 370 children
of Bahraini mothers and noncitizen fathers in September 2006.249 However, this was an
ad hoc decision made by the king, and no law has been passed since then to amend the
existing law, Article 7 of the Bahraini Law of Citizenship of 1963, which permits only
male Bahrainis to pass on their citizenship to their foreign wives and children.250
Another reason that citizenship in Middle Eastern countries is gendered is that
the “social contract” is not often between the state and the individual, but between the
state and members of subnational communities, meaning collectivities based on
religion, kinship, ethnicity, or tribe. In the case of Bahrain, citizenship is constituted in
part through membership in a religious community. There are several ways that
religious identity is instituted as political identity. Although Bahrain’s ruling family is
Sunni, and nearly all top government posts are filled by officials who are Sunni, the
forty-seat elected Parliament is more representative of the population. Currently
seventeen out of those forty seats are held by Shiis. Several of the Parliamentary blocs
are organized by religion. Thirty out of the forty Parliamentary members are part of
religious blocs. Citizens’ official documents, such as the identification card, indicate the
bearer’s religion. The country itself is defined as a religion-ed (comparable to
“gendered”) body. Article 2 of the constitution declares Islam as the official religion of
the nation. Most significant for our purposes, the article also names the sharīʻa as a
“primary source of legislation” (masdar ra’īsī li-l-tashrīʻ).251 When a state grants legal
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authority to a religious institution, such as the sharīʻa courts, it mandates compliance
with the rules of religion. The rules of religion in the case of the Jaʻfarī Shii and the
Maliki Sunni schools of law in force in Bahrain assign women rights and obligations
that differ from those they assign men.
Further implementing the differentiated treatment of women and men is Article
Five, which declares the family as the basic unit of society. Thus, the state establishes
its primary relationship with the family rather than the individual. The family is
regulated by religious laws which in turn declare the husband/father the head of the
family. Therefore, the social contract exists only between the state and the male heads
of families. Women’s rights, then, flow not from the state, but through their
relationships with fathers, husbands, sons, etc. The result is that they suffer from
“double jeopardy” 252 in that they bear the limitations that accompany full civic and
political participation, while also being denied full legal status by being defined as
dependents of their male relatives in matters related to the family.
Another way that citizenship becomes gendered is through the production and
re-inscription of “civic myths” that lend the idea of the citizen with a historicity that
seems to precede the state. 253 Such civic myths “naturalize” what it means to be a
citizen, and “regulate forms of inclusion and exclusion that inevitably transport all
manner of inequalities – gender, racial, ethnic, class.”254 An example of this is the
employment of images of the woman as the symbol of the nation. Much has been
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written about the way in which both liberal nationalist groups as well as conservative
Islamists utilized the role of women in society as a marker of authenticity during the
transition to modern nation-states.255 In the face of colonialism, cultural imperialism,
and internal political struggles, women became a tool for the deployment of one’s ideal
“imagined community.”256 While women have at times engaged in the production of
woman-as-nation imagery as much as men have, it has not, in general served women’s
interests particularly well.257 In the case of the family law debate in Bahrain,
participants in the debate have used the image of the woman and the family in similar
ways. The PLC calls upon the king to defend and protect the family, though the way in
which the family is defined is greatly contested.
In the 2005 family law campaign, it was rumored that the Supreme Council for
Women spent a vast amount of funds on promotional materials: beautifully designed,
glossy pamphlets, colorful posters, and even T-shirts and pens. These showy materials
raised the ire of some long-time women activists because they created the illusion that
the SCW was chiefly responsible for family law reform. While other activists had
worked diligently for decades, the SCW was only established in 2001. Furthermore,
some activists charged that the SCW would not allow the activists to participate in the
decision-making process of the campaign: “They say they want to work as partners with
us, but they won’t allow us to make any decisions…They want workers, not
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partners.“258 Most of the promotional materials carried an image of a happy Bahraini
family, with father, mother, girl and boy all in traditional dress. The image was
accompanied by the slogan: “A Secure Family = A Secure Nation.” (see Photo #2).

Photo #2

SANDY RUSSELL JONES

One of the controversial elements of the image was that the mother is not wearing a
headscarf (ḥijāb). Since the 1990’s, a majority of Bahraini women have adopted the
ḥijāb, while very few wore the head covering in the 1970’s and early 80’s. May Seikaly
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notes that during the time she served as a faculty member at the University of Bahrain,
1983 - 1993, the number of students who wore the ḥijāb climbed from 5 percent to 95
percent.259 She attributes this change to the local social, economic and political effects
of the authoritarian rule of the Ᾱl Khalīfa. The rise of unemployment, the widening gap
between the upper and lower classes, the perceived moral degradation caused by a
Saudi presence on Bahraini soil (mainly for entertainment purposes260), and the
complete lack of legal or political channels through which to express grievances created
a vacuum which Islamic revivalism could exploit. She notes that, “While the Gulf
society generally had always been a more genuinely religious and conservative one,
when compared to other parts of the Arab world this modern return to tradition was
shocking in its intensity and assertiveness.261
Having been made aware of the government campaign, the Shii ʻUlamā’ Islamic
Council (UIC) quickly produced a competing illustration. In the UIC version, a similar
family is shown, but with a mother and little girl who are in ḥijāb, as well as a father
with a full beard rather than the fashionable goatee the father in the SCW poster wears.
The UIC slogan counters that of the SCW: “No Security Without doing one’s utmost for
Religion” (see Photo #3).
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Photo #3

SANDY RUSSELL

JONES

The two images are accurate symbols of the self-understandings of the opposing sides
in the family law debate. The Shii ʻulamā’ present themselves as authentic Muslims, in
opposition to the (Sunni) government and women activists, cast as secularists aping the
West. Alternatively, the government presents their family as progressive and modern,
suggesting that the lack of a law allows for a lack of security, which could mean
national security, or security for women within the family. While the Shii ʻulamā’
frequently trot out the accusation that supporters of the codified law have been infected

161
by the West, the juxtaposition of the two sides’ slogans exposes a more entrenched
divide, that between the ruling minority (the Sunnis) and the oppressed majority (the
Shiis). While the SCW could have chosen many other elements to emphasize in their
slogan (justice, equality, impartiality), they chose to emphasize security. Given the
recent sectarian conflict of the 1990’s, perhaps it was hoped that the promise of healing
the country-wide rift would appeal to Bahrainis’ desire for a resolution to domestic
political tensions. Kandiyoti argues that although the West is often portrayed as “the
Other” in narratives about cultural authenticity, this move can mask different,
underlying problems: “The term representing the threatening and invasive Other can, in
fact, take very different forms. Anti-imperialistic pronouncements about the West are
often a thinly disguised metaphor to articulate disquiet about more proximate causes for
disunity,”262 It has also been suggested that a Bahraini emphasis on security reflects a
wider, regional concern with unremitting political instability in the Gulf.263

Claiming rights as Arabs
“What characterizes these [legislative trends] are the effects of nationalism which are
similar in each of these societies and countries. They are thus bound by heritage and by
historical, cultural and religious factors.”264
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In the two years following Bahrain’s attendance at the 1985 United Nations
Conference on Women in Nairobi, Bahraini women’s NGOs greatly increased their
efforts toward legal reform. The Nairobi conference reviewed the achievements of the
U.N. Decade of Women (1976-1985), and created an action plan for advancing
women’s rights during the following ten years. In 1986 and 1987, members of the
newly formed PLC spoke at conferences, initiated a study of sharīʻa court cases, and
organized a three-day conference on women’s legal rights. While the main focus of
these activities was local, namely, the reform of Bahraini law, the activists’ approach
made use of an increasingly common discourse about rights, and reflected an
international perspective in which Bahrainis saw themselves as part of a larger
community of Muslim nations, as well as a global community of women. Not only did
they adopt reform strategies that had proven to be successful elsewhere, they also began
to examine specific codes that had been enacted in the laws of other countries. Having
met and formed networks with women’s groups from other countries in the region and
around the world, Bahraini activists began to share in a common language regarding
women’s rights and human rights. While the use of a common lexicon was a necessary
step in a cross-cultural exchange of ideas and the creation of common plans of action,
the terms used in such discourses cannot always be assumed to mean the same thing
when different parties use them.
In her study on women in Iran, Arzoo Osanloo discusses the way in which the
term “rights” is often assumed to have a universal meaning; one that is contrasted with
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“culture.”265 For instance, those who advocate human rights often find themselves in
opposition to “cultural” practices that resist the encroachment of “universal” ideals such
as equality and freedom. Osanloo argues that it is important to understand that these
“universal” ideals as well as the discourse about them have themselves been constructed
in particular historical circumstances. “Rights, in general, and rights talk in particular,”
she explains, “are cultural practices emerging from a European-American historical and
political trajectory that includes colonialism, and thus are shaped by global power
relations.”266 So, wherever rights discourse is used, it is embedded with certain Western,
liberal values. However, when it is used in non-Western contexts, it does not remain
untouched by local circumstances: “In local contexts…international human rights talk
takes on a vernacular language, mindful of indigenous values, consisting of a layering
of social concerns.”267
In Bahrainis’ discussions of human rights and women’s rights, many local
concerns are present. Bahrain has a specific history of gender relations that has been
affected by custom, tradition, religion, and especially sectarian relations and domestic
political issues. Bahrainis’ use of rights discourse has also been shaped by the local
appearance of Islamic revivalism from the mid-1980’s onward. Islamist activists are
aware of the Western origins of discussions of individual rights, thus women’s rights
activists have been viewed as promoting secular, liberal values. In the 1990’s and later,
Bahraini women activists begin to alter their strategies and terminology in order to
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accord with the Islamic idiom. The name of the PLC itself that was created in the
eighties, Lajnat al-Aḥwāl al-Shakhṣiyya, The Personal Status Law Committee, is
derived from the Western term “personal status law.” In PLC press statements and
organizational material, the law that the committee advocates is referred to as a
“personal status law.” In the late 1990’s, the PLC begins to refer to the law as the
“family law,” qanun al-usra. While the term al-aḥwāl al-shakhṣiyya has been in use in
Arab countries for most of the latter twentieth century, it is generally associated with
the West and a focus on the individual rather than the community or the family. The
PLC’s change in terminology reflects a growing preference for finding an indigenous
solution to the problem of legal reform, and especially, one that is based in Islam. To
speak about a law for the “family” counters the focus on the individual in “personal
status law.”
Bahraini activists’ understanding of rights has also been shaped by regional
discussions of legal reform. Bahrain’s independence (1971) came later than that of
many other countries in the region (Egypt, 1922; Kuwait, 1961; Lebanon, 1943). Egypt
especially has had more time to develop a legal system in the context of the modern
nation-state, and its legal system has served as a role model for other Arab and Muslimmajority countries. Bahrain’s activists have studied the laws of Egypt as well as the
reform strategies used by Egyptian activists in order to create a model for its own
process of reform. The fact that Egypt, Kuwait, and the other countries Bahrainis have
used as models are predominantly Muslim countries make them legitimate sources of
conceptions of justice and definitions of rights. The section below details the ways in
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which Bahraini activists see themselves as part of a larger Muslim and Arab, and postcolonial community; a community that supports particular ideals of justice which
Bahrainis use as a source of the rights they claim.

*********************

In 1982, one of the first practicing women lawyers in Bahrain (and member of
the royal family) Shaykha Hayā bint Rashīd Ᾱl Khalīfa told the press that Bahrain
needed a code of civil rights, and that “in the absence of such a law, there is no surety
for women’s rights.”268 Shaykha Hayā was among the Bahraini delegates to the Nairobi
conference, and a charter member of the PLC. Upon her return to Bahrain, she and the
other members of the PLC, together with several concerned individual volunteers,
formulated a plan for legal activism. One of their strategies was to produce a study of
sharīʻa court rulings, “Study on the laws of Personal Status for the Family.”269 As
mentioned above, for each type of case examined the committee compared the rulings
of Bahraini judges with the laws of other Islamic countries including Iraq, Algeria,
Yemen, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Somalia, and Kuwait. One of the
group’s recommendations was the enactment of a personal status law that would be
similar to Kuwait’s Code of Personal Status, promulgated on July 7, 1984. The
spokeswoman for the committee, Shaykha Maryam Ᾱl Khalīfa, explained that Kuwait’s
law served as an appropriate model because it laid down a unified interpretation of
268
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sharīʻa: “There is no specific law in Bahrain that guarantees a woman her rights. There
are several interpretations of the Sharia law…In Bahrain, the one which is hardest on
women is applied.”270 Like Bahrain, Kuwait has a population that is divided between
Sunnis and Shiis, although in Kuwait Sunnis are the majority.
By comparing their own legal system with those of other Arab and Islamic
countries, the Bahraini activists saw themselves as part of a larger Muslim world, a
transnational Muslim community that offered them an alternative Islamic paradigm.
Ḥasan ʻAlī Rāḍī, a lawyer who has volunteered his efforts to the PLC since its
inception, spoke to the press on the occasion of the PLC’s submission of the study to
the Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs. Rāḍī explained that in light of the laws of
other Arab countries, Bahrain’s sharīʻa judgments appear to be governed more by
tradition than by strictly religious principles: “The general principles which govern
Islamic law are sound but their interpretation depends on the judge concerned. That is
where the problems come [in].”271 In a recent interview, Rāḍī gave an example of how
Bahraini judges relied on custom when the Islamic texts did not warrant it. He described
the issue of the “bayt al-ṭāʻa” in which a disobedient wife is restricted to her husband’s
house by force. While Islamic texts do prescribe a wife’s obedience (ṭāʻa) to her
husband, there is nothing that requires her imprisonment in her husband’s house if she
does not want to remain there. She would simply be considered disobedient (nāshiza)
and would lose certain marriage rights, but she would not be held against her will.
However, Rāḍī said, this custom still persists: “until recently they used to use the police
270
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to enforce the bayt at-ṭā`a. It was ridiculous – the police would go and get the wife
from, say, her father’s house and bring her back to her husband’s house, and as soon as
they drove away she would leave again.”272 By casting themselves as part of a larger
Muslim world and appealing to a wider shared cultural framework, Bahraini activists
can challenge local tradition and constraints, and appeal to a more purely Islamic form
of religion against local practices.
While the Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs denied the PLC’s charge that
Bahraini judges are improperly applying sharīʻa, spokesman Shaykh ʻAbd al-Raḥmān
ibn Rashīd Ᾱl Khalīfa admitted that codification could be beneficial in that it could
“facilitate the uniformity of justice.”273 He mentioned that the Arab world was
considering a draft law that was drawn up by a special committee established by the
Council of Arab Justice Ministers, an international coalition of Arab justice officials.
Generated during a series of conventions held between 1981 and 1985, the draft was
reportedly derived entirely from sharīʻa, and was created in the interest of providing
Arab countries with a standardized, though fully Islamic personal status and family
law.274
The PLC was also aware of the Council’s draft and analyzed it during their own
conference, entitled “Perspective on the position of women in the issue of personal
status law,” hosted by the Bahraini Young Ladies Association on December 5-7, 1987.
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In the conference materials, the introduction explains that there has been an increased
awareness of women’s issues in society, and that the question of the personal status law
is now being discussed in every Muslim country. The PLC sees these developments as
confirmation of its crucial role in raising awareness in Bahraini society, and doing the
work of assessing the suitability of the codified personal status law for Bahrain.275 The
conference participants included representatives from ten different organizations
dealing with women and family issues and legal affairs. The four primary goals of the
conference were:
1) to study the necessity of a personal status law for Bahrain
2) to compare and contrast the differences and similarities
among the personal status laws of Arab countries
3) to support the activities of the PLC
4) to summarize the results and basic indications gleaned
from the conference276
Papers presented at the conference addressed topics such as the effects of social and
economic changes on the family in Bahrain, divorce in Bahrain, the role of the women’s
organizations in advancing women’s rights, the comparison of the personal status laws
of Arab countries, and a critical examination of the draft unified personal status law
issued by the Council of Arab Justice Ministers.

Claiming rights as humans under international law
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“The lack of a codified law obscures the many rights of the litigants and violates those
rights, which are guaranteed to them by Islam, the constitution, and international
agreements which Bahrain has signed.”277
The substantive legislation of other Muslim-majority countries is a source that
Bahraini women activists draw upon to counter the rulings of the kingdom’s sharīʻa
courts. In the studies detailed above, the activists examined very specific issues to see
how these issues were dealt with in the laws of other countries, for example, use of the
khulʻ divorce, or limits on the minimum age of marriage. The fact that their examples
are all taken from Muslim-majority countries, or as the activists frequently refer to
them, “Arab” countries, is designed to lend them legitimacy in the eyes of a public that
resists external interference in local affairs. The activists also understand women’s
rights to derive from another source that possesses less legitimacy for the public, but
nevertheless provides them with a yardstick by which to measure the Bahraini woman’s
status, and offers real legal grounds for their claims.
Since the United Nations issued the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in
1948, the document has been translated into 370 languages. By its own definition, the
Declaration claims to be universal, and to specify “the equal and inalienable rights of all
members of the human family.”278 As Osanloo has demonstrated, the idea that there are
a priori principles regarding the rights of humans that preexist and override local values
and ideologies derives from the West. Originating in the thinking of Western
revolutionaries of the late eighteenth century, the term “human rights” emerged in the
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context of specific historical and geo-political circumstances, and embodies its creators’
own ideals, values and beliefs. Nevertheless, the United Nations’ Declaration of Human
Rights as well as its subsequent documents and treaties have been recognized
worldwide as ideals for governments to strive for. Whether or not they have in fact
complied with them, many governments have become signatories of these treaties, and
have at least professed to uphold the norms and principles contained therein.

Bahrain is a signatory to various U.N. conventions on basic human rights, the
rights of women and children, and treaties against some forms of discrimination. In
assessing the rulings of Bahrain’s sharīʻa courts, activists have found that they often
conflict with the guidelines established in the U.N. treaties. Founder of the PLC Ghāda
Jamshīr worked closely with the Bahrain Center for Human Rights (hereafter, BCHR)
during the course of fighting the defamation charges brought against her by the sharīʻa
court judges in 2005. Jamshīr’s alleged crime was accusing the judges of corruption, in
public and in private. The BCHR defended Jamshīr, publicizing the case and declaring
that a guilty verdict would constitute an infringement on her freedom of speech. The
BCHR also appealed to the international community to support Jamshīr’s and all
Bahrainis’ human rights.
The publicity involving Jamshīr’s own personal rights served to generate more
exposure for her organization’s cause. NGOs such as Amnesty International and
Women Living Under Muslim Laws were made aware of Bahraini women’s status in
the sharīʻa courts. Jamshīr established relationships with international rights
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organizations, and issued formal statements to the U.N. Human Rights Commission,
exposing specific incidents of concern. Jamshīr clearly spelled out the legal grounds of
her complaint as resting on domestic and international law:
We turn to you on the basis of the principles of equity
and human dignity, as stipulated by the Bahraini
constitution in Article 18 which declares all citizens
equal before the law and equal in all civil and legal
rights and obligations, including being equal before
the court in all its forms, such as the sharīʻa courts.
It is worth mentioning that this principle is strengthened
by the international declarations, treaties and agreements
on human rights, among them the Convention on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).279
First, she calls upon the authority of the Bahraini constitution, and then that of the U.N.
treaties. She also invokes a recommendation made by the U.N. to Bahrain, specifically:
“We also encourage the implementation of the recommendation by the U. N. Human
Rights Committee made in May 2005 to enact a personal status law.”280 During a
session of the Committee Against Torture held on May 12, 2005, U.N. representatives
asked Bahraini officials to respond to concerns regarding the treatment and rights of
prisoners. Among the issues addressed was the issue of violence against women, as
prisoners, but also in general. The Committee was made aware that wives who had
presented medical evidence of physical abuse at the hands of their husbands were
ignored by judges. The Committee expressed a formal concern with: “The overbroad
discretionary powers of the Shariah court judges in the application of personal status
279
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law and criminal law, and in particular, reported failures to take into account clear
evidence of violence confirmed in medical certificates following violence against
women.”281 In its final conclusions and recommendations, the Committee urged the
enactment of a codified family law to prevent violence against women.282
The PLC also draws upon international human rights principles in their
recommendations for reform. Although the Committee’s efforts in the 1980’s focused
on locating Arab legislation that could be used as a model for Bahrain, the PLC came to
refer more often to international rights treaties between 2003 and the present. In a 2003
interview, member Farīda Ghulām described the PLC’s renewed approach in light of
King Hamad’s recent announcement of the formation of the draft committee. Ghulām
explained that the ʻulamā’ were telling the public that the government’s attempt to
codify the family law replicates the legal hegemony of the Ottomans and the British,
and that it sought to erode religion. The ʻulamā’ referred to Iran’s as a more legitimate
form of government. Ghulām argued that, “our national council are not mujtahidīn! We
are supposed to be governed by democratic principles.”283 She said that the ʻulamā’ do
not take the injustices women suffer seriously: “The only way to solve these problems is
to cleanse the judicial system…law is the basic vehicle through which this can be done.
Only through the rule of law can you eliminate injustice and chaos.”284
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PLC demands made to King Ḥamad include many references to assumed,
presumably universal standards of equality, transparency, and professional competency
(of judges). In their 2005 statement, four of five recommendations make reference
either to international standards or to principles described as “scientific (al-ʻilmīyya)” or
“enlightened (mustanīr)” words which I argue are used here as euphemisms for
Western, liberal notions:
Our Demands:
1) An initiative to promulgate a unified and enlightened
(mustanīr) law to govern the family based on the rules and
principles of the Holy Islamic Sharīʻa that would also fulfill
Bahrain’s commitment to comply with international
agreements and treaties, especially that of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, CEDAW, and the agreements
on the rights of children.
2) The participation of legal specialists, rights activists, and
NGOs in the discussion of the specific articles of this law and
their review; the consideration of their opinions [on the
aforementioned articles], therefore [resulting in] the basing
of the law on a scientific standard of equality (miʻyār al-kafā’a
al-ʻilmīyya) and scientific experience.
3) An initiative to put a rapid plan in place to reform and
develop the sharīʻa courts, the court administration, and all
related administrative [structures]; a review of judges’ training
and qualifications, making them subject to compulsory
refresher courses in sharīʻa and jurisprudence to raise their
level of competence to perform the duties of the job; the use of
standards of transparency, equality, education, professionalism,
and impartiality in the appointment of new judges, and the
dismissal of lifetime appointees for inadequacy or lack of
competence.
4) To pursue the creation of legislation specific to Bahraini
women using international and human rights standards;
to pass resolutions and procedures that guarantee the
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speed of transactions in the petition of lawsuits before
the sharīʻa courts.
The last demand focuses on the institution of state support in cases in which husbands
are not satisfying their marital responsibilities, or not complying with judgments issued
against them:
5) To set up the appropriate procedures to make use of an
alimony fund; to work on opening centers for family and
legal guidance, and shelters for victims of domestic violence
in every district. 285
Both the PLC and Ghāda Jamshīr’s WPC ground their demands for rights in the
international treaties to which Bahrain is a signatory. Perhaps the most relevant
agreement to the women’s concerns is the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination against Women, or CEDAW as it is commonly referred to, that
entered into force in 1981. The Convention defines the meaning of equality for men and
women, and explains how it can be achieved. As “an international bill of rights for
women,” the document serves as universal reference for countries interested in
promoting women’s rights and correcting disparities between men and women.286
Bahrain acceded to CEDAW on June 18, 2002, however, it entered several reservations.
Specifically, Bahrain took issue with Articles 2 and 16 of the Convention, insofar as
they are incompatible with the Islamic sharīʻa. Article 2 instructs all member states to
affirm equality between men and women in constitutions and all legislation involving
285
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the rights of citizens. It also directs member states to abolish or amend any and all
existing legislation which constitutes discrimination against women. More specifically,
Article 16 orders that states take all appropriate actions to establish equality between
men and women in the realm of marriage, divorce, child custody and all other matters
related to the family. These recommendations conflict with the sharīʻa in basic ways:
the sharīʻa prescribes different roles for men and women in marriage in that the
husband is responsible for providing financially for the wife while she in turn is
obligated to defer to his judgment; it assigns them different grounds upon which they
can initiate divorce; in most situations it requires that the woman’s marriage be
contracted by a male guardian, while men of the age of majority may contract their own
marriages; etc.
So, if Bahrain cannot comply with major directives of the agreement, why sign
it? Ann Elizabeth Mayer has studied the relationship between Arab or Muslim-majority
countries and the CEDAW treaty. She suggests that there could be several reasons why
these countries would sign the CEDAW agreement, including the growing prestige of
international human rights, the desire to correct or assuage stereotypes of Arab
countries as being anti-woman, or specific political goals that may be easier to attain if
countries cast themselves as cooperative players in the global community.287 Mayer
offers the example of Saudi Arabia which ratified CEDAW in 2000. At the time, Saudi
Arabia was attempting to qualify for membership in the World Trade Organization.288
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Judging Arab countries’ intentions to actually enact the provisions offered in the
agreement as false, Mayer refers to the phenomenon as “the New World Hypocrisy,”
and demonstrates that Western countries should not be excluded from this indictment,
analyzing the United States’ interactions with the CEDAW committee and its continued
rejection of the Equal Rights Amendment.289
With regard to Bahrain’s reservations to CEDAW, women’s rights activists are
not naïve. They understand well that when the government signed the treaty, some of its
intentions did not involve effecting the full equality of women in Bahraini society:
“Most of what [you find] in the media is a display of the conventions on the rights of
the family, women, and children that are signed by the Kingdom, but everyone is aware
that it is just ink on paper unless the authorities support and enact realistic and
systematic procedures and just laws that are strongly backed by those in power.”290 All
of the actors involved are also well aware that in the end, the U.N. has no authority to
enforce compliance with its treaties. They are entered into voluntarily, and countries in
violation of them are not prosecuted except in exceptional cases such as genocide. This
does not mean, though, that the treaties are useless. Even in the case of Arab
governments, the fact of formally accepting international human rights law is both a
sign that the government is already open to some degree of change and an action that
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“sets in motion a dynamic that over time should lead to mounting pressures for actual
compliance with human rights standards.”291
The women activists’ role in this process cannot be underestimated. As we saw
above, Ghāda Jamshīr has petitioned the U.N. directly, describing in detail the status of
women in Bahrain. After studying the CEDAW Committee sessions, Mayer found that
Committee members’ background on member countries is augmented by information
submitted to them by women’s groups and human rights NGOs. Representatives from
the member countries are then obliged to respond to the material presented by these
groups, such as Bahrain did in the sessions of the Committee against Torture and the
CEDAW Committee.

CONCLUSION
Bahrain’s women activists have been struggling for family law reform for over
three decades. In May of 2009, a codified law was passed. However, this law only
applies to the country’s Sunni minority. The corresponding Shii law was immediately
rejected by Shii members of Parliament. It is still too early to tell what the effect will be
on Sunni families, and activists have expressed frustration that the majority of the
kingdom’s women continue to be subject to what they consider to be a broken system.
Even so, the activists have arguably effected significant change. They have played a
role in not only the enactment of the Sunni law, but are also responsible for many other
changes that have produced real differences in women’s lives: the establishment of an
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alimony fund for women whose husbands have defaulted on support payments,292 the
dismissal of six judges reputed to be corrupt and/or unqualified from the sharīʻa courts,
and some procedural revisions that have made processing family cases more efficient.
Women’s NGOs involvement with international bodies such as the U.N. has acted to
exert pressure on the state to bring its laws into compliance with the rights agreements it
has already signed.
Women’s engagement in these activities has been made possible in part by the
opening of a “religious public sphere” in which lay people participate, along with
religious scholars. The activists’ participation in public discourse affects ideas about
what the role of both religion and the state is or should be with respect to family law.
The response of the ʻulamā’ and the government to the women’s activity signals a shift
in power relations in which women and lay people are playing a greater role in the
determination of the meaning of sharīʻa and hence of religion in society.
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CHAPTER 5: THE STATE

The family law debate in Bahrain has become the battleground upon which a
struggle for religious, legal, and also political authority is being fought. Both those who
support the government-sponsored codified law as well as those who oppose it claim
the right to determine the future of the sharīʻa courts and the laws that regulate them.
Shii ʻulamā’ argue that Islam demands that no one but religious specialists are
authorized to engage with family law, while lawyers and women activists contend that
lay people can also participate in legal discourse. Many strategies are used: the women
activists invoke the Bahraini constitution and international human rights treaties, and
the ʻulamā’ pursue political activism through the elected Parliament. Both sides are
striving to win the support of the public as well as the ear of the government, but what
of the government?
The Bahraini government is an authoritarian regime. Power is concentrated in
the hands of the ruler, King Ḥamad ibn ʻῙsā Ᾱl Khalīfa, and he does not require the
consent of the population to pass laws or to issue binding decrees. The elected
Parliament, while structured as a fully-authoritative legislative body serves, in practice,
more as an advisory body, as the laws it passes need not be enacted if the king does not
choose to do so. With regard to the family law the state does not have to justify its
authority. Unlike other actors in the debate, it already has the power to pass the law at
any time. If the ʻulamā’ incite their followers to revolt, as they have threatened to do if
the family law is passed, the police could crush their resistance in a matter of hours.
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Through various initiatives and public statements, the king has made clear his intention
to pass a comprehensive codified family law. After seven years of efforts toward this
end, in May of 2009 Bahrain did enact a family law, but it fell far short of what Ḥamad
had originally intended. The 2009 law applies only to Sunnis, a minority of the
population. To a large extent, the same problems remain: hundreds of divorce cases
stalled in a huge backlog, hundreds of divorced women without homes, and the
continued procedural and professional deficiencies in the sharīʻa courts that handle the
bulk of Bahrain’s family cases, the Shii courts. What are the factors that have prevented
an authoritarian state such as Bahrain from carrying out its wishes?
Despite the authoritarian nature of its rule, the Bahraini government is
constrained by various factors. Three of those factors in particular have shaped the way
in which King Ḥamad has managed the issue of the family law. First, the country’s
demographic composition serves as a persistent caution to the Sunni rulers. The
government does not issue formal statistics of the distribution of the population by sect.
However, at the turn of the millennium international NGOs and other observers
estimated that Shiis comprise approximately 70% of the population. Estimates now put
that percentage closer to 60% or less, and many Shiis will argue that this is due to recent
policies issued with the express goal of altering the country’s demographic balance. A
report published by Dr. Ṣālaḥ al-Bandar, Political Advisor to the Ministry of Cabinet
Affairs, in 2006 described certain government officials’ involvement in the recruitment
of Sunni immigrants from other Arab states, a Shii-to-Sunni conversion program, and
the corruption of election officials. The Shiis have developed a historical narrative that
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highlights the Shiis’ indigenous status on the islands and depicts the Ᾱl Khalīfa as
invaders who took Bahrain by force and subsequently tyrannized the native population.
Based for the most part in fact (see Chapter 2 for an account of the Ᾱl Khalīfa’s arrival
on the islands), the Shiis’ narrative, along with the country’s more recent history in
which the Ᾱl Khalīfa pursued political, economic, and social oppression of the Shii
population, continue to underlie relations between the two sects. Various actions taken
by the rulers have triggered that hostility and led to the open revolt of Shii citizens,
most notably in the 1990’s.
The recent efforts of King Ḥamad to redress these injustices have engendered a
political system that permits greater political participation among all citizens. This
greater political involvement, while limited, is another factor that has placed constraints
on the government. Michael Herb, writing on Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates
(UAE), offers a helpful framework for looking at the relationship between political
participation and state agency. In seeking to explain the divergence in economic
development between the two countries, Herb found an inverse relationship between
economic development and the level of political participation. While the UAE’s citizens
enjoy little to no political participation, the nation’s economic success and ability to
diversify away from dependence on oil revenues was legendary, at least until the recent
economic crisis. At the same time, Kuwait has struggled to advance economically
whereas its elected Parliament arguably holds more power relative to its rulers than any
other country in the region. Herb demonstrates that Kuwait’s high level of political
participation acts to deadlock various economic development projects, thus limiting the
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government’s ability to pursue its policies in this regard. Bahrain’s Parliament has much
more limited powers, and has even been referred to as “mere theater.”293 Yet, Bahraini
members of Parliament enjoy a high degree of visibility, and the public activism of the
Shii bloc, al-Wifāq, in particular has greatly influenced the terms of the family law
debate. While there are drawbacks to Herb’s model, some of which are discussed
below, the model is helpful in partially explaining the effect that having an elected
Parliament has had on the ruler’s pursuit of the family law.
The third, and I argue, the most significant factor that has constrained the ruler’s
actions is the existence of a vibrant public sphere in which Bahrainis participate in
critical debate of public policy and issues. The work of Jürgen Habermas, Dale
Eickelman and James Piscatori provides a framework for understanding the way in
which Ḥamad’s own policies of reform, such as those regarding freedom of the press,
freedom of association, and the rejection of censorship, provided the conditions for the
emergence of an arena in which individual Bahrainis and organizations representing
various interest groups could publicly debate the family law. This included not only
non-governmental actors, but also agencies of the state. Indeed, for Habermas, the
creation of state bureaucracies in part produced a new sphere of public authority in
which the various arms of the state, which are tangible objects separate from the ruler,
participated with other actors in society in public debate. The state is not a unitary
entity, but a set of institutions, agencies and individuals each of which has its own
interests that change with time and depend upon the issue at hand. It is in the public
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sphere that these government agencies compete with non-governmental groups as well
as with each other not just over power, but over the meaning of symbols that express the
nation’s identity, and the “rules and discourse that morally bind the community
together.”294 The sharīʻa court system serves as the symbol of Bahrain’s Islamic
identity. Because Bahrain has adopted Western commercial and criminal laws, legalized
the sale of alcohol, and taken various other actions that are seen by conservative
Muslims as the abandonment of religion, the family courts have been crucial for
demonstrating the government’s commitment to Islam. For the Shii community
specifically, the ability to administer Shii family law without Sunni interference allows
Shiis to preserve their sectarian identity as well as their religion. The agencies of the
state who are involved in the process of sharīʻa court reform such as the Parliament, the
Minister of Justice and the judges themselves have varying interests and factors that
they had to consider when responding to the king’s family law initiative, such as
religious and legal ideology, political and social implications, gender roles, and the
maintenance of their own reputations. These interests which at times extend beyond
Bahrain’s national borders conflict in significant ways. To act quickly or
indiscriminately on this issue would be disastrous for the ruler and for the country.
Eickelman and Piscatori argue that “politics may have as much, if not more, to do with
bargaining among several forces or contending groups as with…compelling
obedience.”295 The following chapter details the actions taken by the state toward the
promulgation of a codified family law. By looking at each of the relevant state agencies
294
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in turn, the chapter examines each agency’s specific interests with respect to the family
law and considers the ways in which those interests complicate the ruler’s management
of the issue. Furthermore, the chapter demonstrates that while the family law initiative
began as a key component in the king’s genuine plan for reform, it quickly became the
means by which Ḥamad delicately balanced various political forces and maintained the
stability of his rule.

The King
The “path for a better future”296 –National Action Charter

A new, codified family law was supposed to have been the crowning
achievement of King Hamad’s new, progressive administration. When Ḥamad ibn ʻῙsā
Ᾱl Khalīfa acceded to the throne on March 6, 1999, Bahrainis were hopeful for an end
to the political repression and economic stagnation of his father’s reign. That hope was
not totally misplaced. Within two years, Ḥamad abolished his father ʻῙsā’s most
oppressive tool, the State Security Law, and released more than 900 political prisoners.
He drafted the National Action Charter, a document that provides a blueprint for a
series of political, economic and legal reforms. In a move that engaged the Bahraini
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population and secured their enthusiasm for his rule, Ḥamad held a national referendum
on the charter. On February 14 and 15, 2002, 90% of eligible voters turned out to
approve the charter by 98%. In addition to endorsing individual freedoms and the rule
of law through the separation of powers, the document promises, albeit vaguely, the
enactment of laws addressing the concerns of women and the family: “The state
endeavors to support women's rights and the enactment of laws on the protection of
family and family members.”297 While it does not specifically refer to the sharīʻa
courts, an article on judicial powers provides for the establishment of a constitutional
court, or at least an official with the authority to assess the constitutionality of specific
laws: “The state shall complete the judicial system as prescribed in the constitution. It
shall specify the judicial authority vested with the jurisdiction over disputes as to
whether a given law or executive regulations are consistent with the constitution.”298
The general principles regarding the government’s intention to address women’s
concerns in the National Action Charter were not just words, but in part represented
actions that were already underway. In August of 2001, the king had established a new
government agency dedicated to the advancement of women, the Supreme Council for
Women (al-Majlis al-Aʻlā li-l-Mar’a).299 Through the Supreme Council for Women
(hereafter, SCW), the king implemented several policies aimed at addressing women’s
concerns. Some of these policies which are dealt with in more detail below include the
establishment of family counseling centers, the provision of free legal assistance for
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women of lower economic classes, the opening of women’s grievance offices, and the
initiation of a formal study of divorce cases within the sharīʻa courts. Then, in a move
long-awaited by women activists, the king authorized the formation of a legal
committee by the Ministry of Justice to draft a family law proposal in 2002. Also
addressed in detail below, the 2002 committee produced a workable draft within a few
months.
Part of King Ḥamad’s reform efforts was to commit Bahrain to many of the
international women’s and human rights treaties promulgated by the United Nations and
other international bodies. Bahrain had become a signatory to the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention
on the Rights of the Child, the Convention Against Torture, the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, and the Convention on the Elimination Against All Forms
of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). Decree Law No. 5 of 2002 issued on
March 2, 2002 declared, “We hereby approve the accession of the Kingdom of Bahrain
into the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
approved by the United Nations General Assembly on December 18, 1979, and attached
hereto…Ministers shall, each within his jurisdiction, implement this law.”300 In its bylaws, the SCW was specifically designated as the agency authorized to assess Bahrain’s
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adherence to CEDAW principles. Bahrain formally acceded to the convention on June
18, 2002.301
A condition for joining such conventions was the participation in meetings and
sessions in which representatives of Bahrain had to respond to the questions of
international committees regarding specific practices occurring in their country that
contravene elements of the treaties. In responding to these questions before an
international audience, Bahrain’s representatives constructed an image of the nation,
and an image of the Bahraini government as it pertained to the specific issues being
addressed. The fact that the family law had not been passed was an issue of concern to
the CEDAW Committee. The Committee which met on July 21, 2008, expressed the
opinion endorsed by Bahraini-NGO analysts that the promulgation of the family law
could address many urgent concerns, and asked Bahraini representatives whether
Bahrain had immediate plans to address the issue. In responding, the Bahraini delegates
reported that “Civil consensus is required before a family status law can be
promulgated.”302 Thus, with respect to the family law issue, the king maintained an
image at home and abroad of a democratic government that responded to the needs of
the people. We will also see this theme repeated below in statements made by other
agents of the state such as the Minister of Justice and Islamic Affairs.
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Unfortunately, the king’s carefully crafted image was severely tarnished almost
as quickly as it was created. Without warning, and on the heels of the popular
referendum on his National Action Charter, Ḥamad promulgated a new constitution in
2002 that rolled back many of the political rights he had just promised to deliver. Shiis
especially were embittered by this surprise move. Therefore, when the Shii ʻulamā’
began to oppose the king’s family law initiative, underlying their resistance was a more
general discontent with Ḥamad’s performance. The sections below will demonstrate the
way in which Ḥamad sought to neutralize Shii opposition using the family law
initiative. While each of the agencies discussed below have their own interests vis a vis
the family law and acted of their own accord, they were also directed by the king to take
certain actions either to enact further or to pull back on the family law initiative. An
analysis of these actions demonstrates the delicate balance Ḥamad sought to maintain
between the political demands of the Shiis, the stability of his rule, the maintenance of
the state’s image, and the needs of the population; as well as the ways in which other
state agencies’ own interests complicated the pursuit of this contentious issue.

The Judiciary
“The court is not for debating religion, it is for fixing problems”303 – Sunni Judge Yāsir
al-Maḥmīd

303

Interview with Sunni High Court Judge Yāsir al-Maḥmīd, Muharraq, Bahrain, March 20, 2006.

189
Any changes that would be made to the sharīʻa courts would of course require
the cooperation of the judiciary, and especially, of the sharīʻa court judges. While
leading members of the Shii ʻulamā’ as well as a minority of Sunni Salafi ʻulamā’ have
generally been opposed to the government’s efforts, it would be a mistake to assume
that because judges are also men of religion, they have been opposed to it as well. The
sharīʻa court system is a government institution. Judges are appointed by the king, and
their salaries are paid by the state. However, Shii sharīʻa judges do, and Sunni sharīʻa
judges prior to the enactment of the Sunni family law in 2009 did, maintain a large
degree of independence. Indeed, that was one of the chief complaints of supporters of
the codified law, that judges had too much freedom in deriving rulings from Islamic
texts. Without a standardized set of codes, a judge could produce decisions that
contradicted those of another judge, or even himself, for the same type of case. Ethical
issues aside, this relative autonomy could have provided sufficient incentive for sharīʻa
court judges to oppose codification, as it would infringe upon their authority and
autonomy.
Judges in both courts, however, have demonstrated support for the king’s
initiative, and have themselves participated in the process of drafting proposals for a
family law. Although he himself has been the target of some of the women activists’
accusations, Shii High Court Judge Shaykh Muḥsin Ᾱl ʻAṣfūr has been working toward
codification for over a decade.304 In 1998, Shaykh Muḥsin submitted a sample marriage
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contract for use in the Shii court.305 The following year, he submitted the first part of a
draft of Shii rules regarding marriage for inclusion in a future personal status law. The
draft contained 1507 articles, and was published in January, 2000 in Arabic and
English.306 When asked about the sources he used in developing the rules found within,
Shaykh Muḥsin said that much of the text was drawn from the works of his ancestors,
Ḥadā’iq al-nāḍira fī aḥkām al-ʻitra al-ṭāhira, by Shaykh Yūsuf al-Baḥrānī (d.
1186/1772) and Sadād al-ʻibād wa rashād al-ʻubbād, by Shaykh Ḥusayn Ᾱl ʻAṣfūr (d.
1802).307 After examining Shaykh Muḥsin’s proposal, the Shii sharīʻa court rejected it.
According to the SCW, this was because “it was an individual effort that contained
differences from what is currently in practice.”308 Although no reference is made by the
SCW to the specific Shii legal school followed by Shaykh Muḥsin, the fact that he is an
Akhbari, while the majority of the Shii court is Usuli (see Chapter Three) most likely
affected the reception his proposal received by the Shii court.309 Shaykh Muḥsin said
that he felt somewhat betrayed by this. He argued that there is a great need for
codification, citing many of the same criticisms that the women activists have put
forward, that there is no order in the courts, that it is chaos. The judges all go by their
own opinions, and 80% of the problems in the courts are caused by the fact that neither
the judges nor the litigants know sharīʻa, Shaykh Muḥsin claimed. In the Shii court
specifically, he said there is no consistency because the judges refer to several different
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marjaʻs, whichever one suits his needs at the time. He noted that there have been over
11,000 complaints made by women against the courts, and said that it is only getting
worse. He blamed the Shii ʻulamā’ of the ʻUlamā’ Islamic Council for hindering
Bahrain’s progress in establishing a personal status law. Disagreeing with their position,
he asserted that their resistance to the family law is based on ignorance.310 Regarding
the government’s rejection of his proposals, he defended himself and his scholarly and
legal abilities, saying that Bahrain’s own scholars are of a higher quality than Shii
authorities that some of the judges refer to. For instance, regarding the scholars of
Najaf, Shaykh Muḥsin said that since Saddam Hussein came to power in Iraq, the
standards of scholarship in Najaf have declined.311
While the government declined to use Shaykh Muḥsin’s proposals, another Shii
judge was more successful in his efforts. Also a judge in the High Shii Sharīʻa court,
Shaykh Ḥamīd al-Mubārak submitted a draft in 2002 titled “Mashrūʻ qānūn aḥkām alusra ṭibqan li-l-madhhab al-Jaʻfarī fī tanẓīm al-zawāj wa-l-ṭalāq wa-l-nafaqa wa-lḥaḍāna (Family law according to the Jaʻfarī madhhab regulating marriage, divorce,
maintenance, and custody).312 The draft was divided into two sections, one on marriage,
and the other on its dissolution. The first section included seven chapters covering alkhiṭba (betrothal), al-aḥkām al-ʻāmma (general rules), arkān al-zawāj (basic principles
of marriage), shurūṭ al-ʻaqd (requirements of the contract), ḥuqūq al-zawjayn (rights of
the spouses), anwāʻ al-zawāj (types of marriage), and āthār al-zawāj (al-nafaqa wa-l-
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nasab) (effects of marriage [maintenance and lineage]). The second section had three
chapters that covered the issues of al-ṭalāq (divorce), anwāʻ al-ṭalāq (types of divorce),
and al-furqa bayna al-zawjayn (al-ʻidda, al-ḥaḍāna) (separation between the spouses
[the waiting period, custody]).313
At the same time that Shaykh Ḥamīd submitted his draft proposal, three judges
from the Sunni court submitted another proposal for use in the Sunni court. Judge of the
High Appeals sharīʻa court Shaykh ʻῙsā Abū Bushayt, judge of the High Sunni court
Shaykh ʻAdnān Qaṭṭān, and judge of the High Sunni court Shaykh Ibrāhīm al-Marīkhī
submitted a draft titled “Mashrūʻ al-aḥkām al-sharīʻa fī aḥwāl al-shakhsīyya bi-tanẓīm
al-zawāj wa-l-ṭalāq wa-l-nafaqa wa-l-ḥaḍāna (Draft of sharīʻa rules of personal status
regulating marriage, divorce, maintenance and custody). The Sunni draft comprised 142
articles and followed virtually the same arrangement as the Shii draft, except that the
types of divorce were divided up and given their own individual chapters (almukhālaʻa, al-taṭlīq, and al-faskh). This draft draws from what is referred to as “The
Muscat Document,” a uniform statute drafted by the Council of Arab Justice Ministers.
The law, formally named “Muscat Document of the GCC Common Law of Personal
Status,” was approved during the seventh meeting of the council in Muscat in 1996 and
has served as a legal reference for several Muslim-majority countries.
At this time, in 2002, the Bahraini Minister of Justice presided over the
formation of a committee to draft a codified law. He included in this committee the
three Sunni judges who prepared the draft mentioned above, as well as Shaykh Ḥamīd
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al-Mubārak from the Shii court and two other Shii judges. When the SCW learned of
the creation of the committee, they requested that a number of women lawyers who
specialize in family law be allowed to participate. The Minister agreed, and the final
composition of the committee included three Sunni judges, three Shii judges, and three
women lawyers.314 Upon examining the two drafts, the women lawyers noticed that
approximately 70% of the Sunni draft and 81% of the Shii draft included rules that were
common to both madhhabs.315 They then suggested that the drafts be combined to form
a single draft, while preserving those elements that were distinctive to each madhhab by
including them in separate articles to be applied according to sect. The committee
agreed, and produced a final, unified draft titled “Mashrūʻ qānūn aḥkām al-usra fī
tanẓīm al-zawāj wa-l-ṭalāq wa-athārhumā (Family law regulating marriage, divorce,
and their effects).”316 The draft was organized according to the arrangement of the
Sunni draft and included 87 articles that applied equally to both sects, 13 articles that
applied only to Sunnis, 19 articles that applied only to Shiis, and 15 additional articles,
presumably addressing organizational issues, for a total of 134.317
In September of that year, the independent newspaper al-Wasaṭ reported that the
draft was complete and would be made law within months.318 While women activists
applauded the committee, Shii ʻulamā’ raised objections. Member of the committee
Zīnat al-Manṣūrī said that the Shii ʻulamā’’s objections surprised one of the
committee’s Shii judges. He is from Iran, she explained, and said that Iran has a well314
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developed codified law, and this has not resulted in a violation of religion.319
Immediately after this, the Minister of Justice was replaced. The new minister froze the
draft and disassembled the committee until further notice. Al-Manṣūrī said that “still no
one knows why, and no one knows what happened to the draft.”320
The freezing of the 2002 draft represented a clean break with the trajectory King
Ḥamad’s administration was pursuing with regard to the reform of the sharīʻa courts.
Many Bahrainis felt as though they were at long last on the brink of obtaining a codified
law, and then it was retracted, without explanation. Women’s groups redoubled their
efforts. The recently formed Women’s Petition Committee (WPC) took their concerns
directly to the new Minister of Justice and Islamic Affairs Shaykh ʻAbdullāh ibn Khālid
Ᾱl Khalīfa. Shaykh ʻAbdullah granted them a meeting on September 25, 2002.321 WPC
founder Ghāda Jamshīr presented her arguments, along with a delegation of more than
20 men and women. Among the delegation were lawyers who worked in the sharīʻa
courts such as Attorney Muḥammad al-Muṭawwaʻ and Attorney Fāṭima al-Hawāj, and
the heads of other women’s NGOs such as president of the Bahrain Businesswomen
Society, Afnān al-Zayānī, and the Director of the Bahrain Women’s Society. During the
meeting, the WPC issued two chief demands: the enactment of the unified personal
status law draft, and the immediate dismissal of some of the sharīʻa court judges.
Jamshīr also asked that a new law be passed to revoke judge’s current immunity so that
they can be held responsible for mistakes they may have committed that have resulted
319
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in harm to the litigants. She argued that the current practice of sheltering the children of
divorced couples in police stations may cause the children psychological harm, and
suggested that social centers and NGOs would be a better alternative. The delegates
then presented Shaykh ʻAbdullah with a range of anecdotes detailing the experiences of
recent litigants, highlighting injustices regarding nafaqa awards or lack thereof,
seemingly unjust custody decisions, and judges’ failure to force husbands to provide
sakan. Many of the delegates argued that these rights were assured to women by Islam,
and that the judges, who were supposed to uphold the sharīʻa, were in violation of
religion. As for procedural oversights, Attorney al-Muṭawwaʻ said that the regulations
contained in Law No. 26 for sharīʻa court procedures are not followed because judges
are generally not familiar with them.322 Offering an example, al-Muṭawwaʻ explained
that he has “appeals in the sharīʻa court for a long period that originated eleven years
ago, despite the fact that the period of appeal is limited to only 45 days.”323 He then
described a particularly troubling case that had not yet been resolved. A woman was
granted a divorce after which, following her prescribed waiting period, she remarried
and became pregnant from her new husband. Her first husband then appealed the case
to the Appellate court which declared the divorce invalid and ordered the wife to return
to him. The first husband appealed to the Supreme Court requesting the annulment of
the wife’s second marriage which this court denied, and confirmed the validity of the
wife’s second marriage. Al-Muṭawwaʻ explained that the verdicts were equally
322

Al-Muṭawwaʻ was referring to “Marsūm bi-qānūn raqm (26) l-sana 1986 bi-sha’n al-ijrā’āt amām almaḥākim al-sharʻīa,” Dawla al-Baḥrayn, Wizārat al-ʻAdl wa al-Shu’ūn al-Islāmiyya, Idārat al-Maḥākim,
Qaṣr al-Riffāʻ, December 22, 1986.
323
Jamshīr, al-Jallād, p. 40.

196
authoritative, but came from two different courts (one Sunni, one Shii, but he did not
specify which was which). Now the woman is in the serious dilemma of being married
to two men, and there is no procedure in place to resolve the issue.324 Attorney Fāṭima
al-Hawāj presented similar complaints, saying that judges often lacked professionalism
and honesty, treated lawyers and litigants with disrespect, and that she had personally
witnessed instances in which judges allowed themselves to be bribed by women
litigants with money or favors when they felt that this was the only way in which they
would be granted their legitimate rights.325
After listening to the arguments and complaints of the meeting attendees,
Shaykh ʻAbdullah pledged to take action: “We will examine the cases our sisters have
presented, especially those which have not yet been resolved and have not yet received
a verdict. As for those which have received [judgments], a complaint will be lodged
with the Supreme Council of Judges to look into it.”326 He added: “If there was any
harm caused by any judge belonging to the Ministry, it is possible to raise [the issue]
also to the Supreme Council of Judges to study and investigate it, and issue a conclusive
decision.”327
Several of the sharīʻa court judges responded to the WPC’s accusations, some
with outrage, some with a measure of humility. Draft committee member and Shii judge
Shakyh Ḥamīd al-Mubārak told al-Wasaṭ newspaper that the judges never claimed to be
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in a position that does not require improvement.328 Shaykh Ḥamīd admitted that
Bahrain’s sharīʻa courts experience problems regarding efficiency and organization. As
for these procedural matters, “the timing of hearings, manner of conduct, and the way in
which the hearings are managed, we need a comprehensive plan…Now after the
creation of the Supreme Council of Judges there is great hope for improvement and
solving many problems.”329 As for the accusation that many of the judges are not
properly qualified and have been appointed not due to their competence, but due to their
friendship with certain officials, Shaykh Ḥamīd responded that even in the highest
judicial authorities in the world, capabilities vary. With regard to the implied accusation
of nepotism, he responded that “I personally witnessed in the early 1990’s that the
system offered many educated religious scholars a chance to become judges, but they
refused in fear of the social liabilities that accompany this job.”330 As for the serious
claim that some of the judges intentionally delay divorce cases in order to bribe women
into temporary (mutʻa) marriages with them, Shaykh Ḥamīd said he never witnessed
any such behavior. On the subject of the delay of cases, he explained that the new draft
has addressed this problem in part by allowing the judge to force the husband to divorce
his wife in cases in which the situation poses a threat to the wife, such as when she has
demonstrated the occurrence of domestic violence. Judge Ḥamīd stressed that the judges
did not arrive at this decision because they were sympathizing with women seeking
divorces, but through exhaustive studies of the Qur’an, Sunna, and the fatwās of
328
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prominent Shii religious scholars such as Sayyid Muḥammad Kaẓim al-Yazdī, who
stated that the judge can utilize ijtihād in any situation that poses a threat to the wife to
force the husband to divorce her.331 Shii judge Ḥamīd Ᾱl ʻAṣfūr said that it is unfair to
make broad accusations against all the judges because it would unduly harm the
reputations of those who are honest and respected, as well as demeaning the entire
profession. He agreed that people’s opinions are important, and that they have the right
to issue complaints, but that they should do so through official channels.332
Other judges were not so cordial in their responses to the WPC’s accusations.
Shaykh Jalāl al-Sharqī, judge of the High Sunni sharīʻa court said that the claims are
reprehensible, alarming, and based on faulty reasoning.333 Quoting the Qur’an, Shaykh
Jalāl said that those who spread such false rumors without providing evidence will end
up in Hell: “They follow nothing but conjecture; and conjecture avails nothing against
truth, 53 (Sūrat al-Najm): 28.” He laid blame for any problems occurring in the courts
elsewhere, saying that judges can only rely on the evidence that is presented to them. If
the plaintiff fails to provide sufficient evidence, Shaykh Jalāl said, the judge cannot be
blamed for what results from it. He added that the Ministry of Justice has placed too
great a burden on the judges who number only 23 in a population of 600,000 Bahrainis.
The High court is forced to hear 20 cases each day, and the two lower courts 18 cases a
day in addition to minor transactions such as the issuance of marriage certificates.
Shaykh Jalāl therefore called for an increase in the number of judges. He defended the
331
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Sunni courts’ handling of cases involving nafaqa and sakan, saying that these issues are
decided based on the husband’s financial status, and that judges are careful to ensure
that the wife and children are kept at a standard of living equivalent to what they
enjoyed prior to the divorce. He did, however, call for the implementation of a codified
personal status law as long as it is in keeping with the Qur’an, the Sunna, and the four
Sunni madhhabs. Shaykh Jalāl supports the Muscat document because it is based on all
these things, and because it standardizes procedures and binds judges in all courts. He
concluded his statement by exhorting members of the WPC to be pious and devout, and
to conform to Islamic norms. He also warned them against attacking sharīʻa and fiqh
from the standpoint of secularism.334
As women activists, judges, and members of the ʻulamā’ presented their
arguments both through official channels as well as to the press, public debate about the
family law heated up. After months of no official word regarding the fate of the
initiative, on February 20, 2003, Minister of Justice and Islamic Affairs Shaykh
ʻAbdullah announced the completion of a family law draft in the government-owned
daily Akhbār al-Khalīj.335 Strangely, he offered no details about whether the draft would
be presented to Parliament, or what the government’s timeline was for enactment. He
did describe the draft, however, noting that despite being a unified document, the
particularities of each sect are preserved in separate articles. The title of the draft was
“Mashrūʻ qānūn aḥkām al-usra fī tanẓīm al-zawāj wa-l-ṭalāq wa-l-nafaqa wa-l-ḥaḍāna
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(Draft family law regulating marriage, divorce, maintenance, and custody),” and
comprised a total of 139 articles. Shaykh ʻAbdullah disclosed the draft’s treatment of
many of the most significant issues such as the rules for parents travelling with children
after a divorce, the husband’s obligations for contracting a second marriage, and the
division of property after a divorce.
Again, just as it seemed that the law would be submitted to Parliament, it was
stalled. By May of that year, members of Parliament began to ask about the draft’s fate.
In June, the Minister of Justice and Islamic Affairs Shaykh ʻAbdullah, who had
announced the law months before, denied that he had knowledge of its current status.
On June 20, 2003, he met with some representatives of a Shii religious institute.336
Tensions were running high on all sides of the family law debate, especially the tension
between some leading members of the Shii ʻulamā’ and the supporters of the codified
law. In what would seem like a transparent effort to address that tension, Shaykh
ʻAbdullah made statements praising the institute’s work, and appeared in photos in the
government-friendly daily, al-Ayyām, sitting next to a Shii religious scholar, smiling
and enjoying conversation.337 During the meeting, Shaykh ʻAbdullah was asked about
his position on the family law. He responded that he is not in charge of the law, that it is
not the Ministry of Islamic Affairs that handles it, but the Ministry of Justice. He did
refer to the draft that had been frozen, however, and said that “the law must emerge
from the will of the people. It must reflect their true wishes above all.”
336
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An official explanation was delivered a couple of weeks later from the Ministry
of Justice. Member of the 2002 drafting committee Judge Ḥamīd al-Mubārak
announced that the effort to arrive at a workable draft had failed.338 Stating that all sides
had agreed upon the necessity to codify family law, the issue of unifying the laws of
both sects had ultimately divided the committee and left them at an impasse. AlMubārak said that the women lawyers on the 2002 committee had almost succeeded in
getting parts of the legislation passed, but even those efforts failed.
A year later, the government started again from scratch. Partly in response to an
opinion poll conducted by the SCW, detailed below, in which 97% of the respondents
felt that the family law should be drawn from sharīʻa, a new committee was formed
exclusively of judges and religious scholars. In addition, separate committees were
formed for each sect. Member of the Sunni committee, Yāsir al-Maḥmīd, Sunni judge
of the High sharīʻa court and self-described Salafi said that a meeting was convened
with the Minister of Justice who said that he wanted a law quickly, within a year.339 He
told the judges that the Muscat Document was not appropriate because it was
disorganized, not realistic, and did not provide enough flexibility. Instead, the
committee looked at the laws of other Arab countries such as Kuwait, Egypt, Syria, and
Jordan, as well as using the Muscat Document as a guideline. The committee also
decided not to adhere to a single madhhab, but chose opinions from all four. AlMaḥmīd commented that there is no prescription for Muslims to follow just one
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madhhab, and that it is best not to have a narrow vision because “the court is not for
debating religion, it is for fixing problems.”340 When asked about the divisive issue of
unification of the Sunni and Shii laws, another member of the Sunni committee, Niẓam
Yaʻqūbī said that he thought it was far too early for such a move. A better approach,
Yaʻqūbī suggested, is to implement new laws for each court, wait a few years, and then
decide which articles the sects have in common and which articles should be kept
distinct.341

Parliament
“This has become a purely political issue, and the losers are women and families” Member of Parliament ʻAbd al-Nabī Salmān342

Because of the history of its domestic politics, the Bahraini political process has
necessarily been defined by sectarian relations. Therefore, any issue that is raised for
legislation is immediately measured against its implications for those relations. The
family law issue is no exception. The fact that women activists had long-supported the
unification of the laws of the two sects into one code gave Shiis reason to worry that
any such resulting document could end up jettisoning Shii particularities in favor of
Sunni preferences. As we saw in the previous section, it was this issue above all that
divided members of the judiciary and prevented the draft committee from reaching a
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solution. Shii members of Parliament have stood firm on this issue as well, opposing
statutory unification, and those who did not lost their popular backing. Sunni members
of Parliament were divided on a variety of issues.
The forty-seat elected Parliament was given the authority to propose legislation.
However, their proposals can be accepted or rejected at the behest of the king. Still,
members of Parliament have a degree of power by nature of their visibility, and for
some, the strength of their constituent communities. Bahrain’s Parliament is largely
organized by religiously-affiliated blocs. The Sunni blocs include al-Minbar al-Waṭanī
al-Islāmī, which is associated with the international Sunni organization the Muslim
Brotherhood, and Jamʻīyya al-Aṣāla al-Islāmīyya, a Salafi organization, while the Shii
bloc is Jamʻīyya al-Wifāq al-Waṭanī al-Islāmīyya, the largest Shii political organization.
While there are currently fifteen religious political organizations in Bahrain, only three
hold seats in the Parliament. It can be said that these blocs are often concerned more
with religious ideology and advancing the interests of those whose religious views they
share than the technical matters of governance. These interests at times extend beyond
national borders, and encompass regional actors who advise Bahraini Parliamentarians
how to vote on certain issues, or who are included in Bahrainis’ consideration of their
own domestic affairs. We will see below that this is the case with the issue of the family
law.
During the April 1st session of the representative’s council in 2003, five
members of the al-Minbar bloc proposed a discussion of the issue of codification of the
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family law.343 The Muslim Brotherhood is generally considered to be a socially and
religiously conservative organization due to its historical involvement with Islamist
politics in Egypt and elsewhere. However, the Bahraini Muslim Brotherhood has at
times been among the most vocal supporters of liberal policies, including the family
law.344 Al-Minbar members first listed several challenges faced by litigants in the
sharīʻa courts: cases drag on too long, especially those divorce cases which are initiated
by women; judges too often deadlock between conflicting judgments; judges
interpretations are not based on clear verses from the Qur’an or the Sunna; and that the
courts have no mechanism with which to implement their rulings. They confirmed that
they were in favor of the enactment of a codified law, and argued that it is possible to
create a law that is not in violation of Islam as long as it is drafted with the assistance of
religious scholars and based on Islamic texts. The al-Minbar members argued that the
law should also be based on studies which assess current social and family conditions so
that drafters can choose only those religious opinions which are best suited to Bahrain’s
specific needs. Lastly, they called for an increase in the number of judges, and the
establishment of training programs to ensure judges’ academic and professional
competency.345
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In the meantime, the Supreme Council for Women also issued a statement
regarding the family law. On May 3rd, 2003, Secretary-General Lūlwa al-ʻAwaḍī
announced that the SCW welcomed the enactment of a new law regulating personal
status issues. She asserted that a unified law would be consistent with King Ḥamad’s
program for improving the nation: “The new law is in line with the principles of
national unity stipulated in the National Action Charter, and contains the objectives of
the amended constitution and His Majesty the King’s reform project.”346 Despite the
great amount of talk about the law, so far the government had not given any indication
of when they would set the process in motion. Members of Parliament became
frustrated. During the May 6th session, member of the al-Minbar bloc Dr. ʻAbd al-Laṭīf
al-Shaykh threw out the first question to the Minister of Justice and Islamic Affairs,
asking why there has been such a considerable delay in enacting the law. The Minister
replied that the Ministry has a number of drafts to consider, and that it is still in the
process of studying them. He did not comment on the committee that was formed in
2002, or on the draft they had produced.347
Public discussion continued between various agents of the state: judges,
members of Parliament, and members of the SCW. On Tuesday, May 13, independent
member of Parliament, self-described as Salafi in religious orientation, Jāsim al-Saʻīdī
stated to the press that he was surprised by a recent exchange between a group of
ʻulamā’ and the king.348 The ʻulamā’ expressed the opinion that scholars of religion
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should be involved in the drafting of any law that would apply to personal status or
family issues, and the king reportedly responded favorably to their request. Al-Saʻīdī
said that he appreciates the ʻulamā’’s concern for the country’s interests, he would like
them to know that the approval or dismissal of the personal status law is none of their
concern, but that of the members of Parliament: “I would like to remind them that the
National Action Charter and Bahrain’s constitution is clear about this matter, and that
there is a legislative council that has been chosen by the people to represent them and to
convey their needs.”349 He said that the law needs to follow the legislative process in the
Parliament, and be presented to the Legal Affairs Committee which is comprised of
legal specialists, religious scholars, and researchers who are deeply knowledgeable in
these matters. After that, the law will be presented for a vote by the general assembly.
Al-Saʻīdī also made an assurance that the law is drawn from the Qur’an, the Sunna, and
will not be drafted from any source other than Islam. This is because, he argued, the
constitution clearly states that Islam is the country’s official religion, and on this basis,
the law will not be incompatible with Islam.350
Al-Saʻīdī’s position opposed that of the Salafi bloc. Upon the occasion of the
launch of the SCW 2005 family campaign, Salafi bloc members reported that they were
against the law because of the fear that it would violate the sharīʻa.351 In 2009 when the
Sunni draft came up for a vote, the three Salafi MPs, ʻAbd al-Ḥalīm Murād, Ibrāhīm
Abu Ṣandāl and Ḥamad al-Muhanndī were the only Sunnis to vote against it. The
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reason they gave is that they had consulted Salafi authorities outside Bahrain who had
advised them to oppose the law.352
The issue of whether the family law should even appear in Parliament drew
some of the most heated debate between MPs and judges. Shii Judge Shaykh Muḥsin Ᾱl
ʻAṣfūr and others who spoke during a conference of religious scholars disagreed with
al-Saʻīdī’s position. Shaykh Muḥsin agreed that the codified law was a necessity, but
said that members of Parliament and members of the appointed cabinet (Majlis alShūra) should not be legislators in this case, and nor should the law be subject to voting.
Because most legislators are uneducated about the specifics of sharīʻa, “subjecting
God’s laws to such parliamentary procedures is an insult to their dignity and
sanctity.”353 Even if it were to pass both councils without being altered, he said the law
would be subject to amendment in the future either by the Minister of Justice or by
royal decree, relying on an argument similar to the one used by Shii ʻulamā’. Another
speaker, ʻAbd al-Laṭīf al-Maḥmūd, argued that just because the constitution stipulates
that laws must be in line with the rules of sharīʻa does not mean that this will be the
case. He said one cannot trust politics, “as it is the biggest liar.”354
On June 20, 2003, three members of Parliament presented their views on the
enactment of a codified law at a seminar convened to discuss the issues surrounding the
law.355 ʻAbd al-Laṭīf al-Shaykh (Muslim Brotherhood), ʻAbdullah al-ʻAālī (Shii), and
Farīd Ghāzī (non-religious Economists bloc) presented their perspectives and welcomed
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questions and comments. Al-Shaykh began by saying that when he questioned the
Minister of Justice about why there was such a lengthy delay in the enactment of the
law, it stirred up a tumult in the streets, and that there was much confusion that needed
to be cleared up. He then defined exactly what is meant by codification: the
organization of rules found in the sharīʻa and setting them down on paper, and
establishing conditions that judges must follow. He said that these rules would only be
drawn from the sharīʻa, and argued that there is Qur’anic text that allows space for new
interpretations. Al-Shaykh explained that the principle of codification should not be a
sticking point: “The idea of codification is not an invention of bidʻa outside the sharīʻa,
rather we say that a study of the law must be completed from the perspective of those
who are specialists.”356 He said that regarding the issue of the unified law, there was
much talk about the difficulties of applying one law in two separate courts. Al-Shaykh
argued that it was entirely possible to work with one law without having to dissolve the
separate courts. He said that the majority of the law would apply to both sects, while
those issues on which there is sectarian particularity would be left to the ijtihād of the
judge.
Member ʻAbdullah al-Aʻālī spoke next, and affirmed his absolute opposition to
the law. Al-Aʻālī explained that codification is exactly what he is opposed to. He said
that the idea of codification originated in the West, and that even today, Western culture
treats women in an unjust manner. Supporters of codification had responded to the Shii
ʻulamā’’s opposition with the argument that Iran, a Shii-majority country with a Shii
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government had had a codified personal status law for some time, and that it had served
the population well. About the fuqahā’ (scholars of jurisprudence) in Iran, Al-Aʻālī
stated: “They were helpless before the authority of the Shah. They passed that law,
limiting sharīʻa. Even now in Iran we find fuqahā’ who are opposed to the personal
status law there.”357
Farīd Ghāzī defended codification, claiming that one will not find a personal
status law in any Arab country that is incompatible with the Islamic sharīʻa and makes
its demise necessary. Nor do you find a situation in which the Islamic sharīʻa treats
women justly and then the personal status law deprives her of that. This is because,
Ghāzī argues, “the law and religion are in agreement.”358 He lamented that, in his view,
“Bahrain is the only country that abandons a [whole] part of its people.” Ghāzī
dismisses as irrelevant the frequent charge of the opposition that the idea of codification
comes from the West, and that the term “personal status law” is a Western term: “The
term ‘personal status law’ is a Roman term, and ‘family law’ is an English term. But we
are talking about a law, not about terms.”359 He asserted that despite what
Representative al-Aʻālī said about the Islamic texts, the law will be drawn from sharī`a,
and from these texts. Ghāzī concluded with a comment about the opposition: “I don’t
find justification for…dividing the country into two Bahrains. They say that everything
that has to do with religion, even questions regarding the muezzins should be kept from
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Parliament. Should we establish a special legislative body for the ʻulamā’ so they can
rule on [these questions]?”360
The most dramatic stand taken by members of Parliament came after the SCW
launched their family law campaign in 2005. Together with the council of Shii ʻulamā’,
al-Wifaq organized a mass demonstration against the family law on November 5th.361
The rally was attended by over 100,000 people, a significant percentage of Bahrain’s
total population. Members of Parliament and the ʻulamā’ specified that it was not
codification itself they opposed, but codification by individuals who were not also
scholars of religion. They also opposed the unification of both sects into one law, and
the fact that any law coming out of the Parliament could be subject to amendment in the
future by the legislative body. Al-Wifāq’s chairman Shaykh ʻAlī Salmān stated that the
Shii bloc would support a codified law only if the constitution was amended to include
a provision that would ensure that, “no authority, even the two chambers of the
Parliament, has the right to deal with it…The law must be drafted and, if need be,
amended only by a religious panel.”362
Not all Shii members of Parliament agreed. Although he is Shii, member ʻAbd
al-Nabī Salmān was a member of the Economic bloc, and supported the 2005 family
law campaign. Citing economic stability and the needs of Bahraini women and children,
Salmān said he believed the country desperately needed the codified law.363 As a Shii,
Salmān tried to broker a settlement between al-Wifāq members and those who
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supported the law, but he was ultimately unsuccessful. Taking the position he did was a
risky move, as the next Parliamentary elections were to be held in November of 2006.
Salmān knew the risk. He described a meeting called by head of the ʻUlamā’ Islamic
Council Shaykh ʻῙsā Qāsim in the early spring of 2006. Qāsim had called all Shii
members of Parliament to meet with members of the UIC to discuss the family law. By
that time new drafts had been created by a new committee, one for each sect. It was
rumored that the drafts would be presented to Parliament sometime before the 2006
elections. According to Salmān, Qāsim had called the MPs together to instruct them to
walk out on the vote. If they refused, Qāsim threatened to withdraw his support, and
therefore that of the majority of the Shii population.364 Despite this threat, Salmān
continued to support the family law, and in November was voted out of his seat.

Supreme Council for Women
“Separated families and small children are the ones most affected by the absence of the
family law…The family law is a purely social issue and it is wrong to politicize it.” ʻIṣmat al-Mūsawī, SCW Member365

At the same time that the Nation Action Charter was being drafted, Ḥamad
created the SCW. Emiri decree #44, dated August 22, 2001 established the SCW as an
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advisory body with legal status to assess women’s status in political, civil, and social
life.366 Article 1 of the decree states:

The Supreme Council for Women is to be established
under the authority of His Majesty, have legal status,
and be considered an advisory body on women’s affairs
for all official agencies…It will express views and decisions
on issues directly or indirectly related to women’s status.
All official bodies will have to consult the Supreme Council
for Women before making decisions in this regard.367
The king’s first wife, Shaykha Sabīka bint Ibrāhīm Ᾱl Khalīfa was made the
chairwoman of the SCW, and the council included sixteen members who would be
appointed by the king. Shaykha Sabīka would choose the deputy chairwoman. The
council was empowered to perform duties including the proposal of public policy
regarding the development of non-governmental organizations; the prevention of
discrimination against women in public life; and the drafting of a national strategy to
improve the status of women and address various problems they may face. The
responsibilities of the SCW also included collaboration with ministries and other
government agencies as well as non-governmental organizations in order to put into
practice principles regarding women’s status laid out in the National Action Charter and
the Bahraini constitution; following up on the application of laws, resolutions and
international conventions regarding women; and the submission of proposals for the
amendment of existing legislation related to women; and the expression of views on
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draft laws and decisions dealing with women before they are referred to the appropriate
authority. The council was also authorized to recommend specific draft laws required to
improve the condition of women.368
In a significant statement of the king’s seriousness in regard to enacting reform,
he chose Lūlwa al-ʻAwaḍī to be the Secretary-General of the council. One of the two
first women lawyers to set foot in a Bahraini courtroom, prominent women’s rights
activist, and pioneering member of the Personal Law Committee, al-ʻAwaḍī would not
serve merely as a mouthpiece for the king. Other well-known champions of women’s
rights were also appointed to the council: Dr. Shaykha Maryam bint Ḥasan Ᾱl Khalīfa,
Shaykha Hind bint Salmān Ᾱl Khalīfa, and Dr. Munīra Aḥmad Fakhrū. From the start,
one of the initial tasks of the SCW was to begin preparations for the reform of the
sharīʻa courts, and the choice of al-ʻAwaḍī and the others with their histories of
activism affirmed the king’s earnestness to reach this goal.
On February 25, 2002, Ḥamad authorized the SCW to conduct a study on
divorce cases in the sharīʻa courts.369 In cooperation with the Ministry of Justice and
Islamic Affairs, the study was carried out by four women lawyers who were members
of the council and specialists in the area of family law. The study analyzed 306 divorce
cases with the primary goal of generating concrete recommendations for alleviating
some of the difficulties arising from both the processing of cases and the issuing of
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rulings.370 Specifically, the goals of the study were to ascertain the duties of the courts
according the code of procedure with regard to the time period within which appeals
can take place, and the conditions of retrial; to measure the time required for the courts
to hear initial petitions, the length of time it took these cases to be brought to a
conclusion, whether they were concluded solely in the court of first instance or if they
involved an appeal; to discover the standards used to determine the amounts and details
of nafaqa (maintenance) and sakan (wife’s housing after a divorce) rulings; and to
examine “the reasons for [why judges] abstained from applying the legal principles
found in the Qur’an in cases of marital discord.”371 Organizational meetings took place
in early April after which the council commenced the study.
The SCW’s findings echoed those which had been published by the PLC nearly
two decades before. Women who initiated divorce cases were left in “desperate
situations” as the majority of their cases were dismissed.372 Women in the Sunni court
often forfeited their rights and the rights of their children because of the difficulty of
proving their claims. In the Shii court, cases brought by women usually ended in
dismissal, or the judge forced the wife to pay compensation for a khulʻ divorce, despite
evidence of harm. With regard to nafaqa, the council found that neither court referred to
any objective standard when determining nafaqa awards, and did not take socioeconomic status, class, life circumstances, or the educational level of the children into
account. Several factors contributed to the reduction of awards, including administrative
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fees and the sector in which the husband was employed, for instance if he was not
employed in the public sector (in which salaries are easier to confirm), nafaqa awards
tended to be smaller.373
The most substantial problems occurred with regard to sakan, the provision of
housing for the wife after the divorce for a specified period of time. In 99% of the cases
examined in the study, following the divorce the wife and children were forced to live
with relatives due to the lack of housing provided by the husband. In the few cases in
which the husband was required to provide housing, the judge did not require the living
space to be furnished. These rulings seemed especially injurious to some of the wives
whose husbands were in the process of establishing a second family.374
In their final recommendations, the council advised amending the code of
procedures to include measures to expedite the processing of family-related cases; the
designation of a special court that would ensure the execution of rulings; and the
establishment of a nafaqa fund.375 They also suggested that the procedure of evidence
be amended in the manner of those rules in force in the personal status laws of other
Islamic countries. The council mentioned the rules of Kuwait specifically, which
require the wife and the close relatives to give oaths in cases in which the wife is
claiming harm.376
With the king’s approval, the SCW had also begun to act definitively on many
of the concerns that had been raised by women’s groups and its own study on divorce.
373

Ibid., pp. 4-6.
Ibid., p. 5.
375
Ibid., p. 8.
376
Ibid., p. 5.
374

216
In April of 2003, a special committee was established to provide legal assistance to
women who cannot afford it for themselves.377 The legal assistance committee worked
with the Ministry of Justice to arrange for lawyers who would be assigned to help such
women. To further assist Bahraini women in understanding their legal rights and
obligations, the SCW published a legal guide titled Women’s Guide to Judicial
Procedures in the Sharīʻa Courts.378 The guide covers both procedural rules for
initiating cases and women’s rights regarding substantive issues. Also in April of 2003,
the SCW secured authorization to establish a grievance unit to receive calls on all issues
of concern to both Bahraini and ex-patriot women living in the kingdom. 379 Field
offices were opened in all five governorates to receive complaints. The field offices
report to the Secretary-General’s office, which then studies the complaints and develops
solutions to the larger, systemic problems. The SCW then works with lawyers to
generate recommendations for legislation that could immediately address these
problems. The head of the Grievance Unit explained that calls began coming in to the
SCW in 2002, shortly after the council was formed.380 Between 2002 and 2004 when
the Grievance Unit officially opened, more than 11,000 calls had come in. 40% of these
calls were from women asking for government housing, most of them having been
thrown out by their husbands after divorce. 10% of the calls were from Bahraini women
who were married to foreign men, asking for official citizenship for their husbands
and/or children. Although the SCW does not have the authority to issue or amend laws,
377
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they can take formal requests to the king. The Grievance Unit is actively working with
the Ministry of Housing and Social Affairs to add housing options for divorced women.
They are also planning a campaign to change nationality laws at some point in the
future.381
In addition to these initiatives, on April 1, 2004, the king approved the creation
of a family counseling center in each governate for those families suffering from marital
disputes and domestic legal issues.382 The centers also provide supervision and
protection of children of such families in place of police stations which had been used
for this purpose previously. The SCW works together with the Ministry of Labor and
Social Affairs and the Supreme Council of Judges to instruct judges how to deal
appropriately with this issue.383

SCW Family Law Campaign
The government’s attempts to arrive at a family law draft in 2002 and 2003
failed partly because none of the parties involved could agree upon a unified draft, and
partly because the Shii population saw it as yet another attempt by the Sunni rulers to
subjugate them. The Shii ʻulamā’ had gained public support for their position, speaking
about the issue in Friday sermons, and giving statements to the press. In an effort to
counter the ʻulamā’’s presence in the public arena, the government formulated an
381
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extensive campaign to win public approval for the enactment of a codified law. The
campaign was organized and directed by the SCW. It began with the administration of a
public opinion poll. The SCW contracted the Bahrain Centre for Studies and Research
to survey Bahraini’s opinions on the question of the codified family law.
The study began in January of 2004, during which initial statistics and
information were gathered during focus and discussion groups.384 A sampling of an
initial glance at the main issues was prepared and examined. During the months of
February, March and April, the scope of the study was determined and questionnaires
were distributed. Analysis was completed and a final report was prepared in May and
June, after which the report was published. The study was completed using the
responses of 1261 Bahrainis, and covered seven chief topics:

1) the extent of the necessity to enact a law that codifies sharīʻa rules
related to the family
2) the role of the sharīʻa courts regarding the law
3) the competence of the sharīʻa judges
4) the Personal Status laws of other Arab and Islamic countries
5) the Parliament and its role in the enactment of a family law
6) how to deal with disputes between spouses in the different madhhabs
7) the basic elements presumed to be included in such a law.385
A variety of statistics about the group of respondents is presented in the report. 53.8%
of the respondents were female, while 46.2% were male. 70.3% were married, while
29.7% were single. Age groups of the respondents were broken down as follows: 18 –
24 years old, 25.5%; 25 – 31 years old, 21.1%; 32 – 40 years old, 28.9%; 41 – 50 years
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old, 16.4%; 51 – 60 years old, 5.9%; and older than 60 years, 2.2%. Educational
background was also taken into account. 6.2% of the sample completed less than
primary school; 17% completed less than secondary school; 46.2% completed
secondary school; 29% completed university studies; and 1.6% completed graduate or
professional school.386 The one statistic that is highly relevant to the family law issue
that was not included in the study is the sect of the respondent.
After being asked about their personal information, the respondents were asked
if they had knowledge of the rules and principles regarding the family currently applied
in Bahrain. A majority (58.8%) admitted that they did not have knowledge of such
rules. They were then asked if they thought it necessary to establish a codified law.
26.8% strongly agreed, 46.9% agreed, 14.8% were not sure, 9.8% did not agree, and
1.7% strongly disagreed that a law was necessary.387 The study included a breakdown
of the sex of the respondents to this question and found that of those who agreed or
strongly agreed, the majority were women (56.08%), and of those who disagreed or
strongly disagreed, a majority were men (64.38%). When asked if the law should be
drawn from the sharīʻa, an overwhelming majority answered that it should (66.9%
strongly agreed, and 30.1% agreed), while only 6% answered that it should not. A large
majority (28.2% strongly agreed, and 44.2% agreed) also believed that the enactment of
a family law would limit the occurrence of the break-up of families, and 20.2% were
not sure.388 Regarding the issue of whether to unify the law to apply to both sects, or
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keep two separate laws, the respondents were fairly evenly divided. They were given
four options and asked to choose the one they preferred: 30.1% preferred a unified law
for both sects; 34.6% preferred a unified law that would include separate sections for
each sect to cover certain issues; 29.8% thought the laws should be kept separate; and
5.6% did not believe any law should be enacted.389 Last, the respondents were asked
who should draft the family law. They were given three options: 1) a group of scholars
of jurisprudence (al-fuqaha’ al-sharʻīyyīn) and religious scholars (ʻulamā’ al-dīn), 2)
legislators, or 3) a committee composed of all of the above in addition to members of
some NGOs. A slight majority of respondents (53.6%) chose the last option, while
45.9% chose the first option, and only 12.1% chose the second.390
The public opinion survey was the SCW’s first step in attempting to establish
national consensus on the enactment of a codified family law. In the meantime, the king
made a move that shocked the nation. In March of 2004, King Ḥamad suspended six
sharīʻa court judges indefinitely. The six judges were some of the same judges accused
by Ghada Jamshir and the PLC of misconduct.391 They were replaced by judges who
were comparatively more qualified, younger, and more open-minded. Member of the
2002 family law drafting committee Zīnat al-Manṣūrī considers this a watershed
moment when the climate in Bahrain changed, and issues involving the sharīʻa courts
came out in to the open: “There is more transparency now. People exposed the
corruption and indiscretions. People are not afraid anymore to talk in the open about
389
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these things.”392 Al-Manṣūrī also said that the character of the courts had changed as
well, much for the better: “Some of the new generation of judges are more engaged with
society. In the past they held themselves above society. The new judges don’t just sit
and advise, they listen instead.”393 Although the king did not offer any explanation to
the public for his dismissal of the judges, observers attributed his decision to the work
of Ghāda Jamshīr, and especially, her exposure of the divorce case of Badriyya Rabīʻa,
a woman who lost custody of her two children due to a particularly poorly handled
case.394
At a press conference marking the occasion of Arab Women’s Day on February
1, 2005 Chairwoman of the SCW Shaykha Sabīka bint Ibrāhīm Ᾱl Khalīfa announced
the council’s intention to promote the promulgation of a codified family law.395 She said
that, according to the opinion poll conducted by the SCW, the enactment of the law is
an urgent demand of Bahraini society. Shaykha Sabīka asserted that the law would
solve many problems faced by Bahraini women, and would help support family
stability. She said it would also be based on sharīʻa, and would preserve the character
of the Bahraini family.396

A SECURE FAMILY = A SECURE NATION
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Secretary-General of the SCW Lūlwa al-ʻAwaḍī officially launched the SCW
family law campaign, “A Secure Family = A Secure Nation” in a press conference on
October 9, 2005.397 Al-ʻAwaḍī announced that the goal of the campaign was to raise
awareness of the role a family law can play in increasing social stability, preventing the
violation of litigants’ rights in the sharīʻa courts, and eliminating discrimination against
women. She said that the campaign would especially target housewives who may not
fully understand their rights or the way in which a codified law could secure them. The
campaign was designed in three phases. The first phase consisted of a series of public
seminars, press interviews, and the distribution of informational materials in public
spaces such as malls and plazas. The second phase analyzed the results of the first, and
the third would be based upon those results.
During the course of the announcements made by al-ʻAwaḍī and by the
Chairwoman Shaykha Sabīka, the SCW was careful to address those who stood on all
sides of the debate. Al-ʻAwaḍī noted the ʻulamā’’s rejection of the Parliament’s role in
future amendments to the law, and their fear that those amendments could entail the
removal of sharīʻa rules from the law, but said that the SCW was in the process of
negotiating with the government to secure regulations in the law that would prohibit
members of Parliament from making any amendments to the law without the approval
of leading Sunni and/or Shii judges and religious scholars. She stated that a focus of the
campaign would be to discourage people from closing their minds to the idea of a
codified law because of the objections that had already been raised against it by some of
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the ʻulamā’. She referenced the 2002 drafting committee and said that it was forced to
cease its activities because it was rejected by women who were influenced by the
ʻulamā’. Al-ʻAwaḍī stated that the SCW does support one, unified law that would
cover both sects because it would enhance national unity. However, she said that if
there is too much opposition to the idea, then having a separate law for each court
would be better than having no law at all.
In her press statement made on October 21, Shaykha Sabīka paid special tribute
to the women activists who had worked for the family law.398 She described their efforts
and reiterated their demands and goals, affirming their importance. She also portrayed
the SCW campaign as a national, inclusive project: “The Supreme Council for Women
welcomes the participation of everyone in the national campaign for the family law.”399
Both Shaykha Sabīka and al-ʻAwaḍī addressed the interest of those who support the law
in reform. Shaykha Sabīka spoke of the importance of regulations to “ensure a fair
judiciary system,” and that “such positive developments will help consecrate the
principles of the state of law based on the national reforms.”400 ʻAl-Awaḍī described the
family law as a legal obligation of the state: “The 1973 constitution and its amendments
highlight the government’s duties to protect family stability and the law is part of the
kingdom’s keenness on fulfilling its obligations.”401 That al-ʻAwaḍī referenced the 1973
constitution rather than the more recent 2002 one speaks to the discontent with the 2002
document that was still present. This important issue had to be handled carefully, as the
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women activist supporters of the family law as well as its Shii ʻulamā’ opponents
tended to agree on the fact that the 2002 constitution was a disappointment that belied
the king’s reform project.
In many of the SCW’s public statements, it was made clear that although the
SCW was a government agency, it did not have the authority to pass the law or to
dictate its contents. As mentioned above, al-ʻAwaḍī explained that the SCW was
negotiating with “the government”402 on the issue of the ʻulamā’’s concern with future
amendments of the law made by Parliament. She also highlighted the SCW’s role in
illuminating some of the problems occurring in the sharīʻa courts, and that the council
“had contributed to motivating the government to hold pay inspection visits and to
courts and evaluate judges’ performance.”403 In her statement, Shaykha Sabīka called
directly on members of Parliament to “initiate steps to promulgate the family law,”
making it clear that the law would not be forced on the country.404
Throughout the month of October, the SCW held seminars during the weekly
salons of members of Parliament, religious scholars, and women activists. In its
monthly newsletter, the council published quotations that supported, or seemed to
support the family law. Judges, ʻulamā’, members of Parliament, and prominent
members of society of every political and religious perspective were featured as being
in agreement with the campaign’s goals.405 Unfortunately for the council, the campaign
did not succeed in winning the public’s support. On November 5, al-Wifāq and the UIC
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brought over 100,000 demonstrators out in the streets to reject the law. This was not
merely a symbolic action. Shaykh ʻῙsā Qāsim issued a statement in the press asserting
that the Shiis would fight the law to the death if necessary: “our faith is more valuable
to us than our blood.”406
In November, the SCW admitted defeat. Secretary-General al-ʻAwaḍī cited two
primary reasons for the failure of the campaign. For one, the approach did not reach the
grassroots, such as housewives in the villages. As for the other, al-ʻAwaḍī blamed the
influence of the ʻulamā’: “The majority of women rejected the bill not because they
were against it, but because scholars did not want it. I thought that reaching out to the
entire population would be a simple mission because of Bahrain’s size, but I came to
know that some segments in society are unreachable because of their dependence on
their leaders…Most women who took part in rallies against the law don’t know much
about it.”407

CONCLUSION
As the SCW campaign was dying a quick death, two legal committees were
busily working. One Sunni, one Shii, the committees were formed by the king after the
results of the SCW’s opinion poll reflected that the country was divided on the issue of
unification. Separate laws were drafted for each sect, and rumors suggested that they
would be submitted to the Parliament for a vote before the 2006 elections. Responding
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to these rumors, members of the Shii ʻulamā’ together with members of al-Wifāq
convened an emergency meeting in which they discussed strategies for action. Speaking
to the press, Deputy Secretary-General of al-Wifāq Shaykh Ḥuṣayn al-Ḍayhī said that
submitting the laws to Parliament would be an undemocratic move on the part of the
government since the Shiis had already expressed their views on the subject: “During
the meeting, we declared our anger at the government’s move to send this issue to
Parliament without taking into consideration our views…We believe that this is a
dangerous proposal which is disrespectful of our sect and its views.”408 The 2006
elections came and went, and the laws were not submitted until January 3, 2009. Again,
Shiis resisted, and on May 14th the Sunni law was passed alone.409
As the shining symbol of a new, progressive era and the solution to many very
real and serious social problems, the government’s family law was supposed to be one
of Hamad’s crowing achievements. Unfortunately for the law’s supporters, the project
proved too contentious. Varying interests of the actors and institutions responsible for
bringing the law to fruition could not be resolved. Although the National Action Charter
promulgated in 2001 promised a truly representative government, the 2002 constitution
enacted on its heels belied this promise. After such a move, all initiatives were met with
suspicion. The family law plan generated even more mistrust, as it proposed to enter the
only area in which Shiis still had autonomy – the sharīʻa court. As the king responded
to the realities of Bahrain’s demography, the expectations created by an increase in
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political participation, and the pressures of public debate over the issue, the family law
became a political tool rather than a political goal.

